Jordan and lebanon offer interesting analogies about combating the spread of ISIS. Both of these countries suffer from the usual litany of problems, which has given rise to an emergence of jehadist ideologies
With the focus on the efficacy of the tactical nature of strategies being employed to combat ISIS — ranging from air strikes, use of Kurdish peshmerga, Sunni tribes, Free Syrian Army and other proxies — it is interesting to note what Jordan and lebanon, two states bordering territory controlled by ISIS, are doing to combat it. Global attention is focused on the actions of the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, UAE and Qatar in containing the spread of ISIS influence.
Jordan and lebanon offer interesting analogies about war on ISIS. Both of these countries suffer from the usual litany of problems, which has given rise to an emergence of jehadist ideologies.
A shared border with both Syria and Iraq, over 1.5 million Syrian refugees and having an estimated 2,000 citizens fighting for ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra means that Jordan is at the forefront in the war against ISIS, and steps taken by it to combat the group have long-term ramifications for the overall strategy to curb the spread of ISIS and its ilk.
With the humanitarian crisis deepening in Syria — refugee flows continue unabated — there is a spike in numbers particularly during an escalation in violence in Syria. Despite the strain to its limited resources, Jordan has continued its policy of accepting refugees from the region. Syrians currently comprise the majority of the refugees; they were preceded by Iraqis and Palestinians before that.
Jordan remains concerned about the effects of the spillover from the Syrian civil war and the resultant destruction of Syria if ISIS were to succeed in its desire of establishing a caliphate and change the existing borders in the region. The start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 led to many radically inclined Jordanians going to Syria to fight against the Assad regime. The military success of ISIS has acted like a magnet for many sympathisers and galvanised support among Islamic radicals who dream of erasing borders across the region to establish Islamic Caliphate. The lure of ISIS narrative raises the prospect of many radicals attacking Jordan from within. Jordan had suffered the blowback from terror emanating from Iraq when Amman was attacked in 2005 by jehadists affiliated to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who led the al-Qaeda in the land of two rivers, a predecessor to ISIS.
Jordan’s approach to confronting the risk emanating from jihadists has set it apart from some other Arab members of the coalition against ISIS. Jordan bolstered its Intelligence units to focus on transnational terror networks understanding the danger they posed. Its focus on Intelligence gathering ensured that its crackdown on Islamic radicals remains effective within its borders, unlike arbitrary arrests which would lead to greater radicalisation. Jordan has also harnessed the historical strength of the affiliation of its tribes across the region and has been using a theological counter-narrative as part of its efforts to counter the spread of ISIS within its borders.
Tribal affiliations
In a region where tribal ties are critical, Jordan has always ensured that its native tribes were well represented in government services. Jordan primarily relies on the tribes straddling the border along with its army and intelligence units to patrol its borders with Syria and Iraq. Jordanian security forces remain one of the most pro-active in the region. Its military units attacked ISIS forward advance fighters who ventured close to its borders, thus, ensuring that ISIS fighters don’t have a free run near its borders. Tribal linkages between Jordanian and Iraqi Sunni tribes in the Anbar and other provinces coupled with the fact that several Iraqi Sunni leaders are resident in Amman ensures that it has some of the best intelligence assets in the region. One of the reasons that sectarian schism engulfed Iraq and led to the emergence of ISIS was the hostility of the Iraqi Government to the Sunni tribes.
Counter-narrative
Aware of the havoc those jihadists among its local populations or the refugees could cause, and the powerful narrative of an Islamic caliphate unleashed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Jordan is using a theological counter narrative. It has released from its prisons two clerics with a strong following among radical Islamists — Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi and Abu Qatada — to preach a counter narrative. The approach has been relatively successful as Maqdisi has mocked the caliphate and expressed outrage at its brutality. This has resulted in divisions among the radical Islamists in Jordan who were previously thought to be very cohesive.
Apart from this, knowing that ISIS relies on fighters from other regions, it is engaging Chechen leaders to target Chechens fighting for ISIS and the Jordanian armed forces have a unit comprising naturalised Jordanians of Chechen descent fighting on their behalf.
The Jordanian Queen too recently highlighted the need to offer a counter narrative in the media in the Arab world and globally, which ISIS has exploited successfully to spread its narrative.
ISIS understands the geographic advantage of lebanon and has been making forays into lebanon in order to create a sectarian battle and take its fight to the Hezbollah which is fighting ISIS and is Iran’s proxy in the region. Its aim is to ensure that the political instability in a country divided on sectarian lines helps it tactically. The presence of ISIS and al-Nusra fighters with an aim of eroding Hezbollah’s grip in a heavily sectarian country could lead to internal conflict. The lebanese Army, which many feared would be fractured along sectarian lines, repulsed ISIS and al-Nusra fighters in the Bekaa valley. While no largescale attacks have happened, ISIS has been able to carry out several bomb attacks.
lebanon, however, remains at risk of renewed civil strife primarily on account of the spillover from the Syrian conflict. While political leaders are keen to avoid a spillover, with memories of the 15 year (1975-1990) civil war still acting as a reminder of the horrors of civil war, growing pressure due to the influx of refugees and rising sectarian tensions could undermine the fragile stability in lebanon.
One of the key factors to the cessation of conflict in the 15-year civil war in lebanon was the consensual agreement between Iran and Saudi in 1989 that paved the way to a semblance of normalcy. The political paralysis in lebanon which had intensified due to schism between the pro- and anti-Syria factions led to a political vacuum at a very inopportune time. But with Tehran soliciting Riyadh’s help in nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, Tehran could reciprocate in making concessions over the nearly six-month presidential election deadlock. lebanon offers an insight on addressing the long-term problems once ISIS is combated as internal stability in lebanon is dependent on the two heavyweights of the region-Saudi and Iran.
Rapprochement between the West Asian heavyweights
The two different analogies offer short-term insights in combating ISIS through counter-strategy (Jordan) and long-term stabilisation through a rapprochement of the two heavyweights in the region— Saudi and Iran. West Asia is a minefield of agendas and so Saudi and Iran being on the same page to combat ISIS is primarily in the hope that the eventual outcome will ensure that the powers that prevail in the region will ally with their interests. However, a rapprochement between the two will yield a stability dividend-reduction in tensions and a common fight against jehadists, else West Asia will remain a major source for global instability.
(The writer is a commentator on strategic issues)