Power politics in Indian Ocean

The sinking of the Iranian warship IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean after a US strike may appear at first glance to be a limited military episode. However, maritime history suggests that events like this often function as early signals of larger geopolitical shifts.

For centuries, these waters formed one of the most stable trading environments in world history. Long before the rise of European empires, merchants navigated the monsoon system connecting the Persian Gulf, the western coast of India, East Africa and Southeast Asia. Horses from Arabia, textiles from Gujarat and spices from the Indonesian archipelago moved across these routes. Even the Portuguese, Dutch and British empires largely focused on controlling strategic ports and choke points rather than engaging in continuous naval conflict across the ocean.

Yet the structural importance of the Indian Ocean has grown dramatically in the 21st century. Today, the region carries nearly 80-90 per cent of global trade by volume, roughly two-thirds of seaborne oil shipments, and more than half of global container traffic. The energy lifelines of East Asia pass through these waters, while Europe’s trade with Asia depends heavily on the same sea lanes. Therefore, the sinking of Dena in the middle of one of the busiest maritime systems on the planet will have strategic implications.

When major powers project force into heavily trafficked sea lanes, the geopolitical character of those waters changes. The Mediterranean is one example. For centuries, it served as an intensive commercial zone between Europe, North Africa and the Levant, yet towards the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries it was transformed into a battleground of strategic interests among empires. Similarly, the South China Sea, which was initially a largely commercial maritime passageway, transformed into one of the most disputed security spaces in Asia as regional powers started to claim competing ownership of the region and increased their naval capacity.

The Indian Ocean is entering a comparable phase. The growing naval presence of multiple powers shows the scale of the transformation. The United States has one of its largest operational deployments in the region through its Fifth Fleet and associated bases. China has expanded its reach through regular naval patrols and logistical infrastructure along the western Indian Ocean. India has also strengthened maritime surveillance networks and naval operations across the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. Each of these actors views the stability of sea lanes as essential, yet their overlapping strategic interests are gradually thickening the security environment.

The case of the sinking of IRIS Dena is no exception. As a naval conflict reaches a major business route, the impact is not limited to direct military action. There is a reaction in insurance markets, a re-evaluation of routes by shipping companies, and governments start to recalculate risks on a maritime region-wide basis. The Indian Ocean is sensitive to such shocks, especially because it is the main connector between the energy supplies of the Gulf and the industrial economies

of Asia.

For India, the implications are both immediate and long term. The relationship between India and Iran has been based on energy trade, cultural ties and various strategically located projects, including the Chabahar port, which opens access to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. At the same time, India’s partnership with the United States has deepened significantly over the past two decades.

The sinking of IRIS Dena in the US strike thus creates a sensitive diplomatic situation for India. New Delhi will hardly be ready to explain the incident through explicitly partisan positions. Rather, it is likely to focus on maritime security, freedom of navigation and the necessity to avoid escalation in one of the areas vital to international trade. Such a stance allows New Delhi to preserve its strategic partnership with Washington while maintaining working relations with Tehran.

This balanced approach is supported by geography. With a coastline of more than 7,500 kilometres and an exclusive economic zone exceeding two million square kilometres, India is at the centre of the maritime routes that connect the Persian Gulf to East and Southeast Asia. Nearly 95 per cent of India’s trade by volume moves through these sea lanes. Any prolonged instability would therefore affect not only regional security but also India’s economic trajectory.

In the coming decade, several trends are likely to become more visible. As states seek to monitor critical sea lanes more closely and aggressively, investments in satellites, radar networks and underwater surveillance will expand, and strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb will attract even greater attention.

However, none of these developments necessarily means that the Indian Ocean will become a full-scale battlefield. But the assumption that these waters exist primarily as neutral corridors of commerce will be hard to sustain. In that sense, the sinking of IRIS Dena may mark a turning point.

The writer is Head of Department, Department of History and Civilisation, Gautam Buddha University, Noida; views are personal