A national brainstorming exercise to identify ‘out of the box’ options for resolution of the Tibetan ‘imbroglio’, long misperceived to be a liability for India, may not be out of place at this juncture — an alternative approach befitting two ‘civilisation-states’ that are ‘strategic partners’ for a dozen years now
Continuing with its focus on coverage of the Dalai lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in the Chinese Press, this second part of this article takes up the April 6 Global Times editorial (featured in full in the first part in this column on Saturday April 8, 2017) for detailed perusal, with an eye on possible leads to gauging the “goings-on” on the Chinese side.
The comparative reading of the Chinese and English versions of the editorial that is attempted below is aimed at exploring the implications of the carefully crafted projections of India (and India-China relations) for the two separate audiences targeted by China’s propaganda machinery — the domestic Chinese populace and external (Indian and other foreign) readers, respectively. Although it might seem to be textual analysis, it is the broader sub-text that is under the lens really.
The overall aim is to explore what insights, if any, can be harvested from such parsing.
Significant omissions
The most notable nugget emerging out of this comparative reading turns out to be the fact that in Chinese, the editorial is found to have avoided a frontal reference to the border dispute.
The stark description “disputed territory” used in the English version of the editorial w.r.t. “Arunachal Province” (or “A-province”, as it is often abbreviated in Chinese) had been avoided in the Chinese one. Instead, the Chinese editorial used the following more muted description to convey China’s claim to that area (referred to as “South(ern) Tibet” in Chinese lexicon):
“This is the South(ern) Tibet region of China”, after adding the word “so called” before the words “Arunachal Province in India” in the preceding sentence.”
A relaxed re-reading of the opening sentences of both versions of the editorial would make the significance of this point clear.
This (manner of covering the border issue in the Chinese Press) is in keeping with the consistent trend of coverage of India-China relations in the Chinese media in recent years (since ‘normalisation’ of relations post-1976), of the matter being played down. References to the border “dispute” are rare and subdued (as an “issue” or “problem”, not “dispute”). And no specifics of the claims and counter-claims of each side, such as the Chinese claim of Tawang or Arunachal Pradesh belonging to China, brought out in the public domain directly.
It is a positive feature, obviously, for it serves to avert complications stemming from an aroused public opinion, as elaborated later. It deserves wider, and more salient, note in the country than is the case at present — its value must not be lost sight of amidst disappointment at Chinese fulminations.
Dalai lama/Tibetan factor
Another noteworthy ‘omission’ pertains to the question of the role of the Dalai lama/Tibetan factor in Sino-Indian relations.
In the English version, the clause “thus the Dalai question became one of the problems that upset Sino-Indian relationship” replaces the anodyne words “which became his base camp” in the Chinese one.
Thus, quite clearly, that clause is an “add-on” — for external projection only.
It is almost a verity with commentators on Sino-Indian relations, not only foreign but also Indian, that the presence of the Dalai lama (and the Tibetan issue in general) has been a major complicating factor for the India-China relationship, and a liability for India in its dealings with China. But that is not what the above suggests.
Why has the charge of the Dalai lama being a casus belli in the Sino-Indian relationship (a central part of the externally projected Chinese narrative on Sino-Indian relations, swallowed in toto by apologists for China) been restricted to the English version of the editorial aimed at foreign audiences, and not included in the Chinese one meant for the domestic audience IJ
Might this be because it might not carry conviction with the Chinese peopleIJ Is there a credibility issue here (for the Chinese leadership) due, in turn, to the high standing the Dalai lama probably enjoys among large sections of the Chinese populace at large, despite unrelenting vilificationIJ The latter may be overtly irreligious under tutelage but inclined nevertheless to believe (in Buddhism or other religious orders) secretly. And perhaps even be harbouring a soft corner for India as the land of Buddhism (bolstered now by the new found popularity of Yoga post-2015 visit of PM Modi).
Indian culpability
likewise, how are the following caustic sentences in the Chinese editorial (dropped from the English version), to be understoodIJ
………..“This has violated all conventions regarding treatment accorded to the Dalai lama by New Delhi in recent years........ India’s use of the Dalai card in order to vent spleen at its frustration in multilateral forums is like flying into a rage out of humiliation (or losing mental balance out of anger and paranoia) ........The India of today comes out as a “tender faced but glass hearted” spoilt child (over sensitive and rather peevish). May be that Western public opinion, which never tires of directing fire at China in a bid to run it down, is coaxing India with a view to getting it to spoil everything (between China and India).”............
It is hoped that the Indian side will maintain calm and restraint and not pander to populist and nationalist public opinion. China ... wishes to patiently resolve some of the knotty problems between the two countries. ... (New Delhi) should be reasonable; it should not make capricious demands upon the Chinese side ....”
As a laboured attempt to justify the prickly official stance (on the Dalai lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh resulting in a downturn in relations with India) to their citizenry, obviously — by seeking to posit Indian culpability in the entire matter and to absolve China of all responsibility by presenting it as a victim of Indian shenanigans.
likewise the words shown in italics in the following sentence of the editorial in Chinese (dropped in the English version):
“The Dalai’s high profile sponsored visit to Arunachal Pradesh this time is widely seen outside and within India as New Delhi using the monk as a diplomatic tool to put pressure on China.”
Agent provocateur
Interestingly, the editorial does not dare to make bold to tell the Chinese people “who started it all” (the recent spat), a common sensical criterion used by most persons to draw their own conclusion about rival claims in any altercation that comes to their notice.
In the English version, there is a clear preface “When China raised the concern over the visit”, before bringing in Minister Rijiju’s remark that “China should respect India’s internal affairs”. But that preface is missing in Chinese. Thus the reader receives no indication that the Indian Minster’s remark was a reaction, not an initiation of a tiff by him.
Chinese readers are presented instead with a picture of an unreasonable Indian Minister making an aggressive “demand”, based on “strange logic”, unprovoked. With no mention, needless to add, of his remarks reaffirming India’s ‘One-China policy’ and with the following sentence helpfully added at the end of the paragraph (which the English version aimed at Indian and external audiences eschews completely, not surprisingly):
“Rijiju is India’s Bharatiya Janata Party’s youngest Parliamentarian, youthful and aggressive with a proclivity to project a proud (hard-line) posture.”
Bravado and Bluster
And finally, the following sentences in Chinese (dropped in the English version) reveal anxiety to reassure the populace that China retains the upper hand vis-a-vis India and that the matter will not go out of control:
“…its (India’s) dependence on peaceful cooperation between the two countries is likewise not as low as that of China... Indians must also consider how many ‘diplomatic tools’
China could come up with if it were to (be inclined to) develop them against India !”
General observations
Overall, the Chinese editorial is clearly more vituperative and shrill in its tone (than the English version, which is hard-hitting but not so charged).
This is rather unusual and needs explanation, for the general trend in the Chinese media is the other way round — the English language news platforms of China are ahead of the Chinese ones in signalling official displeasure and in conveying warnings in situations like these, in which Chinese diplomacy wishes to browbeat, or influence the behaviour of, the other side.
That is because anything that appears in the Chinese media, in Chinese, will be in full view of Chinese public opinion, and therefore requires the leadership to live up to it. That makes it difficult for them to backtrack or ignore transgressions or rejections of publicly articulated Chinese positions/demands (by the other side). It makes the leadership vulnerable to the charge of capitulation, or at least weakness — something that does not go down well with the Chinese people because of vile memories of China’s humiliation at the hands of foreign powers historically.
The propaganda machinery of the Chinese State, therefore, has to be extremely careful in giving public expression to any discord in the country’s external interactions. Differences are generally not made known to the Chinese people unless things have deteriorated beyond a certain point (such that withholding information about that setback is no longer feasible realistically).
The state of play in this regard is somewhat akin to answers to Parliament question (on external relations) in India and other democratic countries, where the Executive is extremely circumspect about what it places on record and very careful in striking the right balance between the competing considerations of avoiding charges of concealment, on the one hand, and of disclosure causing damage to national interest or working out to the advantage of the other side, on the other.
One reason for the strident tone of the editorial in Chinese meant for the domestic audience could be insecurity — a defensive mind-set hidden behind the demanding, school-masterly style of Chinese diplomacy. The above-mentioned markers suggest a certain diffidence on the part of the Chinese leadership in facing the court of its public opinion.
Editorial in perspective
That blip apart, it has to be noted that the substantive (information) content of the editorial, and of other items and commentaries on the subject (not featured here) as well, has been in keeping with the general trend noted above — of caution in reporting, lest matters go out of hand.
[The English language Chinese press, of course, has had a field day in hitting out at India wantonly but it means nothing since it does not represent anything authentic (unlike content in the Chinese Press, which is a record of the leadership communicating with its people); only propaganda material. But it is what makes the headlines and so gets attention in our country, unfortunately, to the total neglect of the real stuff in Chinese. It is ironical that it does not strike anyone as anomalous that the entire discourse on China in the country should be based on material in English helpfully provided by the Chinese to peddle what they wish you to know or keep your attention on, away from their weak points!]
Right from the time of the first official Chinese statement on the subject, which came on October 24, 2016 (at the US Ambassador’s remarks of October 21, expressing support for India’s claim to Arunachal Pradesh after his visit to Tawang) and the second a few days later, on October 28, 2016 at the time of GOI’s announcement of permission for the Dalai lama to visit Tawang. These, and subsequent statements (including the one on February 15, 2017 on protests over the visit of the Taiwanese legislator’s delegation to India which had an obvious bearing on the “One-China” question), were reported upon (in the Chinese language press) more or less factually, not in a charged manner, or not at all.
All the way up to March 20, 2017, when the official spokesperson’s statement urged India to “respect China’s core interests…” This was w.r.t. inauguration of the international seminar in Rajgir by the Dalai lama in the company of the Union Minister for Culture. But even then, it (this official protest statement) was, notably, not reported in the Chinese Press, official or Global Times.
Subsequent statements, after commencement of the Dalai lama’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, were increasingly more hard hitting but not reported in the Chinese Press again until the editorial of April 6. That was the first high-pitched attack in Chinese, and it seems to have come after perceived official GOI and Arunachal Pradesh government’s (publicly visible) involvement in the visit arrangements etc.
Conclusion
Interesting and revealing though it is, a single editorial can hardly serve as the basis for definitive conclusions, even if it be contextualised and seen against other commentaries.
It can only illustrate the potential value of regular monitoring of the Chinese press, as an aid to clearing the haze created by the powerful propaganda machinery of the Chinese State. The latter is extremely adept at obfuscating perceptions of adversaries, as part of the favourite Chinese stratagem of seeking to manoeuvre them into a position of (psychological) disadvantage. In this context, the possibility of India underestimating its soft power in China hinted at by this foray into Chinese media coverage is a valuable lead. It should not to be dismissed without due consideration.
The jury is still out as to what it all adds up to. In the absence of conclusive evidence, the default hypothesis naturally has to be one of abundant caution — the straightforward one that the Chinese verbal virulence portends harsher diplomatic consequences that can be expected to seek to pre-empt perceived possibilities of (further) changes in long-standing Indian policy practice pertaining to Tibet (and the Dalai lama), amongst others. It would be necessary to prepare for that contingency.
A national brainstorming exercise to identify “out of the box” options for resolution of the Tibetan ‘imbroglio’, long misperceived to be a liability for India, may not be out of place at this juncture.
Frontal repudiation of the existing “one China policy” is an, but not necessarily the best, option. Even though that approach has resulted in India “giving away something for nothing” — a very basic blunder in diplomacy — repeatedly (i.e. more than once, not just at the time of the primordial error of the 1954 Agreement recognising China’s “sovereignty” over Tibet consequent to the PlA’s march into Tibet, instead of just “suzerainty”), the remedy may not lie in consciously committing a countervailing “wrong” in the hope of setting the first one right.
But neither will it do for India to simply continue to be a spectator to decimation of Tibetan Buddhism and culture, quintessentially Indian.
A forthcoming article will explore possibilities of an alternative approach in the framework of a radical review of India-China relations in their entirety, not just the Dalai lama or Tibet issue in isolation. As befitting two “civilisation-states” that are, moreover, self-declared “strategic partners” for a dozen years now, no matter that one of them had no compunction in mercurially jettisoning the “bhai-bhai” relationship with a “bye-bye” in less than a decade in the initial round of their interaction as newly independent nations.
[The author is a former diplomat with a China background. He anchors the “India in the Chinese Media” project of the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru, monitoring the daily coverage of India (and its neighbouring countries) in the Chinese Press (www.niasindiainchina.in)]