This year’s Burtse face-off shows that India has learnt its lessons from the 2013 Daulat Beg Odie and the 2014 Chumar confrontations. An initial display of muscle power before starting peace negotiations goes a long way
It has been happening for decades. The Chinese just can’t resist intruding into the Indian territory. It had occurred in April 2013, before the visit of Premier li Keqiang to India and again when President Xi Jinping arrived in Ahmedabad in September 2014. The People’s liberation Army walked into what India considers her territory.
Recently, it was reported that a face-off occurred in Burtse, a few miles east of Daulat Beg Oldie, the site of the 2013 confrontation. According to one report, “The bone of contention is a surveillance structure being erected by the PlA very close to the line of Actual Control.” The Indo-Tibetan Border Police objected to the erection of a tower by the PlA and, with the help of the Army, dismantled the structure. The PlA called for reinforcements, followed by a massing of more Indian forces in the area.
The nationalist Chinese newspaper, The Global Times, quoting Mr Jiang Jingkui, director of the Department of South Asian languages at Peking University, counter-attacked: “Such media accusations are unreasonable, as Chinese troops have never intruded.” Mr Jiang added that this type of information always come from “a certain group of people, including the military, who are hostile towards China.”
Can we conclude that the Indian troops were victims of a high-altitude mirageIJ Hong lei, Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesman in Beijing declared: “As far as I know, there is no such ‘face-off’ between China and India in the border area,” adding that China is committed to maintaining peace and tranquility on the border area. Hence, not only were the local Indian troops fooled by the visual phenomena, but the unmanned aerial vehicles and other long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System, mistakenly saw the PlA troops entering the Indian territory, erecting a tower and later massing troops!
Another serious aspect was, however, not mentioned in the Indian Press. Just a day before the incident in ladakh, a senior member of the Chinese Central Military Commission visited Ngari Prefecture, which borders ladakh, in western Tibet. On September 9 and 10, General Zhang Yang, Director of the PlA’s Political Department, spent two days in Ngari. Officially, he came to convey the ‘loving care’ and the ‘deep feeling’ of the CPC’s Central Committee and the Military Commission to the cadres and masses. Apart from the customary photo sessions, Xinhua reported that General Zhang Yang visited the troops on the border. This raises an important question: Was the CMC member informed that the PlA was building a structure in an area considered by India to be within its territoryIJ let us presume that General Zhang was not informed. This means the PlA has a serious problem of command. If he was informed, it is a serious issue for India, as orders would have been issued at the PlA’s highest level.
The issue was eventually solved after two flag meetings at Daulat Beg Oldie and Chushul. As the nation is gripped by the ‘declassification’ fever, it is interested to look at some archival documents on how the situation was handled some 60 years ago at Shipki la, the pass between Himachal Pradesh and Tibet. It also started with some Chinese incursions.
On September 8, 1956, a note verbale presented to the Chinese Charge d’ Affaires in India gives us the background: “A party of about 10 Chinese Army personnel entered and took up position about two furlongs (1/2 kilometre) from Hupsong Khad on the Indian side of Shipki la Pass.” Delhi first thought it was by ‘mistake’, but soon discovered that the Chinese troops had deliberately crossed the pass and had started claiming areas located a few kilometres south of Shipki la, as Chinese territory.
Article IV of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 had defined the Indo-Tibet border: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route: Shipki la pass; Mana pass; Niti pass; Kungri Bingri pass; Darma pass; and lipu lekh pass.” But soon, China gave its own interpretation: ‘The passes were not marking the border, they were mere indication of the route through which traders could enter India.’ Amazing logic!
Two weeks after sending the ‘informal note’, Delhi presented an aide-mémoire to China: “The Government of India have received two reports of serious situations that recently developed between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki la Pass on the Indo-Tibetan border.” South Block then gave some details about the incidents and commented: “The Chinese Government will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents.” Delhi was “pained and surprised”.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was in a dilemma: How to reactIJ He wrote to the Foreign Secretary: “I agree with (your) suggestion …it would not be desirable for this question to be raised in the lok Sabha at the present stage.” Nehru decided to keep the matter secret within India while bringing it to the notice of the Chinese.
A meeting with officers from the Ministries of External Affairs, Home Affairs, Defence and the Himachal Pradesh Government was, however, held early October. Among other things, it was decided: “Since the Chinese troops had withdrawn (due to the winter), it was not necessary at present to send our troops to this area, “but” our personnel should be in physical possession of Shipki la pass before April 1 (next year). For this purpose, a permanent party, even though of a very small size, should be posted at the pass itself, or, if that is not possible, as close to the pass as possible.” Four days later, on October 10, the Prime Minister sent a note to the Foreign Secretary: “There is no question of sending any troops to the Shipki la now. In fact, even in the spring next year, I do not envisage the necessity of sending troops. The fate of Shipki la is not going to be decided by fighting or by a large show of force.”
Compare what happened in in Shipki la in 1956 and the recent Burtse incident. The moral of the story is that with the Chinese, a show of force helps prepare for the talks. The Indian Army (and its political bosses) seem to have understood this in recent times.
(The accompanying visual is of the recent Sino-Indian border personnel meet in ladakh’s Daulat Beg Oldie area. Photo courtesy: Ministry of Defence)