lesson of 2015, which was a year of setbacks for the Afghan Army, is that the military needs better leadership and enhanced weaponry if it is to provide the political leadership greater flexibility at the negotiating table
At the core of the two peace processes in South Asia are trouble-shooters, Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence — the deep state. India was struck by one of their many strategic assets, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, serially at Pathankot and the Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, rendering on hold the twice cancelled India-Pakistan talks.
In the second reconciliation dialogue with Afghanistan, the deep state plays an even more pivotal role: It nourishes, shapes and selects the Afghan Taliban whom Kabul calls the armed opposition which is to engage in direct talks with Kabul. The ISI is also involved in settling the factional fights within the Taliban to legitimise its chosen Emir of Taliban to replace the late Mullah Omar.
The group, owing allegiance to Pakistan is led by Mullah Akhtar Mansour who is challenged by a more moderate group headed by Mullah Rasool which has distanced itself from Islamabad and wants the talks to be among Afghans without any facilitation. It is believed that the Mansour faction opened its account of violence in the new year by a series of high-profile attacks in Kabul which it believes betters it bargaining at the negotiating table.
Not only will the deep state prop up the Mansour group for eventual face-to-face talks with Kabul, but will also facilitate the entry of the Haqqanis their leader Sirajuddin Haqqani is virtually deputy leader of the Taliban a US/UN banned terrorist group to the talks table. This charade of nominating a group chosen by Pakistan is blessed by the US and China, both Islamabad’s well-wishers, who have placed the destiny of Afghanistan in the hands of the deep state.
Great scepticism abounds in Kabul about the peace process as the National Unity Government is at the mercy of the US and Western donors. Instead of Pakistan reining in the Taliban and the Haqqanis, it has let them run riot, even as it pretends it has only influence, no control, over them.
Under Pakistan’s tutelage, the four-party talks Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US have held two meetings in Islamabad and Kabul and are due to hold the third at Islamabad on February 6, and probably one more before direct engagement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban chosen by Pakistan.
How China, which has so far invested no more than $300 million and recently committed another $237 million over three years, has come to be a part of the four-party talks is mystifying. Beijing is a free rider in Afghanistan. These preliminary meetings are designed to chalk out the broad agenda for inter-Afghan talks including any preconditions — like acceptance of Afghan Constitution, renunciation of violence and severing links with terrorism.
The three-stage dialogue is about evolving a roadmap for talks followed by inviting the Taliban and culminating with implementation of the peace plan. The US has convinced President Ashraf Ghani that the road to peace passes is through General Headquarters Rawalpindi.
Both Mr Ghani and Chief Executive of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah are on the same page scripted by the Americans that Kabul’s salvation lies in the accommodation of the armed opposition. Besides, the challenge of the reconciliation process, two other issues have to be confronted: First, the ratification of the arbitrary post of CEO which is an artificial arrangement crafted by the US to legitimise through compromise a fraudulent presidential election. Both Parliament and the loya Jirga will need to regularise the CEO in the Constitution by September. Second, is holding the postponed parliamentary election in October.
That 18 months after the formation of the NUG Defence Minister Masoom Stanekzai is still acting, reflects the squabbling for posts between North and South.
The Afghan National Security Forces has had a busy year battling the combined might of the Taliban and the Haqqanis estimated to be 40-60,00 fighters. ANSF has suffered nearly 30 per cent more casualties in 2015 than in the previous year when they fought independently (without the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) for the first time. Suffering 16,000 casualties including 7,000 killed is intense attrition given the Taliban occupy more territory in 2016 than at any time since 2001.
According to one estimate, roughly five per cent to 10 per cent of the 360 districts keep changing hands. The lesson of 2015 which the Afghans call the year of setbacks is that ANSF requires better leadership, greater motivation, enhanced weaponry and swifter mobility if they are to provide the political leadership greater flexibility at the negotiating table.
The Taliban is expected to be fighting while negotiating, a strategic posture enabling moral ascendency. A ceasefire which Kabul wants will come with costs. ANSF should exploit the divisions within the Taliban as rival groups battle for space and fight with the Islamic State. Similarly, Pakistan Taliban relocated in Afghanistan be used as a bargaining chip in road map for two-way talks.
Till last month, the usual things were being said about India in Afghanistan: On its own it does not shape outcomes: It is a peripheral player (not part of four-party talks); enjoys goodwill with highest popularity ratings but no political influence; is guided by the US and conscious of Pakistan’s sensitivities; it is in wait and watch mode — sitting on the fence; the two billion dollar committed to Afghanistan could have yielded better political gains elsewhere, and so on.
All this appears to be changing. In a first by any Government official, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in response to repeated requests from Kabul for operationalising the strategic partnership agreement announced in December last year at the most unlikely capital, Islamabad, the equally unlikely declaration: India is ready to work with Afghanistan to strengthen its defence capability. The Mazar-e-Sharif attack was apparently messaging from the ISI to lay off weaponising ANSF.
Already the first of four Mi25 helicopters has been delivered while tanks, guns and howitzers could be in the pipeline. New Delhi can no longer sit on the fence. Military equipment, trainers and a field hospital should be deployed to bolster the defence capability of ANSF. This will enable Kabul to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of relative strength.
When the stalled India-Pakistan dialogue is resumed, Afghanistan should figure prominently for the threats emanating from there, especially from the IS. This requires to be tackled jointly. Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently told the Afghan Parliament: “India is here, not to light the flame of conflict or compete in Afghanistan. We support Kabul without timelines and want Pakistan to be a bridge between South Asia and Afghanistan.” Strengthening the ANSF diminishes Pakistan’s leverage over the reconciliation process.