Experts say the Indian Army and the political establishment are self-deterred when dealing with Pakistan. Recent incidents along the loC reflect a lowering of guard and misplaced virtuosity on strategic restraint
One th0ing is clear: Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has accepted cohabitation with the Army for regime longevity. It is also clear that the Army will not rock the boat till its red lines are crossed. Both are learning to work within their own space, and in the main will operate on the same page. Mr Sharif can keep shouting from the rooftops that the people will never be overruled again and democracy will prevail, a sentiment Chief of Army Staff Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani recently endorsed. Still, it is the Army which will call the shots. Civilian control of the military is a bridge too far in Pakistan, though the Army has made concessions, permitting Mr Sharif to become the first Prime Minister to visit nuclear installations.
When he took office it was said that three events will determine Mr Sharif’s stature vis a vis the Army: The fate of Gen Pervez Musharraf; the selection of Gen Kayani’s successor; and, picking up the threads of the lahore Agreement to jump-start India-Pakistan relations. Gen Musharraf has not been humiliated while he continues to face the courts. Eventually, once Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry retires in December, Gen Musharraf will be allowed to leave Pakistan gracefully. Mr Sharif has so far kept his part of the bargain not to rub Gen Musharraf’s nose on the ground.
On the next Army Chief, reams are being turned out in Pakistan over the line-up and likely successor. In the order of seniority are lt Gens Haroon Aslam, Rashad Mehmood, Tariq Khan and Zahir ul Islam. Mr Sharif has said he will follow the seniority principle, which is almost scrupulously followed in India. There is no dark horse, but the one about whom much is being made is Tariq Khan, who won fame in Swat. Gen Kayani’s choice is Mr Mehmood. The new chief will be announced next month, concurrent with the appointment of the Joint Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.
The buzz is that Gen Kayani may be appointed National Security Adviser or head of a revamped Chiefs of Staff organisation. More likely he will ride into the sunset to write his memoirs as the first COAS to be granted an extension by a civilian Government. Bitten once, Mr Sharif will be extremely careful in making his choices.
Despite all the right noises, peace with India has eluded Mr Sharif. Having tested the waters, he chose to collude with the Army to vitiate the line of Control, and simultaneously made peace overtures. He played up to the Punjabi jihadists by resurrecting the Kashmir issue at United Nations General Assembly, while winking at their anti-India ranting at lahore and Islamabad. He was quick to realise that Mr Manmohan Singh was a lame duck Prime Minister and that he could deliver on nothing. The New York summit last month was, therefore, the stuff of memorabilia.
The Indian maestro at the summit talks was the National Security Adviser, Mr Shiv Shankar Menon, whose low-key, low-profile style masks the tremendous power he exercises in foreign policy. In his briefings to the Indian and the Pakistani media after the summit, he used the word ‘pre-condition’ twice to categorise the significance of restoring ceasefire on the loC for resuming dialogue, borrowing from the line of Actual Control the more prescriptive terminology of maintaining ‘peace and tranquility’ on the loC. Forward movement on dialogue — not the composite dialogue which Pakistan wants — is for all intents and purposes conditional (a term the Indian foreign office is loath to admit) on good behaviour on the loC by Pakistan’s military establishment, he said.
last week, the NSA wrote to the Union Ministry of Defence, directing it to initiate DGMO-level talks for maintaining a stable and peaceful loC in accordance with the Simla Agreement and terms of delineation of the loC. Para 4(II) of the Simla Agreement reads: “The loC shall be respected by both sides who undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.” Para 6’s reference to ‘establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations’ conforms to the present advocacy of restoring the sanctity of loC for resuming dialogue.
Apparently, there is no record in the Indian foreign office of what is referred to as the Cease Fire Agreement of November 26, 2003. The verifiable facts are that the offer was made following back-channel talks by Gen Musharraf under considerable pressure from the Americans and artillery duels along the loC during and after Operation Parakram. That is why there was no reference to this agreement in New York during the summit or at the media briefings.
Cast in stone is the fact that the CFA held for the best part till 2011-2012. Cross-loC infiltration, which is the lifeline of the insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir, was first reduced on orders of Gen Musharraf and acknowledged in August 2002 by the then Indian COAS, Gen S Padmanabhan. later, fencing the anti and counter-infiltration grids aided with technology, higher density of troops and effective politico-military leadership, resulted in bringing down the terrorist population from a high of nearly 3,000 in 2003-2004 to just about 300 today.
Incidents in Keran and Samba and the unprecedented ceasefire violations this year are part of the Pakistan military design to restore the ‘numbers balance’ in order to what Gen Bikram Singh calls, “keep Kashmir simmering”. The beheading of an Indian soldier, ambush of five others, and Keran and Samba incidents this year have kept the loC unsettled. This is a familiar replay after a pause of instigated violence in J&K to keep the Kashmir dispute in the spotlight. Blaming Pakistan’s Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence for aiding and abetting infiltration which they consider a legitimate mission is superfluous. Gen Singh is demanding the Pakistan military establishment be held accountable. The remedy, largely in his hands, has to be repackaged and employed creatively to impose costs and deterrence — nothing else will work.
Experts say the Indian Army and the political establishment are self-deterred. Keran, Samba and other incidents reflect a lowering of guard, over-cautiousness and lack of offensive defence. This passiveness is a malignant handicap induced by a misplaced virtuosity on strategic restraint. The post-2014 Afghanistan scare scenario is being overplayed. Pakistan’s military establishment will settle for nothing less than a friendly Government in Kabul, which will not materialise too easily. Instead of reacting in Kashmir, we should consider investing resources pre-emptively in Afghanistan.
Tough times lie ahead as the Pakistani Army has identified our reluctance to act tough. Empty threats of ‘consequences’ are like an old record stuck in its groove.