Given the popular perception in China that the military is more corrupt than other institutions, President Xi's pledge to ‘a harsh strike against military corruption’ may not have gone entirely well with the military establishment in China
The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping belied the very promising and optimistic assessments that were made by various analysts before the start of the visit. It was expected to be a milestone in the development of bilateral relations. The visit was expected to result in 20 agreements, a promise of $100 billion Chinese investment in India — as against a promised $35 billion by Japan and usher in an “orbital jump” in India-China bilateral relations.
However, while a number of agreements, numbering 16 in all, were signed, most of them elaborating on earlier agreements — such as the one on railways, the Chinese promise of $100 billion was finally reduced only to an “endeavour to realise an investment of $20 billion in the next five years.” By now, India has signed probably the largest number of bilateral agreements — numbering more than 75 in the last 10 years.
Notwithstanding these, the visit did not realise the potential of the first visit by a Chinese President to India in nearly a decade, because of developments surrounding the longest outstanding bilateral issue between the two countries — the boundary issue — in the Demchok region in ladakh followed by another major incursion in the Chumar region. These two intrusions which could not be resolved before the visit began notwithstanding established rules of procedure for defusing such situations in spite of the local Indian military commander’s request for flag meetings. As a result the bilateral discussions and, public discourse on the Chinese President’s visit, was hijacked by these intrusions.
Given the extreme sensitivity of the Indian public — not always justified by facts — it was not surprising that Prime Minister had raised India’s “serious concern over repeated incidents along the border” and suggested that “clarification of the line of Actual Control would greatly contribute to our efforts to maintain peace and tranquility.”
Certain issues need to be analysed critically and dispassionately. The first relates to the “incursions”. There is no question but that India and China have unresolved boundary issues and the two boundaries overlap, in such cases there are always chances of either party straying or doing patrolling in territory claimed by the other. In fact, when two such parties come in contact, it is an intrusion by each in the territory of the other.
The second relates to the timing of the incidents. The Chinese, given the intense reaction that was felt in India last year during the Depsong incursions, must have known — or should have known — the intense negative public dismay and reaction that would have resulted in India during their President’s visit, which would not only distract from the importance and significance of the visit but also eclipse any positive results that may have been achieved from the visit.
That brings us to the third question: Why was this doneIJ If it was done with the approval and concurrence of the President, it does not make much sense, unless, as has been said by many analysts, it was to send a message to India/Modi or test Prime Minister Modi’s resolve. The message certainly cannot be that India should move away from US/Japan as had been suggested by some. Actions such as the recent ones will most likely nudge more towards US and others. One possible scenario, if this action did not have the approval of the Chinese Government, is that it was a local action or an action by those controlling the actors engaged in such intrusions, namely the PlA. That is quite possible.
Since the 18th Party Congress in late 2012, CMC Chairman and CCP supremo Xi Jinping has sought to aggressively confront PlA corruption. First, early this year, Gu Junshan, who served as deputy head of the PlA General logistics Department, was charged with bribery and abuse of power, Then in July, Chinese General Xu Caihou was stripped of his CCP membership on Monday, becoming highest-ranking military official to be brought down by charges of graft. Xu had earlier served as vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, making him the highest military official during Hu Jintao’s administration.
Given the popular perception in China that the military is more corrupt than other institutions, President Xi’s pledge, made during a visit to a military installation, to “a harsh strike against military corruption” may not have gone entirely well with the military establishment in China. Therefore, it is quite possible, although improbable, that the military may be attempting to embarrass the President during one of his high-profile visit.
Finally, the question for resolving the lAC issue may need to be revisited. It is very highly likely that the Chinese conception of the lAC with India is identical with their current claims on their present international boundary configuration with India. The Chinese have been quietly engaging in cartographic aggression and this current boundary goes beyond earlier definitions of their boundary with India and includes even more Indian territory that the claim line that was given to India during the extensive high-level talks between Indian and Chinese experts that were held in 1960 extending nearly six months and spreading over nearly 60 meetings held in three different countries. India should insist on resolution of the lAC issue only after analysing what its response should be to such a development.
(The writer is Consulting Fellow, IDSA, New Delhi)