Modi trashes UPA legacy of state capitulation
By calling off the Foreign Secretary-level talk with Pakistan, in response to Islamabad's envoy in New Delhi meeting with Kashmiri separatists, the Union Government has drawn its red lines and made clear that it will not tolerate them being violated. Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh had previously conveyed India's reservations on this issue to the Pakistani High Commissioner, Mr Abdul Basit, and given him a clear choice: Either engage with the separatists or with the Government of India. He and his bosses in Islamabad chose the former. Now, it is entirely possible that the Pakistani authorities assumed that India was bluffing, that they could have their cake and eat it too, as indeed they have done through much of these past two decades. A desperate-to-please Congress-led UPA regime had allowed meetings of Pakistani politicians and diplomats with Kashmiri separatists, in the run-up to official meetings with Indian leaders, to become part of the bilateral dialogue. Thankfully, the BJP-led NDA Government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has trashed that shameful, if not offensive, template. No legitimate Government of a sovereign state should be amenable to such shenanigans which effectively erode its own authority.
Modi-baiters have expectedly criticised the Government for derailing the peace talks. This is a factitious argument. Terms and conditions, some negotiable, some non-negotiable, are attached to every negotiation. It is only when both parties agree to them can there be meaningful engagement. In this case, Pakistan broke the rules. Hence, India disengaged. However, this does not prevent the two from re-engaging at a later stage. It merely debunks the absurd case for ‘unconditional engagement' that is often made by jholawallahs. The other reason why the cancellation of the talks is not the last nail in the coffin of the India-Pakistan peace process, as some peaceniks are making it out to be, is that little was expected from the meeting in the first place. It was a symbolic step, at best, and a waste of state resources, at worst. Moreover, given the current situation in Pakistan, wherein Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's one-year-old Government is facing one of its gravest challenges yet, it is unlikely that Islamabad would have been able to expend the political capital necessary to make the talks a success.
In fact, the talks may have suffered because a weak political force in Pakistan essentially translates into a stronger military hand. More specifically, Prime Minister Sharif knows that his Government will hold strong as long as the Army does not step in to favour his political opponents. At this point, he will not do anything to antagonise the generals in Rawalpindi — least of all, fight them on a foreign policy issue that is so close to their hearts. Also, the recent conflagrations along the line of Control, timed keeping in mind the talks that had been scheduled for August 25, makes it amply clear who has the upper hand in Pakistan. Finally, some critics of Mr Modi have said that his policies weaken Mr Sharif, who remains India's best hope in Pakistan. But it is not for the Indian Prime Minister to strengthen his Pakistani counterpart's position; nor is it his job to weaken it. It's for Mr Sharif to rise to the occasion.