India is debated, watched and prioritised in the Chinese outlook under multiple prisms. Neither does China foresee the supremacy of Indian power as akin to American power nor as a past power like Japan. India is seen more as a ‘potential power’. This may offer a positive bequest in China’s India dialogue
A consensus is emerging among the experts and academia around the world that Beijing’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping is in continuous transition. Core to this transition is China’s economic rise and the confidence that it has attained in the recent past. During the world economic slowdown, it was the Chinese economy that was the centre of stability and attraction. Its economic rise has helped China to pursue an action-driven foreign policy, with “proactive diplomacy” (zhudong shi waijiao) taking over from “responsive diplomacy” (fanying shi waijiao). Consequently, there is asynchronous focus on neighbouring as well as remote countries, minor and major powers, developed and developing countries, which was not the case of post-1978 “open China”.
Where does India figure in this Chinese foreign policy focusIJ
Most of the foreign policy debate in China is quite accessible today. Russia is a stable political as well as “strategic partner”. The influence of Russian power may have faded in Chinese outlook, but Beijing does value Russia as a most “dependable” partner in neighbourhood politics and regional as well as global affairs. The Chinese view of American power and Japanese power is also not clandestine. Beijing, under Xi’s leadership, has been quite expressive in its views about both the USA and Japan. American power is seen as the most “contentious” to China’s national interest while Japanese power is seen in rival terms, mostly as a “problematic” phenomenon in Asia’s contemporaneous footing. China views Japanese power as a story of the past, which nevertheless still causes some disquiet to China’s national interests, mainly in maritime matters. American power is still a dominant one, and remains most adversarial to China’s international presence and rise.
Unlike most of China’s contemporary debate on foreign affairs, the India debate in China remains relatively less known and less visible to the outside world. China’s current India debate is a stimulating occurrence that explicates contemporary China’s foreign policy density and versatility. Unlike in the 1990s, India has emerged as a vital focus in China’s foreign policy today. India’s standing has significantly increased in China’s contemporary outlook. India is debated quite frequently though restrictedly, and unlike in the past, China’s India debate is quite serious today. The fundamental notion of this Chinese seriousness is that “India is rising, and rising steadily”. At the same time, neither does China foresee the supremacy of Indian power as akin to American power nor as a past power like Japan. India is seen more as a “potential power”.
The current Chinese perspective is a culmination of the historical Chinese perspective of India as a neighbour, dating back to the British legacy, where civilisational discourses like Tibet, the Dalai lama, and the McMahon line were some of the factors. It is basically a culmination of an authoritarian and conservative outlook of a closed society that the Chinese state has pursued over the years as regards its immediate democratic neighbour. Nevertheless, India is being seen afresh as a “competitive” and a reasonable power. leaders like Xi Jinping and li Keqiang view India more within the hypothesis of a changing world order. India is currently placed higher in order. Even though China’s India debate is inaudible unlike its explicit outlook on the USA and Japan, still China’s India debate is multipurpose and rational. The new-generation leaders and their current perspective on regional and world politics bring these new elements into China’s India dialogue. China is open to debate and alteration, if required, in its outlook.
But how does the illustrious authoritarian Communist regime perceive the largest and representative democracy in the world todayIJ
Five correlated courses may be observed which more or less form the core of the Chinese state treatise about another country. These are: (i) the Chinese media’s perspective; (ii) the intellectual and scholarly perception; (iii) outreach of the economic community and its course; (iv) citizens’ perspective; and (v) the leadership’s thinking.
The Chinese media reporting on India offers the prime glimpse of China’s India debate. For the media, India is a matter for close attention. Most of their coverage is based on two versions: one focuses on culture, economics and social aspects; the other covers India from a “third eye” perspective. There is only occasional direct reporting on the Indian political scene in China.
The Chinese media feel more secure in reporting about India’s cultural, economic and societal facets, showing India in poor light, struggling as a democracy, vis-à-vis China’s success as a Communist phenomenon. This works to cast doubt among those Chinese citizens who may seek political change or introduction of more democratic values. The “third eye” perspective is linked with countries or issues that are adverse to China’s strategic or foreign policy interests. In this perspective, India is seen to be linked with countries like the USA and Japan and in an adversarial position on issues that are linked to China’s strategic or national interests. But as regards emotionally involved issues like Tibet and China’s “most wanted terrorist”, the Dalai lama, the Chinese media are quite vocal against India. In brief, the Chinese media outlook on India may be partial, judgemental and restricted; but it surely nurtures and influences the state discourse towards India.
As regards the intellectual and scholarly dialogue, there is a rising flavour to study and research about India, but the India studies curriculum still remains poor. Neither are the existing India study programmes on par with Japan or Russia or America studies programmes nor are they strong enough to generate any positive impression about India among the Chinese public or intellectuals. The India study programmes in universities or think-tanks are mostly constructed as part of South Asia study units. Orthodox university departments to study about Indian literature, culture and tradition do exist, but they lack dynamism and policy influence. Only recently, some mainstream universities and think-tanks have started studying India as a separate discipline, but most of these are agenda-centric, being backed either by Intelligence units of the government or the Communist Party. Or they are mostly ideological and social science-related, and not so much focusing on modern India’s cotemporary primacies. The usual mindset that India is not affable towards China circumscribes nuanced objectivity.
Modern China is a trading nation, which results in the business and entrepreneurial communities significantly influencing its foreign policy approaches. The Chinese business elite do not usually see India in a positive light. They see the Indian economy as a “rising” one, but not quite pertinent to China’s state or economic interests. There has been some interest among the Chinese business community to reach out to India in recent times, but it remains lukewarm. It sees India more as a nation struggling to take decisions. India’s complex bureaucratic and administrative culture in its turn tends to view Chinese business and entrepreneurial outreach with suspicion. This is fostered by the fact that business and economic contacts are part of China’s state political practice.
The Chinese citizens’ perspective of India is of a somewhat “mysterious and complex” country, though a graceful land of Buddha and religion. The attractions of Bollywood cannot compensate for the fact that India is the country where the Dalai lama resides. The common Chinese citizens generally may see India as deserving respect, but may be apprehensive of their government as regards advocating something that is pro-India or India-friendly. They also lack information to form a correct picture of India.
The current Chinese leadership account of India is that India is a “rising” power, and a spirited power in Asia. There is clearer understanding among them about India and its contemporary regional as well as global reach. The Chinese leaders and officials acutely follow India’s interests and undertaking as a power today. Domestic developments, foreign policy courses and India’s leadership thinking are taken seriously by the Chinese leaders and their disciples. Think-tank scholars and university teachers also partially help the Chinese leadership to update on India and its movement.
The current Chinese leadership outlook on India is diverse. Xi Jinping and li Keqiang do take India as a serious neighbour and as a prime country in Chinese foreign policy. Being unsure about India’s foreign policy approach and its global worldview, the Chinese leadership constantly remains vigilant about India. For China, India needs to be viewed seriously, particularly for the reasons of the Dalai lama and boundary dispute. India is watched under China’s neighbourhood policy, but more than that, the current leaders have seen India more as a “limited Asian partner”.
China’s links with India in sub-regional and regional forums like BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar), RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) negotiation process, and India’s joining in the China-proposed Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) are some indicators that explain that China does see India as an Asian partner, conceivably more as a limited or issue-based partner. The current Chinese leadership has also invited India to join China’s proposed Maritime Silk Route (MSR). It is clear that the Chinese leaders foresee India more as a competitive power. These perspectives can be noticed in China’s approach towards India at the regional level in different segments of Asia, from Central Asia to Southeast Asia to South Asia. Between an immediate neighbour to limited Asian partner, China and its leadership see India as a valuable multilateral partner or collaborator. India-China relationship in BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) climate grouping recites this portent.
The Chinese perspective to locate India as a multilateral collaborator is also associated with the fact that India is a developing country, and China’s collaboration with India at cross-continental or intercontinental or global levels can be beneficial to China itself. Beijing does comprehend that it is difficult to reform the Bretton Woods institutions single-handedly. India could be an effective partner in this matter or in establishing alternative institutions in Asia and beyond. At the same time, the prevalent Chinese perception of India is that it is not so much a “pro-China” country, being more attuned to American construct or worldview that is antithetical to China’s strategic and global interests, including sharing special ties with Japan.
In brief, India is debated, watched and prioritised in the Chinese outlook under multiple prisms. India is seen as an immediate neighbour and a conditional regional and global partner. This may offer a positive bequest in China’s India dialogue. Amid all this, Beijing does carry the outlook of a restricted and conservative notion on India, which remains a problematic discourse. It is practical for China to view India in multiple prisms because of the multi-polarity of world politics, and especially, in view of India’s emergence as a potential power in world affairs. But this outlook must be methodological and nuanced. The structural edifice in China, which is of a Communist command, does restrict China’s India outlook being better nuanced.
(Dr Jagannath Panda is Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Author’s write-up on ‘India’s China Prism’ will be published next week on Saturday Special Oped. The author can be reached at: jppjagannath@gmail.com)