New Delhi must rewrite its Pakistan policy
As the Indian Army's 11-day long effort to flush out infiltrators from the Keran sector in Jammu & Kashmir draws down, two things have become clear: First, high-level peace talks with Pakistan are meaningless unless they are supported by improvements on the ground. And second, those improvements are unlikely to happen any time soon. Indian soldiers had been locked in a bloody battle in Keran with Pakistani irregulars supported by Pakistani troops, while Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was meeting Mr Nawaz Sharif in New York. Islamabad and Rawalpindi may choose to deny the role of the military in this episode, but without overt and covert support from Pakistani soldiers, as many as 40 militants could not have infiltrated, survived and sustained themselves this long in the face of an Indian onslaught. Also, electronic surveillance has indicated that the terrorists were being replenished with arms and ammunition by the Pakistani Army. The confrontation in Keran cannot be viewed in isolation. It comes just weeks after five Indian soldiers were killed in the Poonch sector. Pakistani troops were watching Indian movements and they attacked during a change-of-guard. In Keran too, they followed the same pattern by taking over the post when it was vacant during a similar change-of-guard exercise. Also, both episodes have played out against the backdrop of ceasefire violations that caused rising tensions and increasing hostilities along the line of Control.
let alone improve, the situation will more likely deteriorate in the near future with a possible return to the kind of constant fighting and firing along the loC that characterised the 1990s. In fact, Shala Bhata, the ghost village which the militants had infiltrated, had been abandoned two decades ago because the residents could no longer live in a battlefield. Importantly, Shala Bhata is also strategically located atop a vital arc that overlooks Pakistan's main line of communication along the loC. It does not require a military analyst to figure out why Pakistan would like to grab this particular village. Incidentally, short-term occupation of vacant posts held by the enemy, followed by low-intensity battles for tactical superiority, had been a common phenomenon in the 90s. But it had stopped over the years as the loC had calmed down and a semblance of peace was established. The last time such an incident was reported was in 2002, when infiltrators occupied the loonda post, also in the same sector. At that time, New Delhi had responded firmly by bombing the occupied bunkers in broad daylight, after which Indian troops took back their positions. No such incidents were reported — until now.
So, why has the situation taken a turn for the worseIJ The answer to that lies in a combination of factors which include the 2014 US withdrawal from Afghanistan that has created a regional flux, the upcoming change of guard within the Pakistani military and the return to power of Mr Sharif with at least some support from extremist elements, who now want their pound of flesh. But more importantly, it is the presence of a lame duck regime in New Delhi, with a propensity to appease Pakistan and with little political will to be strong and decisive in the face of an adversary, that has emboldened the militants and their Pakistani handlers.