While many would argue that surgical strikes have increased the possibility of escalation, the recent telephonic conversation between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his Pakistani counterpart Nasir Khan Janjua reflects a broader strategy which the Modi Government (hopefully) could be following
As this piece is being written, a new debate seems to be picking up on whether the surgical strikes did really happen. While questions like these are not anomalous to a democratic set-up, they do reflect something deeper and profound.
They raise questions of mixed loyalties to the entity defined as state holding us hostage to rethink how the project of nation-state has evolved in post-colonial societies.
While revisiting the Indus Water Treaty, boycotting SAARC, and revoking MFN status to Pakistan can be invoked as multiple diplomatic options, one also needs to recognise that there is a development deficit in South Asia, institutional malfunctioning incapacitates water governance in India and Pakistan and people who reside on bordering regions bear the cost of war.
Given the costs that escalation entails, it would not be diplomatically unwise to think about de-escalating tensions. While many would argue that surgical strikes have increased the possibility of escalation, the recent telephonic conversation between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his Pakistani counterpart Nasir Khan Janjua reflects a broader strategy, which the Modi Government (hopefully) could be following.
The debate between surgical strikes and the diplomatic symbolism is embedded in the vocabulary of tactics and strategy. While strategy takes a long term and wider view of calculated means to achieve desired political ends, tactics are instrumental political moves and can be appropriately understood as strategy in operation.
There could be multiple tactics (military and diplomatic) employed in field of diplomacy to change the behaviour of the other State, and if seen in isolation, tactics could be confused with strategy.
Significantly, a strategist needs to connect all the dots to understand the strategy in place. The surgical strikes, in this context, need to be seen as tactics which could be part of larger strategy. Operational tactics in terms of surgical strikes can be perceived as a diplomatic signaling of sorts (to multiple audiences) to highlight the costs, which can be inflicted by the Indian defence forces in future. If one examines the response of the DGMO and the Government, surgical strikes come across as the least evil among the available diplomatic and non-diplomatic options. The vocabulary of pre-emptive strike clubbed with “proportionate” and “necessary” is something, which has been resorted to justify the use of force in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
The announcement by the Indian DGMO, lt Gen Ranbir Singh, that India has no intention of continuing the operations is a reflection of a measured response.
The diplomatic rationale of the tactical operation can also be seen as an instrument towards calling Pakistan’s bluff.
It is an appropriate negotiating strategy employed in situations where parties take a positioned stand. In this case, the denial by Pakistan to acknowledge the presence of terrorists on its territory is a pointer to that.
This has been countered by the media briefing of the DGMO when he noted that Pakistan was not following the commitments made in January 2004 and that it expects the Pakistan Army to cooperate with it, with a view to eliminating the menace of terrorism from the region.
Pakistan’s response of denial in this case is symbolic of refusing to take the bluff. In this context, it can be argued that the surgical strikes were a well thought-out tactical operation which has an element of diplomatic signaling embedded in it.
Calling the bluff is a significant moment in diplomatic practice. It could either lead to escalation or de-escalation. Strategy above tactics becomes significant in this context.
The strategy of de-escalation, therefore, needs to be undertaken with utmost seriousness, the lack of which can lead to diplomatic offence, inflicting diplomatic cost on India, Pakistan and South Asia as a region at large. Some insight can be gained from revisiting negotiation literature, which emphasises the need for removing cognitive biases when it comes to the art of diplomacy.
For this to happen, it is important that one understands the moral universe of the other based on its own merits, terms and conditions. The primary assumption, which rests behind this concept, is that it will be counterproductive to negotiate with an adversary if one does not understand the moral impetus which compels an adversary to act.
lyn Boyd Judson defines this diplomatic style as strategic moral diplomacy and argues that sometimes it can be strategically useful and even politically correct to assume that the arguments of the adversary are credible.
Significantly, even though it might look politically unwise to believe the moral claim that the adversary is making, in the long-term, it can help one achieve the end goals which serve the political objective.
This is an important argument, because the assumption that the other side is ill-intentioned never works in diplomacy, in fact it could strengthen the hardliners increasing the costs for engagement.
Pakistan, on its part, has been arguing that it is a victim of terrorism rather than a perpetrator of terrorism. One needs to take cognisance of this fact at the highest diplomatic level. This in many ways could open some channels of communication and help in de-escalating the situation.
Opening channels of communication between India and Pakistan is in the long-term interest of both countries.
First, the two neighbours are geographically proximate to each other and isolation at the regional and international level is not a conducive strategy.
While one might talk of scrapping the Indus Water Treaty, trans-boundary rivers can never be a credible deterrent. One needs storage structures which come at a cost of environment, rivers and people. Moreover, all these measures are long term, and require sustained political will and policy coordination.
Democratic spaces and electoral politics in India can be a potential game changer in this context. Besides, India is middle riparian in South Asia, and can be tweaked by an upper riparian China, if it politically desires to define itself as water hegemony.
As for Pakistan, it needs to recognise that while China and India might have divergence of interests at the regional level, there is a certain convergence of interests at the global level. Both the countries are rising economic powers and are important players in shaping the Asian century.
Second, it is important to separate people from its leaders.
Economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation are measures, which have long-term costs for the people of a country. The ruling establishment in Pakistan should think of the accountability it has to the ordinary Pakistani citizens. The civil and political society of Pakistan should realise that a positional discourse will strengthen the Army and radical elements, which exist in Pakistan.
Third, isolating Pakistan from SAARC is diplomatic myopic on India’s part. In the past, SAARC has played an important role in normalising relations between both countries. Other SAARC countries have played a role in opening some lines of communication between India and Pakistan. There are pressing challenges, which countries of SAARC face in terms of climate change, water issues, disaster-management, economic connectivity among others.
The South Asian University is a remarkable experiment of carving a distinct space for the youth of South Asia. It is a neutral space, where people of South Asia gather. Channels of communication are important mechanisms for learning and unlearning perceptions which one creates about the other. In the context of diplomatic engagement, it can be instrumental in managing conflicts and even transforming them if the political leaders are willing to be agents of transformation from above.
It is time to think of strategy. Focusing on tactics will only do harm than good and strengthen the voices of hardliners in South Asia.
As a long-term strategy peace is important — the ultimate political end goal. Diplomacy plays an important role in this context and channels of communication need not be closed.
Indeed, voices for peace should not be questioned — for they contain in them the wisdom for humanity to survive.
liddell Hart, a soldier scholar, emphasised the importance of strategy, when he noted that any kind of prolonged war only leads to mutual ruin. Hart is not alone to caution against war. Sun Tzu in Art of War and Kautilya in Arthashastra noted that war is only one of the options.
Needs of the people and minimising the costs of war are important parameters in their analyses. Thucydides’ History of Peloponnesian War is a masterpiece on the tragedies which war begets where he cautions against shades of political emotions which can get activated in war. De-escalation thus becomes a strategic imperative.
(Medha Bisht is Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal. She can be contacted at medha.bisht@gmail.com)