Composite dialogue started in 1997, was suspended after Kargil, restarted after the 2003 ceasefire agreement, suspended after 26/11, restarted after Sharm-el Sheikh, and suspended again after the beheadings this year
The ceasefire of 2003 held for so long that the current intensity and frequency of its violations along the line of Control can only be equated with the fire and spark of Operation Parakram. Neither of the Directors-General of Military Operations has broached the need for restoring peace and tranquillity as agreed by Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Nawaz Sharif at the New York summit last month. Who will bell the catIJ Pehle aap.
In the meantime, the Pakistani Army has upped the ante targetting posts on the International Border which they call the Working Boundary with multiple objectives, among them creating gaps for infiltration and bolstering terrorist capacities for internationalising Kashmir, even as Mr Sharif met US President Barack Obama in Washington, DC, asking him to intervene in Kashmir and seeking nuclear parity with India.
While Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has advocated exploring “other options” to counter Pakistani firing, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid enunciated his pithiest theory: We are talking to Pakistan but it is not a dialogue. National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon, one of the biggest votaries of engaging Pakistan and the one who scripted the Sharm-el Sheikh summit statement which said “action against terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue”, lambasted 40 self-styled experts from the strategic community who asked Mr Singh not to talk to Pakistan till ideal conditions exist and all terrorism stops. Actually, they advised not to rush into a conversation and cancellation of the New York summit though not ending dialogue. Still, the summit took place, and the only initiative it produced was on stopping ceasefire violations — an outcome unlikely to fructify enytime soon. The firing will taper down once the passes close.
The debate in India on engaging Pakistan has never been more shrill but evenly divided with the naysayers largely influenced by public opinion. Mr Singh has said India cannot be a great power unless it is at peace with Pakistan. This begs the question: Does Pakistan — its military establishment and its army of jihadis —want to live in peace with IndiaIJ Saner Pakistanis, the constituency Mr Menon wants to cultivate through talks, and some Americans tell Indians that there has been some change of heart in the Pakistani Army, that militancy and terrorism and not India are the main threats; and the days of military coups are over.
Pakistani Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani who frequently spells out his thoughts at the Kakul Military Academy exhorted officer-cadets last month to fight terrorism and support democracy. This must have been music to Mr Sharif’s ears. He has said that he won the election championing improved relations with India and reviving the lahore Agreement, and was also forced out of office in 1999 for these very reasons.
Mr Singh’s Special Envoy on AfPak, Mr Satinder lambah, attended Prime Minister Sharif’s swearing-in, and with his counterpart Sharyar Khan backchanneled for weeks to make the New York summit a reality. Unfortunately, a week before the summit, the Pakistani Army opened the Keran front which was an extension of the ongoing ceasefire violations in the Poonch and Mendhar sectors.
It appears Mr Sharif has been persuaded to shelve his India programme till the new Government in New Delhi takes office. In the interim, he has unwisely joined hands with the Army and Punjabi Taliban to strengthen his nationalist credentials. This dangerous game of looking both ways is bound to haunt him. Mr Sharif is expecting a miracle if he thinks he will be able to alter the behaviour of the Army towards India and his civilian leadership. In other words, a shift in the civil military balance of power. As this is most unlikely, the Army chief who will replace Gen Kayani on November 29 — most probably lieutenant General Rashad Mahmood — will pay lip service to strengthening democracy so that US and international aid is not switched off. Washington needs the Pakistani Army’s services and cooperation for a responsible withdrawal from Afghanistan. It will even countenance some misbehaviour on the loC and in Kashmir. Still, in the joint statement with Mr Sharif, Mr Obama obtained “no country’s territory should be used to destabilise it’s neighbours”.
Talks between India and Pakistan may resume by the middle of next year to break the hassled cycle of disruption and dialogue. Previously disruption was inflicted by a major cross-border terrorist attack. Now it is through violent incidents on the loC inflamed by public opinion. Clearly, India’s tolerance level on terrorism has shrunk considerably though no element of deterrence has replaced strategic restraint. Tactical reprisals on or along the loC are not good enough. The Army and security forces can create the environment conducive for dialogue only by convincing the adversary that violence will not pay.
The composite dialogue, started in 1997, was suspended after Kargil and remained disrupted till the ceasefire of 2003 and General Pervez Musharraf’s demonstrated committments not to allow the use of Pakistan soil for cross-border terrorism. During the Musharraf era not only did the ceasefire hold but infiltration also reduced and a Kashmir resolution appeared within grasp. Between June 2004 and May 2008 five rounds of composite dialogue were held, till disrupted by Mumbai 26/11 which occurred after Gen Musharraf’s exit. Two-and-a-half more rounds of revived talks followed till the beheading of an Indian soldier in January this year and the attack later on the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
Mr Sharif has six months to establish his bona fides by showing progress on the trial of the 26/11 accused and reining in the Punjabi Taliban and the Army. He has conveniently linked the grant of the Most Favoured Nation status to India to normalisation of relations and peace on loC which his Army has disturbed. While in Beijing, Mr Singh said: “India and China have progressed as the border was tranquil”. Here is one set of issues to resume dialogue. It should begin with renewing committment to the provisions of the Simla Agreement, inviolability of the loC and non-use of Pakistani territory for cross-border terrorism. These are as per the loC agreement of December 1972 and ceasefire agreement of November 2003. To the issues of Kashmir and terrorism, add Afghanistan and Balochistan. These core concerns should be discussed at the Foreign Minister/National Security Advisor level. The second cluster should include trade, travel, water (including the Tulbul Navigation Project) and people-to-people ties. The third bunch could be military-to-military and other confidence-building measures. Siachen and Sir Creek are settled issues that require political ratification and can wait till there is progress on core concerns. Just a rejig of the toolbox.