In its almost 100 days of staying in power, the BJP Government has made substantive footprints in the discourses around neighbourhood policy
On May 16, when Indian premier Narendra Modi invited the heads of States and governments of South Asian countries and Mauritius, it appeared at least symbolically that a “South Asian moment” had arrived. The gathering was a reminder to the fact that democracy has indeed made a mark and the potential “idea” of South Asia could perhaps take roots in the 21st century. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Modi’s mandate in India has significantly indicated that for the next five years, Indian foreign policy will not be hostage to coalition politics.
Against the backdrop of hopes and aspirations, could one envisage the beginning of a South Asian momentIJ In its almost 100 days of staying in power, the BJP Government has made substantive footprints in the discourses around neighbourhood policy. While Bhutan was the first destination in the Indian PM’s itinerary where he articulated the vision of Indo-Bhutan relations within the broad ‘B4B’ (Bharat for Bhutan and Bhutan for Bharat) framework, the External Affairs Minister chose Bangladesh as her maiden destination, with outreach to all the sections of society as her primary dictum.
Underlining that bilateral relations will be “country to country and government to government”, the idea of prioritising institutions over individuals was emphasised. The interpretation of this articulation is significant in the wake of the controversial elections which were held in Bangladesh in early January this year. Almost a month later, Sushma Swaraj visited Nepal to co-chair the Indo-Nepal third Joint Commission meeting held after a gap of almost 23 years. While frameworks and institutions for cooperation do exist between the two countries, they have been inoperative for years, where the talks often do not walk its path in a time-bound manner.
An interesting issue which emerged amongst the gamut of other areas discussed was the finalisation of Power Trade Agreement (PTA), the text of which is yet to be finalised. An important element of the agreement would be a guarantee to private developers that power will be purchased in India. In this context, the agreement will witness some discussion given the Indian premier’s visit to Kathmandu in early August.
With much activity on India’s diplomatic engagement with her eastern neighbours, will New Delhi go past the shadows of the Nehruvian era and beyond, when the Indian neighbourhood policy was criticised for being a mere colonial extension. This discourse had certain unintended consequences — as against the backdrop of Cold War and jingoistic politics of the subcontinent, the very idea of South Asia was fossilised within a strategic framework where civilisational values and common past were often interpreted as a euphemism for India’s regional primacy, and got entangled in identity discourses. As a result, even though terms like beneficial bilateral and Gujral Doctrine were pronounced, they failed to have a sound diplomatic resonance, often meeting domestic resistance.
The appropriate question at this juncture should therefore, be — will the Modi Government make a break from the past or will we be served old wine in a new bottleIJ While it is too early to be optimistic about these maiden visits, there are three templates that the BJP Government could offer to India’s eastern neighbours. While the first template relates to more continuity than change, it entails distributive strategy. The second entails continuity in change, and entails accommodative strategy. The third entails more change than continuity and entails integrative strategy.
Distributive strategies entail claiming tactics, where parties do not easily make concessions. Zones of agreement shrink as other linked or not-so linked issues are held hostage to it. If one goes by the history of India’s neighbourhood policy, often distributive strategies have been used to deal with neighbours. For instance, security is the precondition for economics. This precondition often stems from the geography and gives rise to the geostrategic logic to dominate. Moreover, fragile democratic culture and favouring personalities over institutions often gives rise to trust deficit amongst various stakeholders, which impacts bilateral relations. If the Modi Government will follow this template, little would be achieved. While it is good to learn lessons from the past, to become a hostage to it will be detrimental for the region. Thus, be it the connectivity or river sharing agreements with Bangladesh or power agreements with Nepal, less will be achieved without changing the frames of engagement. Unless or until the prosperity of the region is prioritised, and micro/bilateral policies are a subtext to it, little will be achieved. The vision of South Asia is therefore, something to ponder upon. Water, energy, food, connectivity, trade and focussing on the strengths of geography rather than its weaknesses are the key. Creating a right environment to facilitate negotiations is important.
An accomodative approach was primarily seen during the brief period of the Janata Party and the United Front when concepts and ideas such as bilateral beneficialism and Gujral Doctrine were introduced. Concepts like non-reciprocity, neutrality and non-interference made little headway and these ideas were only partially successful. In fact, some were even hostage to the nature of polarised polities in Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan, where benign policies were seen to be rewarding individual leaders in those countries. If the Modi Government adopts this template, nothing new would be offered. Bilateralism would dominate bypassing the idea of the region. This trajectory could be endorsed in the policy circles, given the growing inroads of China into South Asia, further entrenching the ‘fear of the other’ syndrome.
Integrative strategies explore common solutions and are driven by problem-solving approaches thus, increasing the zone of agreement. Regionalism and multilateralism facilitates this approach. While such strategies are rare to find at the regional level, a good example of such strategies is the Indo-Bhutan relations. Operation All Clear of 2003 when Bhutanese army pushed out anti-India elements out of its territory, the mutually beneficial hydro-power agreements, which has given a boost to Bhutan’s GDP, and cross-border cooperation with hotline pursuits between both countries are a few relevant examples. While Indo-Bhutan bilateral arrangement has already proven that such approaches offer diffused benefits, there should be a strategic imagination to respond to integrative strategies. A regional imagination based on creating value or problem-solving approach which goes past the bilateral framework, where issues are not compartmentalised but seen within the larger grand strategic framework of South Asia is therefore, important. While one might argue that given India’s economic rise, the parameters of India’s neighbourhood is being redefined; one should not forget that India will have to tread its path through its immediate neighbourhood i.e., South Asia. Engaging China, facilitating regional connectivity and trade are some ways to deliberate upon.
A way out, therefore, is to recast the neighbourhood policy. Creating an environment of confidence, is perhaps then the most feasible way out. Under the National Democratic Alliance, India could be at the threshold of making new foreign policy initiatives. Recently, the statement given by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi is quite insightful. The Minister noted that “the new Indian Government had injected new vitality into an ancient civilisation.”
Was the Chinese foreign minister pointing to South Asia with soft borders or was it an invocation of a well-connected South Asia, in which both India and China can be major players, is something to be reckoned with. This statement could be significant, as India’s neighbourhood policy at least in the perception of neighbours, seems to be carrying the burden of British colonial past. Since one has now moved past the shadows of the 60s and 70s, and the South Asian environment has changed to a great extent, with significant stakeholder base emerging in countries such as Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, one needs to package the Indian Foreign policy in a different way. Integrative approaches built around the vision for South Asia seems to be penultimate grand strategy for the Modi-led Government.
(The writer is Assistant Professor, Dept of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi)