last week Somalian terrorists grabbed the centre stage of world attention through a daring strike in neighbouring Kenya’s capital, killing, almost in a repeat of 26/11, nationals of several countries including India. Here is a chilling backdrop to one of the worst post-9/11 terrorist strikes
The terrorist siege of Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which left at least 74 dead, including 62 civilians and more than 175 injured, is the handiwork of the Islamic militant group Al-Shabab which has acknowledged responsibility via Twitter.
Kenya is no stranger to terrorist violence. Groups linked to Al-Shabaab have carried out many attacks in Kenya, and elsewhere in East Africa, over the past decade. The country is living with the fallout every day of what is happening in Somalia.
Kenya shares a 400-mile border with Somalia, and has had to endure an overflow of refugees during the past two decades. Recognising a need to restore some stability to its neighbour, the Kenyan government hosted the internationally recognised Somali Transitional Federal Government, as well as European training facilities for Somali soldiers.
Somalia, one of the poorest and most conflict-riven countries in the world, is often cited as an example of what political scientists refer to as a “failed state.” After the fall of long-time dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991, the country’s national government collapsed, and rival warlords and factions battled for supremacy.
Al-Shabab, a radical offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union - the preeminent Islamist faction in the country during the early part of last decade - established itself in the mid-2000s and eventually became allied with al-Qaeda. Spurred by the 2006 Ethiopian incursion into Somalia to dislodge the Islamic Courts Union from the capital, Mogadishu, Al-Shabab rapidly gained support and expanded into new territory, wresting control over most of the southern part of the country.
Uniqueness
But like the Islamic Courts Union, Al-Shabab is a loose confederation of Islamist warlords and not a highly centralised organisation. Altogether it has approximately 5,000 dedicated fighters, as estimated by the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.
After Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia in 2009, an African Union peacekeeping force stayed behind. This force, led by Ugandan troops, managed to provide some cover for the Transitional Federal Government to operate, but had to cede most of the south of the country to Al-Shabab.
In mid-2012, Kenyan forces (nominally under the auspices of the African Union) began an offensive against Al-Shabab in the south of Somalia. The Kenyans restored the rule of the recognised government in several areas, including the important port town of Kismayo, Al-Shabab’s primary economic centre and political stronghold.
Al-Shabab anger over its loss of territory and economic resources likely spurred the Westgate Mall attack.
While the Westgate Mall siege was by far the most complex and ambitious terror attack Al-Shabab has staged within Kenya, more than two dozen smaller-scale grenade and small arms attacks linked to Al-Shabab have taken place there over the past two years.
Waves of terror
Kenya’s deadliest terror attack, however, was the August 7, 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi. Carried out by an al-Qaeda cell, the coordinated attack against the American embassies in Kenya and Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania, killed a total of 234 people, 223 in Nairobi alone.
Prior to the Kenyan intervention in Somalia, and with the exception of the 1998 embassy bombing, most high-level terror attacks within Kenya targeted Israelis or Israeli interests.
In 1980, Arab terrorists bombed the Norfolk Hotel, killing 20 and injuring 80, in retaliation for Kenya allowing Israeli forces to refuel in the country during the 1976 hostage rescue at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.
On November 28, 2002, Islamist radicals with ties to Somalia and al-Qaeda bombed the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 13 and injuring 80. At the same time, terrorists fired two shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles at a Boeing 757 airliner in Kenya owned by Israel-based Arkia Airlines. The missiles failed to hit the plane, which continued on its flight to Israel.
In December 2006, Ethiopia, with US backing, intervened to set up a Transitional Federal Government. But that move had the effect of catapulting the Al-Shabab, previously a mere fringe movement, into a full-blown insurgency. In 2008, alarmed by the prospect of Somalia “deteriorating into an Afghanistan like cauldron of militancy, the United States, the UN, the African Union, the league of Arab States, and other actors endorsed the UN-sponsored Djibouti Peace Process. This led to the election of Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, a moderate figure in the ICU, as president of the TFG. However, these efforts backfired. Al-Shabab and other hardliners quickly and successfully labelled Ahmad a Western puppet, and his appointment triggered the creation of a new fundamentalist Islamist group, Hisbul Islamiyya (HI), led by Shaykh Aweys, allied with Al-Shabab but with a more nationalist agenda.
In January 2009, Ethiopian soldiers withdrew from Somalia, leaving behind African Union forces (AMISOM) to help protect the coalition government and enforce its authority. On May 7, the opposition rebels attacked and captured most of the capital of Mogadishu.
AMISOM managed to halt the opposition forces and protect a few square
kilometres of government buildings, now the only territory under TFG authority. In June 2009, the TFG government declared a state of emergency and requested immediate international support.
The TFG is currently organising its last stand. Ethnic Somalis living in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan--some reportedly recruited from refugee camps--have been trained abroad and most are now back in the capital waiting to fight. About 700 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers will reinforce the effort, and the United States is providing funding and some tactical support.
A safe havenIJ
On one hand, Somalia is a chaotic, poor, battle-weary Muslim country with no central government and a long, unguarded coastline. Its porous borders mean that individuals can enter without visas, and once inside the country, enjoy an almost complete lack of law enforcement. Somalia has long served as a passageway from Africa to the Middle East based on its coastal location on the Horn of Africa, just a boat ride away from Yemen. These aspects make Somalia a desirable haven for transnational terrorists, something al-Qaeda has tried to capitalise on before, and is trying again now.
On the other hand, Somalia is different from other failed states in several ways. While it is roughly the size of Afghanistan, its landscape lacks Afghanistan’s many natural hiding places and does not offer the topographical haven of other states like Yemen. It is also a fiercely clan-oriented culture with an aversion to foreign presence of any kind, including Arab jehadi organisations.
These factors were responsible for al-Qaeda’s failure in the 1990s, when it tried working closely with al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI). Al-Qaeda was unable to root itself in Somalia’s clan system, and, according to former ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn, “overestimated the degree to which Somalis would become jihadists.” The experience of the al-Qaeda operatives was so treacherous that Bruton says: “U.S. intelligence officials came up with a verdict that Somalia was actually inoculated from foreign terrorist groups, that it’s just fundamentally inhospitable, that the clan system is so closed to foreigners that there’s just no way that these groups can operate.”
Since the Ethiopian invasion, Al-Qaeda has seen a resurgent connection to the country, and HI and al-Shabab control most of the territory. However, experts disagree over whether Somalia could be the base for an international attack or whether the group will continue its domestic focus.
However, a publication of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute investigated the credibility of the Shabab threat, stating that since the Ethiopian invasion, “the group’s rhetoric and behaviour have shifted ... reflecting an eagerness to strike internationally.” It added that “the group has made clear its desire and intention to strike beyond the borders of Somalia, and it currently has the means to prepare and execute such an attack. It is partners with and loyal to Al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda in Somalia
A US Senate report states that estimates of Al-Qaeda fighters in Somalia vary widely, from a low of twenty to a high of three hundred. Al-Shabab and
Al-Qaeda appear to coordinate the administration of training camps in the south. According to Andre le Sage from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Some of these are reserved for imparting basic ideological precepts and infantry skills to newly enlisted Somali militia members, while others provide more advanced training in explosives and assassination. However, other than training and funding, it is not clear what operational control or connection exists between the two organisations.
The strongest tie between Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda seems to be ideological. In September 2008, a senior Al-Shabab leader released a video in which he pledged allegiance to Osama bin laden and called for Muslim youth to come to Somalia. In February 2009, Ayman
Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, released a video that began by praising Shabaab’s seizure of the Somali town of Baidoa. The group will “engage in jehad against the American-made government in the same way they engaged in jehad against the Ethiopians and the warlords before them,” Zawahiri said.
However, although Al-Qaeda appears to support Shabab’s jehad, it’s unclear whether Al-Shabab has ambitions beyond Somalia. The December 2008 International Crisis Group report labels the group a self-radicalising movement, whose aims are local and national.
(John Balley is an international commentator on Islamic fundamentalism. This article was written exclusively for Saturday Special)