The Quad speaks: Is Beijing listening?
The Quad meet in Delhi was a reminder that the group has a potential to take on China and is a force to reckon with in Indo-Pacific
When the foreign ministers of Quad countries — the United States, India, Japan, and Australia — met in Delhi, they sent a message to the world, — Quad is here to stay and will be proactive in defending the cause it stands for — to keep Indo-Pacific free from power play. Some had been declaring the Quad’s demise, pointing to the fact that its national leaders haven’t met since 2024. Critics often question its relevance in a world where ideology and persuasion is waning fast. Yet the very convening of this ministerial — on Indian soil, in the shadow of a recent Trump-Xi summit — proved that the Quad is a potent force. The timing of the New Delhi meeting follows US President Donald Trump’s visit to China and is widely understood as a signal that US engagement with Beijing does not diminish Washington’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific Quad framework. India’s decision to host the meet underscored urgency over protocol. It is no denying that the Quad has always been diplomatically coy about naming its primary concern. The grouping does not describe itself as an anti-China alliance, instead framing its purpose around constructive regional contributions. However, the China variable remains the unspoken organising principle behind nearly every agenda it takes up. This meeting was no different. While the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was on the agenda, the top priority was China.
The agenda was substantive — confirm cooperation in critical minerals and emerging technologies — two domains where China’s dominance poses risks. Supply chain resilience, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and the governance of next-generation technologies rounded out the strategic priorities. For Australia, Japan, and India, the task is to continue investing in their national security as the most effective way to ensure Washington that they are powerful in their own right and capable of countering China and do not depend on the United States. This is no small thing. Both India and Japan carry unresolved territorial disputes with Beijing — the Galwan shadow still lingers over the Himalayas, and Chinese vessels continue to test nerves around the Senkaku Islands.
The biggest takeaway of the Delhi meeting was that the US has not abandoned the Indo-Pacific. As part of the summit debrief, the potential sale of US weapons to Taiwan likely featured, and Rubio was expected to receive private support from his Quad colleagues. This is quiet but consequential diplomacy — the kind that is vital for balance of power. The Quad entered 2026 carrying the weight of a full year of Indian chairmanship that concluded without the Leaders’ Summit it was meant to produce — a gap whose strategic cost is real, since prolonged silence carries a reputational cost. It was thus a necessary course correction.
The way forward is clear, if demanding. The Quad must move from signalling to delivery — on critical mineral supply chains, on maritime domain awareness, on semiconductor and AI governance. A Leaders’ Summit must follow. China will not be deterred by meetings alone; it responds to capability, cohesion, and credibility. Quad has the mettle but it must show it.
