Some experts believe that even a remote chance of a Cold War II will be a boon for NATO, which needs to justify the necessity of such a huge military alliance
The Crimean referendum to secede from the Ukraine and Russia’s swift move to absorb it is likely to have impact on the world order post-Cold War era in which the US, the EU and their military alliance, NATO, are ruling the roost.
In all possibility, Russian President Vladimir Putin could take extreme steps to ensure that the Ukraine is not inducted into North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Therefore, the chance of a military conflict, though remote, cannot be ruled out completely as that could try to find solutions to some of the toughest problems in today’s multi-polar world: efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the continuing civil war in Syria, and wider disarmament ambitions, etc.
Also, the Obama Administration will find it harder to manage the complex logistics of the long-awaited withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan as Russia has been facilitating the transit of American troops to and from Afghanistan and both Washington and Moscow share an interest in ensuring stability in the region after NATO withdraws its troops this year.
Moreover, Russia is concerned that its withdrawal from Crimea may result in the West’s crawling of NATO forces toward the borders of Russia, thus jeopardising its security and weakening its strategic depth.
If the relationship between the West and Russia freezes over the Ukranian crisis, it will be difficult on the part of the US to seek Russia’s support in pressurising the Syrian government to reach out to a peace deal in the country’s ongoing civil war. Also, Russia may annul a final deal on the Iranian nuclear dossier by striking its own bilateral energy agreement outside the negotiating framework of the P5 + 1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany). Since 2006, the US has successfully garnered consensus among world powers with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme, the outcome of which were UN-sanctioned resolutions, followed by unilateral US and EU sanctions. Both these developments could result in setbacks for US President Barack Obama’s foreign policy.
Moreover, China, which is at a crossroads with no clear strategy regarding the Ukrainian crisis, is reluctant to stand with the West against Russia — a strategic partner and ally of Beijing that has never openly criticised it. On the other hand, it is also about the cardinal principle of Chinese foreign policy — non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and commitment to the territorial integrity of states.
China’s opposition to international interference in a country’s internal affairs as evident from the Western recognition of Kosovo independence to the American invasion of Iraq and to the US and EU military operations in libya has been one of the key principles of its foreign policy, which also resulted in Chinese “veto policy” in the UN Security Council. Such a posture has always coincided with Russian policy, generating a strong strategic partnership between states aimed at counteracting the diplomatic and economic power of the West. Indeed, Chinese aspiration to play a more proactive role in maintaining peace and security in the world as a responsible member of the international community forms one of the most important elements of Beijing’s policy. Kremlin will be pushed further towards China in the wake of Russia facing sanctions from the US and some other countries after it annexed Crimea from Ukraine.
Despite the breakthrough in US-Russian relations during the early years of Obama’s first term that included new START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) to reduce nuclear weapons, and Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organisation, the outcome of the Ukraine standoff will have an impact on nuclear non-proliferation. The White House also hoped for enhanced co-operation with the Kremlin over North Korea, Afghanistan, trade, and military-to-military engagement. Under the terms of the Budapest Memorandum (1994), international security assurances were central to persuading Kiev to agree to get rid of its nuclear arsenal.
On the legal aspect, Crimea’s secession cannot be regarded as remotely legal under the Ukrainian Constitution, as Article 73 of the Ukrainian Constitution states: “Alterations to the territory of Ukraine shall be resolved exclusively by the All-Ukrainian referendum”. International law does not recognise a right by any community to secede per se, but it also steers clear of prohibiting unilateral declarations of independence. So if Russian-speakers in Crimea voted to slice themselves off from Ukraine and throw themselves into the arms of the Russian Federation, no international court will raise much of a fuss, but neither would one take pains to defend the peninsula’s right to secede.
Condemning Russia’s military action in the Crimean Peninsula, NATO Chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen described the crisis as “the most serious threat to European security since end of the Cold War”. Observers feel that a return to the Cold War would be a boon for NATO since after the end of the Cold War in 1991, questions were being raised on the necessity and the need for such a huge military Alliance. Hence the re-emergence of Russian as a threat to the West will continue to provide justification for maintaining NATO and for the close Euro-Atlantic military co-operation.
(The writer is a PhD scholar)