India’s win highlighted Pakistan’s weaknesses, but also proved that, even post-Nehru, the country would hold together as a democracy, capable of taking care of itself
As important for India as the military outcome of the 1965 war with Pakistan — this country clearly had the upper hand — which ended 50 years ago on September 22, were some other consequences. One was a huge boost to the Indian Army’s standing which had suffered following the 1962 war with China. Its men doubtless battled incredible odds. Consider the battle of Rezang la in ladakh, where men of the 13 Kumaon Regiment’s C Company scripted one of the most glorious chapters in the world’s military history. Clad in summer uniform, they were armed with 303 lee Enfield rifles and 600 rounds of ammunition each and, between all its three platoons, had just six light machine guns and few two inch mortars. Thanks to a mountain feature, they did not have artillery support. The Chinese, on the other hand, had 7.62 mm self-loading rifles, medium machine guns and light machine guns. Further, they had 120 mm, 81 mm and 60 mm mortars; 132 mm rockets and 75 mm and 57 mm recoilless guns for use against bunkers.
Undaunted by the odds, the troops fought to the last man and the last round. Finally, when quiet fell, there were only 14 survivors, nine of them seriously wounded, out of the C Company’s total strength of three junior commissioned officers, 124 other ranks and the commander, Major Shaitan Singh, who was posthumously awarded a Param Vir Chakra. On the other hand, the Chinese, according to conservative estimates, lost over 500 men before over-running the Indian positions.
While Rezang la stood out, out-numbered, out-gunned and out-provisioned Indian troops fought valiantly at a number of places before being overwhelmed. The fact of the Indian Army’s general defeat, however, had dented its reputation and Field Marshal-turned President Ayub Khan of Pakistan boasted that one Pakistani soldier was equal to 10 Indian soldiers. A section of the Western Press suggested that the reverses were also due to the fact that Indian troops were commanded by Indian and not British officers!
The 1965 war put paid to all that. Instead of heroic battlefield reverses at places like Rezang la and Walong, there were heroic victories like the ones at Asal Uttar — the turning point of the war and the biggest tank battle since World War II — Phillora, Burki and Dograi. Pakistan lost 97 tanks, 72 of them Pattons of the latest variety, at Asal Uttar. More, India won its victories despite the Pakistani Army’s possession of superior armour, supersonic F-104 Star fighters and a far greater store of ammunitions.
In Pakistan, people knew what had happened despite all the propaganda by a captive media. Particularly the fact that the Indian Army had reached the outskirts of lahore was not lost on the inhabitants of Pakistan’s second largest city. Hence, it could not have been lost on the rest of the country. The erosion this caused in Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s image and its Army’s credibility, led to agitations, Ayub Khan’s ouster, and the elections of December 1970. Besides, east Pakistan was left virtually undefended. While this convinced a large section that the country’s federal Government could not care less about the wing’s security, the fact that India did not bomb or attack it despite its soil being used for the air attack on Kalaikunda airbase in Orissa, was not lost on the inhabitants. It became yet another factor in deepening the alienation that eventually led to the creation of Bangladesh.
The 1965 war also showed that post-Jawaharlal Nehru India could not only hold together as a democracy but successfully fight a war. If lal Bahadur Shastri’s ascent to prime ministership had answered the question, “After Nehru whoIJ”, the war answered the question, “After Nehru whatIJ”. The answer was: India would continue as a robust democracy capable of taking care of itself.