The Pathankot attack has once again muddied India-Pakistan peace process. It remains unclear if Pakistan has made a genuine commitment to better bilateral ties or, more importantly, if Rawalpindi and Islamabad are on the same page
The Pathankot attack raises one key question: Does Pakistan really want improved relations with IndiaIJ It was hoped that the Indian Prime Minister’s sudden visit to lahore will bring about a thaw in the strained relations and strengthen peace negotiations. It was also anticipated that both state and non-state actors of Pakistan will adopt devious means to scuttle the peace process. This has been the pattern in the past, and history has now repeated itself.
The moot question that now arises is, if the terror attack had the backing and blessings of the Pakistan Army. The answer seems to be yes. It was hoped that the peace process, initiated by the two Prime Ministers, would enjoy the support of the Pakistan Army which controls Pakistan’s foreign policy. But that seems unlikely.
Pakistan’s National Security Advisor General Nasser Khan Janjua is a trusted confidant of the Army chief, General Raheel Sharif, and will endorse the decisions which have the backing of the Pakistan Army. Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a risky decision, knowing well that peace with Pakistan is a difficult and complicated process, and that his counterpart in Pakistan is not the master of the house.
There are a number of state and non-state actors influencing Pakistan’s policy towards India and there is an ever-present danger of sabotage of the peace dialogue. The pattern seems to be the same. Whenever India-Pakistan relations seem to be on the mend, the Pakistan Army ratchets up tension and scuttles chances of understanding.
But Mr Modi also feels that India’s economic development cannot be realised unless there is peace in the neighbourhood. India can fast develop its economy only in a cooperative and peaceful region. Also, in his election speeches, Mr Modi had promised a robust response to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. He now understands the need for maintaining peace with Pakistan, but at the same time does not wish to appear weak.
It was calculated by the mandarins of the External Affairs Ministry that after the Paris attack, there has been a strong international opinion against those helping and harbouring terrorists and abetting their acts of violence. The point was probably driven home to the General Sharif during his visit to the US.
It was also felt that the changing scenario in Afghanistan will have a sobering impact on the Pakistan Army. In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s diminishing control over the Taliban has caused a serious loss of face before the US and Western powers. Today, the Afghan Taliban no longer fully trusts Pakistan.
The proxy war against India is also failing to carry conviction among large sections of people in Pakistan. There is some kind of consensus among the political parties in Pakistan for peace with India. But if peace negotiations are to succeed, the Army has to make serious efforts to rein in the terrorists.
The US has urged Pakistan to walk the talk in dealing with terrorists but it is doubtful how far America will be able to change or influence the Pakistan Army’s policy of encouraging cross border terrorism and coddling groups like lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jaish-e-Muhammed in order to bleed India.
India has clearly linked the progress of peace talks to Pakistan’s action against terrorist groups responsible for the attack. The ball is in Pakistan’s court. Though Pakistan may promise action against the terrorists, past experience shows that very little is likely to be done in practice.
Prime Minister Sharif is in no position to overrule the ISI. Some cosmetic, face-saving measures may be taken, but there will be no meaningful action. India has not fixed a time-limit but expects a prompt and positive response from Pakistan. India should stay the course, carry out peace negotiations but make clear that no lasting understanding with Pakistan is possible unless Pakistan gives up proxy war against India.
India has to exercise flexibility while demonstrating extreme dissatisfaction through appropriate statements. It also has to prepare itself for a robust retaliatory response if any further attack takes place. While improving preventive capacity, it must keep its powder keg dry.
That said, it must be acknowledged that India’s options for giving a befitting reply to Pakistan are limited. Economic sanctions are not of much use in the absence of extensive trade and commerce links. Overt military action carry the risk of an uncontrollable escalation and even nuclear war. Surprise air-strikes, without retaliatory risks, may not be feasible. Covert tit-for-tat terrorism may or may not be effective. But options has to be explored to inflict pain on Pakistan whenever serious terrorist strikes originating from Pakistan take place.
The post-attack blame game has already started. Many are finding fault with National Security Advisor Ajit Doval for deploying the National Security Guard and not acting swiftly on the available intelligence input. Failure to prevent entry of the terrorists into the airbase has also been criticised. The fact, however, cannot be gainsaid that because of the actionable intelligence and swift action on the intelligence received, strategic assets could be protected and terrorists eliminated before they could enter ground zero.
It will be good to suspend judgement till a full enquiry is held and all facts unearthed. The loss of soldiers’ lives is most unfortunate, but if the terrorists had succeeded in attacking some of the military targets, there would have been colossal outpouring of anger and perhaps public pressure on the Government for precipitate and perhaps knee-jerk reactions.
(The writer is former Director General of National Human Rights Commission and former Director of National Police Academy)