If Karzai is still obstinate about his decision, it is not because of India's willingness to work with him but on account of the US inability perhaps to keep its diplomatic linkages with his administration
With the date of withdrawal of the US forces drawing nearer, Afghanistan is bracing for a season of gloom ahead. The Americans are insistent on an early conclusion of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would facilitate their continued presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014, while Karzai, the outgoing President serving his last term in office, is quite adamant and unrelenting that the decision to sign the BSA should be left to his successor.
Implications of Karzai’s intransigence
long held as an American stooge in Afghanistan, Karzai is subjecting the future of Afghanistan to his whims and his personal differences with the US. While he enabled a loya Jirga, consisting of members chosen by his administration, to facilitate signing of the BSA, he has chosen to stand down the decision of the Jirga and refused to sign the BSA in a hurry. Perhaps he wants to redeem himself and signal it to fellow Pashtuns that he is not all that bad as was made out of him. He may also be playing the game of brinkmanship to extract some more concessions from the Americans. Many Afghans would even tell you, he may suspend the whole electoral process and with American help prolong his stay in office beyond 2014.
His brinkmanship has so far had negative implications for Afghanistan. Some Americans find in it an excuse to advocate zero option which involves wholesale pull out from Afghanistan and could involve withdrawal of financial commitments beyond 2014. labouring under economic downturn, there is perhaps no appetite for prolonging American commitments abroad.
If the Americans, God forbid, abandon Afghanistan at such a critical juncture, it would not take long to reverse all the positive steps taken by the international community under American leadership to lay the foundation of a democratic and liberal Afghanistan.
Karzai fiddling while…
American grunts against Karzai must be music to Taliban ears. However, Karzai is fiddling too, while Afghanistan is undergoing a critical churning process. He is oblivious of the fact that his inflexibility over the BSA is not earning him any good repute among the Afghan people. While Afghans are beginning to panic, he seems to enjoy the negative attention that he is receiving from the Americans. Recently, as the US media reported, responding to an Iranian top official’s advice that he must sign the BSA as soon as possible, Karzai was heard saying: “You seeIJ.. The Americans want this deal so badly they are even getting the Iraqis to pressure me.” American impatience seems to add to his intransigence.
Things are slowly coming to such a pass that by pitching his anti-US rhetoric high, Karzai is even making his successor’s task difficult to go ahead with the BSA. On the other hand, by dangling the threat of zero-option in front of Karzai, the US is unnecessarily lionising Karzai at one level, and betraying its helplessness vis-à-vis Karzai at another.
Perhaps the constituency favouring long-term economic and security commitment in Afghanistan is shrinking in the US, which makes zero-option an “option” for the US at the moment in Afghanistan. But, if one looks at the way the strategic environment is shaping up around Afghanistan, any American decision to exercise a zero-option will only concede strategic space to countries like China and Pakistan and embolden al Qaeda-Taliban forces in the region.
Karzai wooing IndiaIJ
Against this backdrop, Karzai’s visit to New Delhi with a long shopping list for robust strategic engagement with India assumes some significance. There is a view gaining ground in the US that India is seeking to gain some strategic advantage by strengthening its linkage with the outgoing Karzai administration and by responding positively to Karzai’s advances it is only adding to Karzai’s confidence and his stubbornness about the BSA. However, this may not be true.
It is believed that India and Afghanistan signed the strategic partnership agreement in 2011 without express American consent. From this time onwards, India and the US are perhaps not having enough discussion on Afghanistan leading to wild formulations about Indian approach to Afghanistan. Some analysts in the US have argued that India and Pakistan are lodged in a classical zero-sum strategic game in Afghanistan. Given the long-standing hostility between India and Pakistan, this view has gained currency in the US too.
Indian interests
In reality, however, India has in the past pushed for Indo-Pak cooperation in Afghanistan, even while pursuing its genuine strategic interest of securing Afghanistan from the clutches of radical elements, which had, in the past, used Afghan soil against Indian interests. It is a fact that despite spending 2 billion USD on Afghan reconstruction and development, India has deliberately avoided the limelight factoring in sensitivities in the neighbourhood about Indian presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban have even grudgingly acknowledged India’s quiet endeavours in the past. The strategic partnership agreement in 2011 was signed not to spite Pakistan but to ensure Indian engagement with Kabul beyond 2014. But India is well aware of its limitations and Karzai must have recognised it during his recent visit, despite Indian assurances of support for training and supply of non-lethal material to the Afghan army.
India favours continued presence of US troops in Afghanistan as an insurance against any possible adventurism by Taliban and its backers in Pakistan. It is not hard to imagine that India’s position on the BSA must have been communicated to Karzai as well. If Karzai is still obstinate about his decision, it is not because of India’s willingness to work with him but because of the US inability perhaps to keep its diplomatic linkages with his administration.
Afghan view
A chance conversation with an Afghan delegation last week revealed that majority of Afghans cutting across ethnic lines would favour signing of the BSA at the earliest and hoped that Karzai would sign it soon before the campaign for Presidential elections starts.
At the same time, there was a common concern among them that the US policy towards Afghanistan was being driven by Pakistan and therefore, there was an unnecessary emphasis on reconciliation with the Taliban. Rather than focussing on strengthening the capacity of the Afghan National Army, and throwing its weight behind the government in Kabul to drive the dialogue with the Taliban, the US was allowing itself to be persuaded by Pakistan to accord more importance to the Taliban than it deserves.
Need for caution
The prevailing uncertainty about the BSA as well as the American willingness to reintroduce Taliban into Afghanistan bypassing the government in Kabul defines the sense of gloom hanging over Afghanistan.
Any decision in Washington to disengage from Afghanistan to teach Karzai a lesson is in nobody’s interest. The US could rather patiently wait till June 2014 for the next elected President to take a decision on it and in the meanwhile, international community should invest more energy in evolving measures to ensure that the process of democratisation goes on uninterrupted. This is perhaps the time when there is a greater need than ever for Washington, Kabul, New Delhi and perhaps Islamabad to work together, take into account each other’s concerns and bring stability to Afghanistan.
(The writer is Senior Fellow and Coordinator, South Asia Centre, IDSA, New Delhi.)