The first public feting of a visiting Chinese leader since the halcyon times of Zhou Enlai's maiden visit of 1954 was pitched just right — genial, and gracious, but by no means euphoric or even unduly effusive — in keeping with the current forward looking mood in the country but also mindful of the sea-change in the climate of relations since the heady days gone by. With its location in his home State, the setting was conducive for the host to concentrate on preliminaries away from confining environs of the national capital and reserve hard talk for later.
Atmospherics apart, the visit could safely be said to be successful on substantive aspects as well, going by what can be gauged from the two documents available — the Prime Minister's statement to the media made in the presence of the Chinese President and the Joint Statement released on Friday — and the visuals of the photo ops.
The media statement suggests a play of forthrightness with tact. Prime Minister Modi would seem to have come straight to the point, after pleasantries: that the heart of the problem with India-China relations was lack of “a climate of mutual trust and confidence”. (This was underlined by a similar oblique note of caution about proposals for improved physical connectivity in the Asian region, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor in particular, which he said he believed also "require(d) a peaceful, stable and cooperative environment, and a climate of confidence, in the entire region.
The difficult issues were not glossed over. It was “necessary to resolve” the “repeated incidents along the border”, the visitor was told. Also “strict observance” of the “important understanding between the two nations” that “peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes the essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realising the potential of our relationship”. Further, there was need for “an early settlement of the boundary question”.
The visiting dignitary cannot have missed the message, fearlessly frank but sincere, at the same time, in the desire to reach out and impart a more purposive turn to the troubled relationship than hitherto, on the basis of mutual respect.
However, President Xi stuck to his prepared statement, in his remarks following his host's, advancing the undefined boundary as a reason for such incidents implicitly. He was without an answer to the (preemptive) suggestion of his host that resumption of the stalled process of “clarification of the line of Actual Control (pending a settlement) would greatly contribute to…. peace and tranquility”.
The Joint Statement would appear to confirm the above reading — of the undercurrent of the meeting being a clear message from the Indian side about the need to build trust.
Some idea of Modi's impress on the tenor of the discussions can also be had from the clear preference for pruning past excesses of rhetorical flourish, and for guarding against vague formulations that lock India in a web of words — seemingly harmless but causing confusion on the global strategic plane — which runs right through the document. It is markedly milder in tone, and balanced in content, as compared to all previous ones in recent times (the May 2013 one upon conclusion of Prime Minister li Keqiang's visit, most directly).
Thus a new twist has been given to the 2005 “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” (concluded ahead of Japan, inexplicably, and without any tangible quid pro quo on even on the Indian Security Council candidature, let alone the all important questions of defanging of the Sino-Pak nexus and a settlement on the border), presumably in recognition of the extremely weak foundation of its original conceptualisation and subsequent embellishments. A “developmental partnership” (leveraging 'mutual complementarities, and based on mutually reinforcing growth processes and developmental goals pursued in a mutually supportive manner') is to form its “core component” now. Not the undefined “convergence on global issues” or platitudinous exhortations to substantiate it without spelling out how, of yester years, neither of which figures in the document.
And no allusions are made to the India-China relationship as “an effective model of friendly coexistence” as an “example for relations between big, neighbouring countries”; or to its “global and strategic importance”, or to “strategic convergences” such as their “shared interest” in a multi-polar world, etc, as before. Instead, the watchword now appears to be plain and simple beneficial bilateralism focusing on tangibles. Such as the target of $20 bn Chinese investment in the next five years, backed up with a Five Year Trade and Economic Development Plan and agreements for upgradation of Indian Railways.
More than what is said, it is what is not said or repeated (in both the Joint Statement and PM’s media statement) that should gladden the hearts of hard-headed strategic analysts maintaining a watch on the international chess board for it leaves India free of baggage, and freer to roam the strategic landscape.
The Joint Statement is not entirely without rhetoric though, despite its much improved cogency overall. For example, the paragraph on global affairs: “The promotion of a multi-polar world, economic globalisation, cultural diversity and information revolution are high on the global agenda. The two sides will make joint efforts to democratise international relations…..” This is tall order, well beyond the ken of the two “emerging economies” hoping to usher in an Asian century. There are other instances too — the cobwebs cannot all be cleared naturally at one go.
All in all, the Indian side would appear to have acquitted itself well, with a well thought out strategic approach for resetting the equation in what is indisputably the nation’s most important relationship on the basis of a fresh look at the state of play uninhibited by the inheritance from the recent past. This was long overdue but advantage of a makeover could not have been reaped in the absence of disruptive ‘new think’ inspired by a leader with ideas of his own.
The Chinese side would certainly not be short of food for thought on returning home and the scene now shifts to the next round, in a ‘so far so good’ scenario. For, after all, this was only the first substantive meeting covering comprehensive ground. It was a ‘getting to know each other better’ meeting, both literally and figuratively.
A word about translation/interpretation: Even with his rusty Chinese, this writer could detect some fumbling when it came to the sensitive paragraphs, the first of the three on the border mainly - enough to raise doubts whether to the import of the remarks would have gone across accurately. Overall flavour yes, but precise meaning IJ Hard to say.
It is a shame that a country of our size and numbers does not have a handful of persons with felicity in language enough to interpret for our leaders, necessitating reliance on personnel provided by the other side.
A more basic shortcoming than the pitfalls of interpretation from Hindi (or English) to Chinese is the fact of there being gaps between the Hindi and English versions of the PM’s Statement (and in both vis-à-vis the one actually delivered). Though there were no howlers, or errors of consequence, requiring immediate corrective action, there were several omissions and inaccuracies that are inexcusable. The crucial sentence “We should seek an early settlement of the boundary question” comes in at a wrong place — at the end of the second of the three paragraphs on the border, whereas it was made by PM at the end of the first. That altered juxtaposition makes a (big) difference to the intended emphasis of that sentence.
Clearly, remedial action on these weaknesses on the language front is called for very urgently.
(The write is former Ambassador of India to the UN and other International Organisations in Vienna, Austria, Ireland and Vietnam. At present, he is Adjunct Faculty, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru)