This refers to the editorial, “Beijing’s sabre-rattling” (July 1). Ever since the Chinese and the Indian troops faced off on the Depsang Plains in 2013, New Delhi has steadily hardened its military posture along the line of Actual Control. In response, China appears to have escalated pressure on Bhutan, seeking to persuade the kingdom that New Delhi’s long-standing security guarantees are not credible. The aim of the pressure is well-known: To persuade Bhutan to cede Dokalam, through which China has built a road linking lhasa to the Nathu la pass and is in the process of driving a railway line, for two other disputed enclaves. The stand-off at Doklam has to be seen in the larger context of divergence in geostrategic pursuits and posturing by New Delhi and Beijing. The Chinese may feel they are entitled to feel peeved at New Delhi’s unwillingness to be impressed with Beijing’s superpower assertiveness; and, on its part, India is within its right to proactively protect New Delhi’s strategic footprints.
Yes, the Chinese will be well advised to stop threatening India by invoking their win in the 1962 war, and concentrate on efforts to de-escalate the situation arising out of the stand-off at the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction. Now, the Prime Minister will have to develop a policy vastly different to what he follows when dealing with other neighbouring countries — China is the ‘big brother’ in every sense of the term. Thus far it has been India’s policy to underplay difficulties with Beijing, has that only ‘encouraged’ more aggressive posturesIJ