Tobgay’s rise to power in Bhutan and Modi’s reinvention of himself as an able and charismatic leader hold promise of Achchhe din ahead. Now the two leaders should talk about alternative templates on the border issue conducive to the interests of both countries
When Modi and his team departed for their two-day visit to Thimpu on June 15, 2014, there was atmospherics of speculation and exhilaration on both sides. A three-pronged explanation can be offered for Indian PM’s visit to Bhutan.
First, Modi’s choice can be considered as a sheer symbolic reciprocity to Bhutan for being an “all weather friend”. Second, it can also be considered as a proactive response to China’s inroads into Bhutan. Notably, the twenty-third round of Sino-Bhutan border talks are due to be held this August. Third, and most importantly, it can be related to the significant South Asian focus, with North-East having a critical place in it. Bhutan is important because of its proximity to India’s North-East. The fact that BIMSTEC found a special mention in the bilateral discussion is an effective pointer to this.
On the eve of the visit, Modi issued a press briefing stating that Bhutan is a “natural choice”, and that the Himalayan country will be a key foreign policy priority. Similarly, Bhutan’s Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay too, on the eve of visit, emphasised the depth and expanse of India-Bhutan relations, ranging from “trade and investment, economic cooperation, development of hydropower, development assistance, cultural cooperation to security interests”.
This was vindicated later when a joint statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs stated that the “discussions focused on both bilateral relations and economic cooperation as well as cooperation in regional and multilateral forums.”
India announced the doubling of the Nehru-Wangchuck scholarship to Rs 20 million per year, and assistance for the establishment of the digital/E-library in Thimpu and in all 20 districts of Bhutan. Significantly, on the security front both countries agreed to collaborate with each other not allowing their territories to be used against the interest of each other.
While, there were other significant issues such as diversifying and balancing bilateral trade and investment relations, overcoming the rupee crunch being experienced by Bhutan, establishment of Bhutanese banks across the Indian border towns, pricing of power and articulating a vision for cooperation in future; the visit will be remembered for Modi’s invention of the “B4B formula”, i.e. Bharat for Bhutan and Bhutan for Bharat. The B4B formula was indeed articulated to signal continuity in India’s Bhutan policy. Even as PM’s recent visit becomes significant, given the gamut of issues that have found place in the discussions, it is pertinent to look back and revisit the broad pattern which the two countries have followed. This approach will not only enable one to go beyond the usual template of the oft-repeated bonhomie, but will offer a substantive way forward for the bilateral engagement.
Given the difficult neighbourhood that India has, it is appropriate to ask why India-Bhutan relations are different. Is it due to Bhutan’s overt economic and geographic dependence which makes her adjust to New Delhi’s interests, or is it because of the subtle relations with the Wangchuk dynasty, which New Delhi has cultivated overtimeIJ
Commonsensical as these statements appear, the answer lies in the distinct diplomatic culture shared by both countries at the bilateral level and the peculiar “cultural identity” that Bhutan has cultivated at the national level, thus weaning herself off the identity discourses which dominate South Asia. At the domestic level, the notion of “one nation, one people”, a common dress code, viz. the gho and kira, the official language — Dzongkha — and strict migration policies, amongst others, helped disciplining internal societal cohesion to a great extent.
If one traces the trajectory of bilateral relations, one finds that contrary to popular perceptions, Bhutan has not acquiesced to India all the time. The case in point is the Sino-India war of 1962. During the war, Bhutan refused to allow stationing of Indian troops in eastern Bhutan. In another incident, Bhutan categorically recorded its complaint to the Indian Army headquarters that the Indian troops had crossed the boundary and entered Bhutan, objecting to the fact that her territorial integrity should be safeguarded. A decade later in 1971, Bhutan established relations with Bangladesh without seeking India’s approval, thus symbolically conveying it was beyond India’s dominion. Bhutan differed with India on the issue of landlocked countries at Manila at the UNCTAD V, and further abstained from voting at the UN on the Afghanistan issue.
These few facts from history reveal that despite such differences, Bhutan nevertheless has been able to manage a successful diplomatic walk. While issues like Bhutan-China border dispute are still inconclusive, one could attribute an ascendant pattern to it. So far twenty-one rounds of border talks have been held, and focus has moved from disputed North-Western sector to the central areas in the Wangdue Phodrang district. Notably, the option of having diplomatic ties with China has also been highlighted in the past.
On the economic front, Bhutan has slowly upgraded itself from being an aid recipient to that of an exporter of power. In 2007, India and Bhutan successfully kick-started the second phase of power cooperation towards generating 10,000 MW of electricity by 2020.
While there have been differences, there is also an emerging pattern of integrative rather than distributive strategies being adopted. While integrative strategies explore common solutions and are driven by problem-solving approaches; distributive strategies entail claiming tactics, where parties do not easily make concessions. Examples of the latter are sparse, instances of the former abound. Operation All Clear of 2003, when Bhutanese Army pushed out anti-India elements out of its territory, the mutually beneficial hydro-power agreements, which has given a boost to Bhutan’s GDP, and cross-border cooperation, with hot-line pursuits between both countries are few relevant examples.
With an insight into history, the Modi Government must realise that stakeholder base in Bhutan is slowly increasing and multiple level interaction should be the focus. The understanding during the bilateral talks to use social media in influencing opinion is significant. However, such views should be imbibed to sensitise bureaucratic behavior.
On economic issues, if the Modi Government is able to control inflation, Bhutan would directly be benefitted, given that Ngultrum and the Indian Rupee are pegged. Establishment of Bhutanese banks is a good idea in this respect, as this was a long-standing concern of Bhutan.
However, on the security front, with Modi’s approach to take India-China relations to a collaborative level, an integrated approach should be deliberated upon. China during the twentieth round of border talks with Bhutan offered the idea of perceiving “borders as bridges”.
It is time that the leaders of the India and Bhutan talk about alternative templates on the border issue conducive to their interests. This is an important issue and should not be swept under the carpet, as there is a growing local perception in Bhutan with respect to its relations with China.
Tobgay’s rise to power and Modi’s reinvention of himself as an able and charismatic leader hold good promise for both the countries. So far, only integrative strategies have taken India-Bhutan relationship forward. Since, China-Bhutan border dispute has seeds of distributive bargaining, political acumen of the time suggests that this should be avoided at all costs, if ‘B4B’ is to be translated into reality.
(Medha Bisht is Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, South Asian University, New Delhi. She can be contacted at medha.bisht@gmail.com.)