Instead of trying to tinker with the ‘no first use’ nuclear weapons doctrine which has served its interests well, India must concentrate on enhancing credible minimum deterrence and re-thinking its ballistic and cruise missile strategy
The BJP, which mentioned a revision of India’s nuclear doctrine in its election manifesto, has, wisely, ruled out tinkering with the declaratory nuclear no-first-use policy. That leaves two other issues — credible minimum deterrence and triad — to be reviewed.
Formulated in August 1999, the nuclear doctrine was slightly modified in January 2003 to pledge that India “will respond with massive retaliation should deterrence fail”, the emphasis being on the word ‘massive’. This suggested that India will both have the capability to survive a purported nuclear first-strike of Pakistan and China, and to retaliate menacingly, indicating a large inventory of possible high-yield warheads and a variety of delivery systems or vectors. This sounds neither credible nor minimal.
Worse, neither adversary has been deterred by it, as is evident from the Pakistani Army’s role in the 26/11 attacks and its unceasing support to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, and China’s successful military transgression in April-May 2013 in ladakh. Moreover, Pakistan has used India’s declaration of ‘massive retaliation’ along with its supposed Ballistic Missile Defence, its emerging sea-based deterrence, and the India-US nuclear deal as reasons to both rapidly increase its fissile material stocks and procure two more nuclear reactors from China. Clearly, India’s nuclear doctrine remains defanged and in urgent need of reassessment.
let us start with ‘credible’ and ‘minimum’. Given India’s unique but similar doctrines against Pakistan and China and vice-versa, where threat or an actual use of nuclear weapons will follow conventional war-fighting, wouldn’t it be better if deterrence is provided at the first conventional war stage itselfIJ This would also harmonise well with India’s stated position that nukes are not meant for war-fighting. Explained, this means that India’s conventional war-fighting machinery should compel an adversary to seriously consider a massive conventional retaliation, if provoked. Now, building a formidable conventional capability requires commitment on the part of political leadership, which in turn will necessitate an understanding between the political and military leaderships by regular interactions. Such mutual understanding will also strengthen political will for retaliation. Therefore, real deterrence, in our case against both adversaries, rests with conventional rather than nuclear capabilities.
Next, ‘credibility’ should also involve a seamless transition from conventional to nuclear domain. Thus, there should be joint-plans to integrate conventional and nuclear forces (done by Pakistan and China), and these should be known to all concerned stakeholders. At present, conventional and nuclear forces stakeholders operate on restricted need-to-know basis; they should instead know each other’s capabilities, capacities, and doctrines. This requires a transformation of the National Security Advisor’s office.
Once the adversaries are conscious about ‘credibility’ by gauging India’s conventional capabilities, political will, and integrated plans of conventional and nuclear forces, the ‘minimum’ in the nuclear doctrine can well be limited. Against Pakistan’s elongated geography, where too many of its high profile strategic targets are close to the border, when it has congested urban dwellings with virtually non-existent civil-defence, ill-equipped hospitals and other life-saving facilities, why does India need more than 20kt yield nukes in limited (low double digits) quantities even with a declaratory no-first-use policyIJ
Against China, if nothing more than a border war in Tibet and Xinjiang, if at all, is envisaged as the worst case scenario, what is the need for over-deterrence by threatening China’s mainland with megaton (fusion) or even high-yield fission nukesIJ However, as I argued in my last column, India should consider having sub-kilo tonne tactical nukes with strategic command and control against China.
let us now review the triad thinking, which appears out of sync. I recommend a dyad instead, with the Indian Air Force being removed as a likely vector. With two live borders, dwindling combat strength, and the need for long-range preponderant firepower against both adversaries in conventional war, the IAF will find it virtually impossible to provide its assets for a nuclear mission. Moreover, a unilateral announcement of removing the IAF from the nuclear delivery role will help Pakistan not misread its payload each time they enter its airspace. Making a virtue out of necessity, India could even offer non-use of air-power on nuclear role as a confidence-building measure to Pakistan; it is an offer which the Pakistani Army will find difficult to refuse as its preferred vector are ballistic and cruise missiles, which unlike its air-power, are under complete control of the Pakistani Army chief.
Regarding sea-based deterrence, it is a known secret that India is building three nuclear submarines of exactly same capability (80 MW nuclear reactor), referred to as S2, S3 and S4 vessels. Considering when the Defence Research and Development Organisation had started the secret Advanced Technology Vessel programme, it had kept its sights low on Pakistan, without worrying about China, why not stop at S2 and S3 (which have reached advanced stages) and make bigger vessels with 180MW nuclear reactors which would be credible against ChinaIJ India will save huge amounts of money and time to commence work, which even with outside help, will require a decade to accomplish. What use are three similar nuke subs whose protection itself is unsure in a nuclear role against ChinaIJ
On ballistic and cruise missiles, India’s policy needs a re-think. The DRDO has successfully test-fired the 5,000km range Agni-5 ballistic missile, and after two or three more tests, plans to operationalise it. This should suffice against China. In an ambitious over-reach, the DRDO has indicated its plans to produce 6,000km Agni-6 and work on Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles; these are unnecessary and will not add to deterrence against China.
The DRDO should instead focus on two major areas: Building indigenous propulsion system for long-range cruise missiles, and accuracy for ballistic missiles. India needs capability to balance Pakistan’s game-changer: long-range Babur cruise missile. India’s supersonic cruise missile, BrahMos is not the answer because being a joint-venture with Russia, Moscow (under international restrictive regimes) will disallow its use with nuclear weapons. Moreover, the DRDO should develop better guidance systems for accuracy so that ballistic missiles can be used with conventional warheads. This is essential because the Chinese have converted their small and medium range ballistic missiles from nuclear to conventional roles only; this is compatible with its stated conventional war-fighting doctrine that ballistic missiles will be used to supplement air force with tighter control. It is axiomatic that Chinese guidance systems would have been given to the Pakistan Air Force.
On DRDO’s BMD, there is a need for re-valuation. Given DRDO’s track record of grossly overstating its accomplishments, this programme has done more damage than good. It has provided Pakistan with a perfect reason to enhance its fissile material and range of vectors. The limited gains have been a few claimed technology spin-offs. The truth is that the DRDO is woefully inadequate in all BMD sub-systems. It lacks space-based tracking and acquisition radars and its land-based radars are procured from Israel. Most importantly, the DRDO does not have high-energy propellants (the burn rate is 10mm/sec; needed is 70mm/sec) to intercept hostile missiles at more than 80km altitude. Since years, efforts have been made to procure them from either Russia or Israel. Even if the DRDO succeeds, the next Government should know that the deal would involve a trade-off which may not be worth seeking.