Given the nation's unique political arrangement, it is to be seen how ‘complete economic transformation' will shape and converge in the new Constitutional scheme
The 13th National People's Congress in China has drawn anticipated interest from scholars and experts in the country. Given the steps to amend ‘two-term' limit on the Presidency in China, the question of its larger implication on domestic politics and China's outreach efforts remains a matter of analysis.
While the domestic media hailed the development, citing its concurrence with the realisation of ‘China dream', the global media has identified this change with the proverb ‘President Xi forever' in China. While noting the limitation of Western notions to understand the politics in developing world, The Global Times editorial identified “strong party leadership” a key component to China's growth.
Interestingly, the office of the President has not always remained important in China where we have seen examples of Yang Shangkun (1983-1987), or even li Xiannian (1983-1987) holding ceremonial position subject to 1982 Constitution. However, what distinguishes Xi Jinping is that he not only holds the Presidency but also the office of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). He also heads more than a dozen ‘small policy groups' within the Government.
Despite too much focus on describing the amendment as making Xi Jinping President for life, what lies behind the scene is how this transition towards ‘centralisation of power' within the party and the Government has happened in China over the last five years. The real cause of concern should be the possible rise of Xi and its implications. The two major trends that reflect the current development are the increased role of ‘personalities over institutions' and a shift towards ‘individual over collective' leadership in China. In one sense, rather than building institutional authorisation, the present changes reflect more on promoting ‘authorisation of power' under the present regime.
Over the years, a system of collective leadership has been built into the Chinese political system but is more likely to face a challenge given the latest amendments. After the end of Deng Xiaoping rule, the next two decades in China witnessed a rule by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who steered the process of economic reform under the same principle. The system of collective leadership was much able to form a stable, accommodative and transferable ruling arrangement in China. As Xi took the centre-stage with the ‘core leadership', he has effectively ‘overturned the consensus-driven collective leadership model’. With the recent changes, it would be interesting to see how China achieves a delicate balance between both.
In recent years, the issue of corruption has been an age-old phenomenon and penetrated deep into the Chinese system. Under the present regime, the anti-graft campaign has been a key policy priority for the ruling establishment. The anti-graft campaign has been more about managing the scope and consequences of corrupt practices than rooting them out altogether. This not only got him popular with the masses, enforcing discipline within the party, responding to some contending voices, but also combined it with rule of law promotion.
Most likely to defy the age limit, he is set to become China's Vice President, marking an important shift from established practices in China. The same has been the case with China's Supreme People's Court (SPC) chief Zhou Qiang, who himself has been the country's most vocal critics of judicial independence. As the trend shows, China seems more tilting towards the importance of personalities over institutions in the political system. All these developments have helped the present leadership strengthen its hold on power in China.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) says that the country faces unprecedented new challenges, which demand strong leadership. As China moved from revolution to reform and now towards rejuvenation, the call for strong leadership seems closely tied to the objective of Chinese dream. While some say it is too early to pre-judge if President Xi will go for the third term, no doubt, ending the two-term limit ignores the painful lesson and vulnerabilities of unaccountable power centralisation during the Maoist era, which the party itself attributes of being ‘70 per cent right and 30 per cent wrong'.
The ‘two sessions’ also discussed the plan for economic reform and innovation, along with other two focus areas being anti-corruption and protection of the environment. China is standing at a new historic juncture of development as socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era. Against such background, it would be interesting to see in the future if the party's theory and Constitution, the fundamental law for State governance, are both evolving with the times and in a right direction. Given the recent developments, it remains futuristic how the ‘complete economic transformation' of China, based on reform and development, will shape and converge in the new Constitutional scheme given China's unique political arrangement.
(The writer is a PhD candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University; and Fellow, South Asia Democratic Forum, Brussels, Belgium)