The problem with the Indian Army is that it seems to be bent on exhausting itself in no-war-no-peace tasks in Jammu & Kashmir so much that it has little capability, capacity, and mind-set left for its war tasks
At his annual Press conference to mark the 82nd Indian Air Force Day on October 8, the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha’s concerns regarding the dwindling combat power have been reported widely. What has got completely ignored was his reason for this anxiety. In probably the first public assertion by an Air Force chief, Air Chief Marshal Raha, a mild-mannered man, got visibly excited while making the point that the Air Force will be the lead player in any conflict, whether with Pakistan or China. His unsaid part was that the 13-lakh Army, as opposed to the 1.7 lakh Air Force, should either play second fiddle to it, or joint operations should be unsatisfactory if not in jeopardy. I agree with him.
This was a marked departure from the eighties when Air Force chiefs took pride in calling their service a tactical force in support of the Army. With time — a bit to do with the coming of nuclear weapons and technology — the tussle between the Army and the Air Force grew, but remained under wraps, with the people getting a vague sense that cooperation between the two services — critical for land war — was minimal. The Army and Air Force have different war perspectives leading to separate war doctrines — which is understandable — and can be bridged.
The problem is that the Army seems to be bent on exhausting itself in no-war-no-peace tasks in Jammu and Kashmir so much that it has little capability, capacity, and mind-set left for its war tasks. On the 3,488 kilometre line of Actual Control with China, where the People’s liberation Army is non-existent, the Army physically holds the entire ground at altitudes from 10,000 feet to 18,000 feet. On the 746 kilometre line of Control with Pakistan, where it is in eye-ball-to-eye-ball confrontation, it does not have an offensive posture to keep the enemy on tenterhooks. The Army instead, keeps itself on tenterhooks by doing anti-infiltration and counter-insurgency operations, and of course, perception management to maintain good domestic profile. In short, the Army, to the glee of the adversaries, has established itself into a strategic defensive posture. This explains its unpreparedness during the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 2001-2002 Operation Parakram, and the 26 November 2008 terrorists’ attacks in Mumbai.
Against this backdrop, what purpose is being served by raising the Army’s new 17 mountain strike corps (90,000 troops) against ChinaIJ The corps, which started its raising on January 1 this year, will cost a whopping Rs1,10,000 crore (defence and finance figures given to the Government) over 10 years at 2013 prices. According to the Defence and Finance notes, it will require the Indian economy to grow at 12 per cent annually if it is to meet its defence modernisation needs, previous obligations and the raising of 17 corps on time.
Coming to the purpose of 17 corps, it can be one of the three: First, to fill an operational gap needed to deny a war advantage to the enemy. This was done by new raisings of 56 and 71 mountain divisions (total 25,000 troops) between 2009 and March 2010 by Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor. The second purpose can be empire building, which is self-explanatory. The third purpose can be offensive capability. Considering that 17 corps is called strike corps, these forces will be Army headquarters’ reserves to be allocated for taking battles inside Tibet. WhyIJ To capture some territory in a limited conflict.
Four questions arise — Why will the PlA get into a contact war with the Indian Army when the PlA can do plenty of damage in space, electromagnetic space and cyber domains short of warIJ Second — Why will the PlA not unleash its humongous conventional capabilities instead of restricting itself to a limited war that suits the Indian ArmyIJ Third — What purpose will be served by the Indian Army capturing some land in TibetIJ Fourth and the most important — Did the Army consult the Air Force (for joint operations critical for any success in war) when it projected its offensive forces requirement to the GovernmentIJ
The raising of a Mountain Corps was General VK Singh’s idea that was a part of his study on ‘transformation’ that he had done as the Eastern Army Commander before becoming the Chief of Army Staff. Given his turbulent tenure in South Block, nothing moved on this matter till General Bikram Singh took office and assumed ownership of the idea. Nothing wrong with it, except that the Army Headquarters under him by-passed the Chiefs of Staff Committee — a forum where the chiefs examine proposals — and gave the concept paper for raising of a mountain corps directly to then Defence Minister AK Antony. While the latter did reach out for comments of the Integrated Defence Headquarters, General Bikram Singh managed to convince Mr Antony to clear the proposal, which was then sent to the Defence Ministry, Finance Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office.
It was at the PMO that things got stuck. Not finding the comments of the COSC, the then National Security Advisor, Mr Shivshankar Menon, asked his military advisor, lieutenant General H Prakash Menon, to get its comments. Once it was approached officially, the COSC made three comments on the raising of a new mountain strike corps, namely, it was not part of the five-year operational directive issued by the Defence Minister in 2009; it had not been catered for in the long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (15 years acquisition plan of the three services) which had already been cleared by the Government; and the colossal amount needed for raising would upset the justified lTIPP procurements. With these remarks, the Army was asked by the PMO to seek incremental assets like additional firepower. General Bikram Singh did not favour this.
The windfall for the Army came with the Chinese three-weeks’ incursion in Depsang plains (ladakh) in April-May 2013. It was during this period that a briefing was organised by General Bikram Singh in the military operations branch which was attended by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Mr Antony and other officials. The Army made the case for a strike corps by flagging three main points. Arunachal Pradesh — which the Chinese claim as South Tibet — was extremely vulnerable. Except for Kameng district, which saw the rout in the 1962 war and is well fortified, the rest of Arunachal needed more forces. Next, the forces from the strike corps could also be used in Jammu and Kashmir. For example, during the 2001-2002 Operation Parakram, a corps headquarters and a division were moved to the Jammu corridor, which, given the two-front threat, will not be possible in the next war. And lastly, the added forces could be used for rest and relief during peace time on the lAC and as reserves during war. With the Chinese threat looming large, the Government gave the Acceptance in Principle, with the Air Force being asked to add its requirements. On 17 July 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security finally cleared the raising of 17 corps.
While the corps is a reality, can it do strikes at altitudes of over 12,000 feetIJ Could the India Army have managed for 17 corps manpower from within its resourcesIJ The Army already has trained 80,000 Rashtriya Rifle (five divisions) troops, most of which can be used on the frontlines. These forces, raised in 1990, have still not been given a permanent status by successive Governments because they were meant to be disbanded once the paramilitary took over the CI responsibilities in Jammu and Kashmir. Given the two live borders, it is time for the Modi Government to send the Army where it should be — on the borders.