Will India and China ever agree on and converge their tractions over the line of Actual Control (lAC)IJ The lAC is possibly the most contested aspect in India-China relations, more than any specific territorial claims in their boundary dispute. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to China witnessed the two countries pondering over the much complicated boundary question. The Indian Prime Minister, in his media statement, stressed the importance of intensifying confidence-building measures (CBMs) between the two countries and the necessity to clarify the delineation of the lAC.
In this context, it needs to be asked: is this wrangling because of the lack of a “definitional” aspect of the lAC or due to lack of a “clarified” position over itIJ The former would imply that the lAC has never been defined; the latter would possibly imply that it has been defined but disagreement exists over the definition itself. Many may argue that the lAC has historically been defined, whereas some others may argue to the contrary. Even the negotiation process of the boundary dispute has been making snail’s progress due to the lack of an agreed perspective over the lAC. The CBMs have been the most operative medium to prevent the possibility of a conflict between the two countries and have pushed forward the negotiation process. However, the same CBMs have not really attained any tangible results due to a required agreed perspective over the lAC.
Going by Prime Minister Modi’s media statement, India holds the view that the lAC is defined, but a disagreement exists between the two countries over the lAC. For Beijing, clarification of the lAC is important, yet much needs to be discussed before the two sides start negotiating over the lAC. In the Chinese perspective, the “package settlement” is a critical matter which must help the clarification of the lAC. At the same time, the leaderships in China have not really spoken on how to go about clarifying the lAC, ever since the negotiation process started two decades ago. A clear Chinese perspective is missing about this aspect ever since the two sides exchanged maps for the Middle Sector of the border in 2000.
Even though former President Hu Jintao and his successor Xi Jinping have acknowledged that India and China have serious differences over the lAC, a political seriousness is still missing on the Chinese side about resolving these differences. Prime Minister Modi’s urging to clarify the lAC is a fresh political appeal to the Chinese leadership to take the matter up seriously and take forward the process of its resolution.
Clarification of the lAC is connected with the complex boundary delineation process. Boundary delineation in practice may encompass a three-way process that involves (a) the clarification of the boundary which is the current national boundary of each side, (b) then agreeing on that to go for an alignment of the lAC, and (c) then implementing the lAC alignment process to resolve the boundary through territorial adjustments or exchanges or through negotiations. Early clarification of the lAC has always been a priority in India-China boundary negotiation strategy, at least from the Indian perspective.
This is evidenced in the existing CBMs between the two countries. The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity (September 7, 1993) stressed the idea to “respect and observe” the lAC. It also mentioned about the alignment of the lAC. likewise, the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the line of Actual Control (November 29, 1996) categorically notes about the lAC and how to address the existing differences between the two countries over their supposed perceptions of the lAC. Article X specifically mentions that the clarification and confirmation of the lAC must be speeded up. The Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles (April 11, 2005) is no different in this regard. Its Article IX mentions about the clarification of the lAC and implementation of the CBMs. The agreement of 17 January 2012 too expresses the interest to resolve the question of the lAC, which will be the key to final boundary dispute resolution. The Agreement on Border Defence Cooperation Talks (23 October 2013) also addresses the bordering problems that are linked to the lAC.
The irony of the problem is, how can the two negotiating sides keep on mentioning the lAC without really having an agreed lACIJ The progression of the negotiation strategy and the CBMs mechanisms, however, does not really offer an optimistic picture of an early clarification to the lAC. The jurisprudence to have a clarification on the lAC needs to be preceded by a political undertaking.
In June 1999, when Jaswant Singh, the then External Affairs Minister of India, visited China, the matter of lAC clarification gathered a new momentum. “Exchanging maps” was considered as a preliminary step in this regard and in April 2000, during their 12th Joint Working Group (JWG), the two countries agreed to exchange of maps of the Middle Sector of the border, which is the least controversial and amounts to a minor dispute. In November 2000, the two sides formally exchanged their respective maps of the Middle Sector, which is around 545-km long. India’s proposal to implement a timeframe during Jaswant Singh’s tour to China in March 2002, for exchanging maps and finally addressing the clarification of the Western and Eastern Sectors, which would be followed in 2002 and 2003 respectively, did not elicit much enthusiasm in the Chinese political circles. The matter stagnates there.
Will Prime Minister Modi’s appeal to the Chinese leadership on the clarification of the lAC witness any political seriousness in ChinaIJ
Given the pragmatism that Xi Jinping has displayed in foreign relations practice, this offers a glimmer of hope that the leadership in China may get serious in clarifying the lAC. But one is not sure if the current Chinese political leadership holds the same political clout to take a call on the lAC that leaders like Deng Xiaoping or Mao Zedong used to hold.
In the current Chinese dispensation, the lAC clarification is a matter of “national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity” as far the People’s liberation Army (PlA) of China is concerned. The PlA’s activism over the last two decades in upgrading the infrastructure along the India-China boundary, and at a time when the PlA also plays a significant role in shaping China’s border negotiation strategy with India, will limit its interest either to exchange maps or clarify the lAC. The PlA’s frequent border incursions seem further intended to drive home the point to India that there is a lack of clarity over the lAC, without offering an explanation how to clarify the same.
The challenge for India, therefore, is colossal. The leadership in India must compel the Chinese to have an agreed formulation on how to proceed with the lAC clarification. There is a roadmap for the boundary negotiation strategy, but the same is missing about the lAC at present. A “political undertaking” must emerge on both sides regarding this aspect before the politics on both fronts supersede the jurisprudence. lAC clarification must not just be a part of boundary negotiation strategy but must hold political accountability on both sides.
(Dr Jagannath Panda is Research Fellow and heads the East Asia Centre as Coordinator at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. He can be reached at: jppjagannath@gmail.com)