For India, Iran is an important player because of its vast hydrocarbon reserves, substantial influence in Kabul, and current support to Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State. A purposeful engagement with Iran can lend new effectiveness to India's international relations
Iran has always regarded itself as the most important regional power. Due to its unique geopolitical location, on account of its geographical reach to Central Asia, Caucasus, West Asia and the Persian Gulf as well as South Asia, Tehran’s efforts in making a strong play for the status of a regional power, along with its position as a major supplier of oil and gas have made for multi-faceted relationships between Iran and the US, Iran and India, Iran and China, Iran and Pakistan, and Iran and Russia.
Post-sanctions, challenges before Iran will be to re-define its regional leadership role in a realistic way which combines greater accommodation with the US while still continuing to have excellent relationship with other big powers.
It is hard to deny the importance of Iran — whose geopolitical stock is bound to rise with the landmark nuclear deal. Amid avalanche of adulation, the deal is also attracting a lot of negative commentary without interruption which is a nothing but a symptom of the lack of imagination of those criticising it while refusing to visualise the internal tensions in Iran that the fallouts from the deal may generate.
Brushing aside those observers who criticise the nuclear deal with Iran and argue that it cannot lead to positive outcome, Barack Obama, the US President, candidly observed some time back in an interview: “Don’t judge me on whether this deal transforms Iran, ends Iran’s aggressive behavior toward some of its Arab neighbours or leads to detente between the Shias and the Sunnis. Judge me on one thing: Does this deal prevent Iran from breaking out with a nuclear weapon for the next 10 years and is a better outcome for the US, Israel, and our Arab allies than any other alternative on the tableIJ”
It is indisputable that India stands to be a major beneficiary of the Iran nuclear deal. There is a plenty of optimism around as India can rightly hope to become a major importer of Iran’s oil and gas in the immediate aftermath of the lifting of crippling sanctions. But there is a need to conceptualise a grand strategy that will prove to be adequate to the new circumstances beyond the generic desire to secure energy supplies through pipelines. It is about an eventual emergence of a liberal-democratic society in Iran which is largely independent from Government control. This narrative is glaringly absent at the moment.
The inward-looking conservatives in Iran’s ruling establishment have so far relied heavily on outmoded norms of sovereignty, pan-Islamic symbols, nationalist rhetoric and anti-imperial propaganda as sources of legitimacy. As Iran will seek to deepen its ties with the global political economy to facilitate access to international markets, investments and technology, it will be expected to make some compromises.
And what would be the implications of those compromisesIJ In the long-run, it may cause the greater change in Iran’s political culture as it will force the fundamentally conservative ideology to confront the challenges posed by increasing political and cultural interactions with global and Western players. The reformists in Iran’s ruling elites will become more confident to fight for democratic consolidation, cultural opening and economic liberalisation.
Change is more likely to occur when new social actors appear on the scene. Iran’s military-religious establishment has remained strong enough to prevent the emergence of a new social group that might challenge its power. But the regular practice of electoral democracy seems to have made a difference in Iran. A huge middle class has appeared. In many Muslim societies, the middle class has been the dynamic force responsible for political change. The aim of bringing about democracy has, however, remained chimerical in those societies. If electoral democracy is not to regress further into more rigid form of ocratic authoritarianism in Iran, the Western countries cannot avoid to systematically engage the forward-looking, non-violent champions of political Islam.
It is not an overstatement that political Islam is not entirely inconsistent with modern democratic norms and principles. It is to India’s advantage to see Iran emerging as a well-established democracy where all kinds of debates, including political, are largely open and well publicised.
With Iran on the verge of being unshackled from severe international sanctions, India must find a balance in its strategic interests in the politically volatile and energy-rich Central Asian and the Persian Gulf regions. The phenomenal spurt in Chinese influence in Central Asia is certainly a matter of concern to India.
The US hopes to integrate Central Asia with South Asia, as is clear from its support to the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline project. Is it not reasonable to expect that sooner than later both Iran and Afghanistan should be economically integrated with South AsiaIJ While this might suit India, its troubled ties with Pakistan and the continuing instability in Afghanistan prevent a genuine integration between the two regions in the foreseeable future.
As all major players in West Asian and Central Asian region have severe differences among themselves in their respective perceptions of regional security, India is likely to remain distrustful of the efforts of those countries that are eager to limit the strategic influence of the US in Central Asia after its eventual exit from Afghanistan. What is sure is that India, China, Russia, the US, Iran and Pakistan all have perspectives and prescriptions that are diverse, and it is important that these are coordinated to significantly weaken the power of jihadist and extremist groups.
The India-centric security paradigm is deeply ingrained in Pakistan’s military psyche as a conservatism that tolerates the intolerable. Chinese leadership, which has been shielding Pakistan from international scrutiny over its brazen support to terrorism, must be reminded that throughout the west Asian region, continuing violence and instability have helped the fortunes of jihadist groups. As there are more violent groups seeking power in Afghanistan and the likelihood of disaffected Taliban getting attracted to the Islamic State is gradually increasing, Iran will have to re-position its earlier stance of throwing in its lot with Pakistan’s dubious mediatory role.
India no longer discriminates significantly between the US, the EU, the countries of the The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Russia, Israel, China, Iran, and even Pakistan as it is willing to do business with all. Power politics, religious or revolutionary ideology and moralising are considered undesirable for business, whereas economic linkages are seen to promote stability. But India seems to be caught up in a number of competing factors. And these factors leave India with rather difficult political choices in West Asia and Central Asia in the coming years as it is hazardous to predict the long-term consequences of nuclear deal with Iran.
For India, Iran is very important player in the region particularly because of its vast hydrocarbon reserves, substantial influence in Kabul, and current support to Iraq and Syria against the IS. Iran’s continued isolation and chastisement does not serve any strategic purpose. A purposeful engagement with key countries having direct interest in the stability and security in the region can lend new effectiveness to India’s international relations. Needless to say, Iran is one of those countries.
(The writer is Assistant Professor, Department of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sardar Patel University of Police Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur)