Agniveer and the broken Gorkha legacy
Pokhara has long been the cradle and nursery of Nepali Gorkha recruitment, a tradition abruptly halted in June 2022 when India dropped the Agniveer “bombshell” on Nepal and its Gorkha community. Until then, approximately 1,200 to 1,600 Nepal Domiciled Gorkhas (NDGs) were inducted into the Indian Army each year. Although there were hints that such a move was coming-given Agniveer’s tactical and strategic flaws-virtually no one outside the PMO and NSA Ajit Doval knew the plan would actually be implemented. The scheme has since drawn serious criticism from former service chiefs. Agniveer was conceived to cut manpower costs, especially pensions under OROP, which in 2019 exceeded even the modernisation budget. Yet it was marketed as an effort to “youth-ify” a military that was already among the world’s youngest and fittest. Recruitment was initially halted under the pretext of Covid-19, even as far more crowded activities like elections and the Kumbh Mela continued. In reality, the freeze that began in 2020 served to cut salary and pension allocations.
At the Chanakya Dialogue in November 2025, Defence Secretary Rajesh Singh lamented that India’s defence spending had dipped below 2 per cent of GDP. With recruitment paused for nearly three years, combined with Agniveer’s limited intake and the annual retirement of 60,000 soldiers, fighting units-typically 850 strong-are now short by 120 to 140 soldiers. The worst hit are the 38 Gorkha battalions, the Army’s largest regiment, which have not recruited a single Nepali Gorkha in six years. India was fortunate that Operation Sindoor did not escalate beyond visual-range exchanges, given such manpower deficiencies.
From the gate of the Embassy of India Pension Paying Office in Pokhara’s Ram Bazaar (formerly Rum Bazaar), one can still see the majestic Machapuchare massif watching over the town. Gold shops have multiplied despite the rising cost of bullion and shrinking remittances from the dwindling Brigade of Gorkhas. Yet ex-servicemen (ESM) are no longer openly lamenting Nepal’s ban on sending recruits or Delhi’s silence. Before the Gen Z uprising, nearly 60 per cent of Nepal’s Parliament comprised Communist MPs who had long opposed foreign military recruitment-even as 2,000 Nepalese youth leave the country daily in search of work.
Today, ESM prefer to stay quiet, just 90 days after the September uprising that produced an interim government. Many are now willing to accept Agniveer terms, even if reluctantly, but the Nepal government continues to oppose them. A future Parliament with a non-Communist majority may soften its stance. For the Gorkha community, the issue is existential: they do not want their legacy of valour to fade. Neither India nor Nepal has taken the initiative for a frank dialogue.
Delhi neither informed Kathmandu nor explained the implications of Agniveer. Nepal, for its part, referenced the 1947 Tripartite Treaty with the UK and India, hinting that the scheme might violate its spirit. Legally, Agniveer is tenable, but the dispute is fundamentally political and strategic, requiring high-level engagement. The dispute began in June 2022, when the Indian Embassy sought routine permission to conduct recruitment rallies. Kathmandu did not respond. Nepal signalled that the truncated terms of service-four years, only 25 per cent retention, and no pension for those discharged-were unacceptable compared to the earlier 15-year minimum service with pension. While the Indian Army has taken the hit, the British Army and Nepal Army have benefited. The British Army has always been the top choice due to better pay, but for combat exposure, discipline, and character building, the Indian Army remains unrivalled. Meanwhile, the Odisha Police and several Indian states, including Bihar, have tapped the gap by recruiting thousands of Nepali Gorkhas.
At the official level, India appears unperturbed by the loss of NDGs, seeing it as shedding colonial baggage. An MEA official even remarked that Nepal “has not come back to us.” The Army hierarchy has shown little concern, though senior commanders continue to swear by their Gorkha battalions. Senior Gorkha officers, including CDS Gen Anil Chauhan, have maintained silence, accepting the scheme as a “political decision.” Veterans hope matters will somehow resolve, yet no unified “Save the Gorkha” campaign has emerged despite the presence of a former Army Chief and dozens of Army Commanders from the regiment.
Among those advocating for a revival of recruitment is Subedar Khem Jung Gurung, a versatile ESM and member of the Janata Samajwadi Party. He told me in Pokhara that this is a “Gen Z ko sarkar,” and that since youth want to join-even under Agniveer — the issue must be pursued. For Gorkhas, this is about preserving an identity forged in blood and history. Only Prime Minister Modi can amend Agniveer to carve out an exception for Nepal, but little attention has been paid to the scheme’s impact on India-Nepal relations.
Questions over NDG loyalty have also surfaced. However, Indian officers posted across Nepal-many from Gorkha regiments-affirm that Gorkha ESM remain loyal to India, except on sensitive issues like the Kalapani dispute or the 2015 blockade. They refer to India as “hamro Bharat” and “Daju” (elder brother)-terms of affection, not doubt. For Nepal’s remittance-driven economy, Gorkha pensions and salaries-around Rs 5,000 crore annually-are vital, especially after the losses from the Gen Z uprising. By 2075, when India hopes to be “Viksit Bharat,” the last Gorkha soldier may retire, his aura long diminished.
This is a collective, avoidable loss: economic for Nepal, emotional for Gorkhas, and strategic for India. Are Modi and Doval listening?
The writer, a retired Major General, served as Commander, IPKF (South), Sri Lanka, and was a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff; views are personal
