Bangladesh: India’s strategic dilemma

Time flies. August 5 marks two years since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted in a student-led uprising, forcing the deposed Awami League leader into self-imposed exile in India. Since those tumultuous events, India-Bangladesh ties have suffered a severe setback, with both sides still struggling to rebuild a once-robust partnership. A lingering trust deficit now clouds relations as the two neighbours attempt to reset ties under Bangladesh’s new Prime Minister, Tarique Rahman. Rahman, who assumed leadership of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) following the death of his mother, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, took office in February. His party, seen as anti-India, swept the polls.

While the sharp friction that characterised New Delhi-Dhaka ties under Bangladesh’s interim government led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has eased, relations remain uneasy. Stable on the surface, the partnership continues to be tested by underlying strain.

For now, India is banking on the upcoming BRICS Summit in New Delhi this September to host Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman and initiate a much-needed reset in bilateral ties. Although Bangladesh is not a BRICS member, it aspires to join the grouping, and Rahman has been invited to the summit’s Outreach Session. New Delhi hopes his participation will pave the way for a crucial meeting on the sidelines with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Adding to New Delhi’s chagrin, Rahman prioritised a visit to China, India’s primary geostrategic adversary. Rahman’s trip to Beijing was a clear strategic setback for Delhi.

During his four-day visit in June, Rahman was assiduously courted by Beijing as the two sides signed 17 pacts. The visit elevated bilateral ties from a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” to a “China-Bangladesh community with a shared future”. Additionally, Dhaka and Beijing agreed to institute regular strategic discussions and launch a 2+2 dialogue covering foreign policy and security.

Worryingly for India, Beijing has pledged support for Bangladesh’s Teesta River restoration project. To prevent Chinese inroads along this strategic river basin, New Delhi needs to finally deliver the long-stalled Teesta water-sharing treaty-a task made far simpler now that a BJP government leads West Bengal.

Equally troubling for India is the agreement between Dhaka and Beijing to expand Mongla Port, alongside the decision to grant a Chinese firm the right to develop its adjacent economic zone. India was originally slated to develop this zone, but the project did not materialise and ultimately fell through. As a result, India will have to grapple with a growing Chinese footprint in the Bay of Bengal, which poses significant security risks in its immediate maritime neighbourhood.

The Rahman government’s embrace of Beijing poses a clear challenge to New Delhi’s strategic interests. China’s expanding footprint in India’s immediate neighbourhood, the Indian Ocean Region, and the broader Indo-Pacific directly threatens Indian security. While the new government in Dhaka has framed its foreign policy around “Bangladesh First” and multi-alignment, it remains to be seen whether it will truly adhere to these principles.

New Delhi’s substantial leverage over Dhaka vanished with Sheikh Hasina’s departure. Although Hasina cultivated strong relations with Beijing, she was always sensitive to India’s regional security concerns-a principle New Delhi will undoubtedly highlight if the Modi-Rahman meeting takes place. The BNP government may not be as sensitive to India’s concerns. A meeting at the prime ministerial level, therefore, is a necessity for India to be able to voice its concerns at the highest level.

For Rahman, a visit to New Delhi poses significant domestic risk as he has to navigate deep-seated anti-India sentiments at home.

Rahman, therefore, is treading carefully. He would also be looking for substantive outcomes from his India visit to quell any criticism he may face on the domestic front. A major sticking point in bilateral ties at present is Sheikh Hasina’s continued presence in India. The Awami League leader has been tried in absentia in Bangladesh by a special tribunal and sentenced to death for alleged crimes against humanity. Dhaka has put in a formal request with New Delhi seeking her extradition.

The former Prime Minister’s political rhetoric while in exile here has also angered Dhaka. If India wants to safeguard its long-term interests and foster cordial relations with Bangladesh, it must firmly advise Hasina to refrain from engaging in political rhetoric from Indian soil.

Another major strain on bilateral relations has been the BJP’s sustained campaign against illegal immigration from Bangladesh, marked by harsh political rhetoric-including Home Minister Amit Shah’s controversial characterisation of illegal migrants as “termites” in 2018. This anti-immigrant rhetoric reached a fever pitch during recent state assembly elections in West Bengal and Assam, casting a long shadow over neighbourly ties. Moving forward, both nations must prioritise more effective border management and establish a robust, formal mechanism to address the contentious issue of cross-border migration.

If India wishes to establish strong ties with Bangladesh, it will have to make extraordinary diplomatic efforts to keep Bangladesh within its sphere of influence. For instance, the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is up for renewal before it expires in December. Dhaka has already signalled that cordial relations will depend on extending the pact.  With China eagerly waiting to occupy any strategic space that India might cede in the neighbourhood, India also needs to walk the talk and strengthen its economic, trade and investment linkages with Bangladesh. The new government in Bangladesh is grappling with numerous economic challenges-from inflation and acute energy shortages to rising youth unemployment and sluggish FDI. India should capitalise on this moment by offering meaningful economic support.

Addressing Bangladesh’s long-standing concern over the sizeable trade deficit is equally critical. To that end, both nations should prioritise and expedite negotiations for the proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). While Beijing may currently appear to hold the advantage in the contest for influence, India has the advantage of geographical proximity. This geographical edge will continue to work in New Delhi’s favour-provided its diplomatic approach is driven by mutual benefit rather than an overbearing posture. This would also allow the BNP government to address its domestic constituency’s anti-India sentiments while reaping the benefits of robust ties with India.

The writer is a political analyst specialising in strategic affairs; Views presented are personal.