But Congress-led UPA has no counter-strategy
The horrific Maoist attack on security personnel in Chhattisgarh on Tuesday that claimed 16 lives adds to the high price that the nation continues to pay for the Congress-led UPA Government's inability to fight the radicals. Over the past decade, the regime, undecided about how to approach the issue, has failed to put together a strong and comprehensive counter-insurgency programme. As a result, Maoist attacks have continued with impunity. The latest attack happened in the same area where 27 people, including almost the entire State-level leadership of the Congress, were killed by insurgents last May. That strike happened while the politicians were campaigning for the State Assembly election, much like Tuesday's ambush has been timed keeping in mind the upcoming lok Sabha poll. Spectacular attacks have been the Maoists' standard response to any electoral exercise — which is in keeping with their opposition to the Indian state and the democratic values that it represents — and even the intelligence agencies had sent out warnings in this regard. In fact, between March 5 and March 9, at least six inputs had been sent to the local security personnel about Maoists assembling in the area and additional insurgents trooping in from neighbouring States. Yet, the Union Minister for Home Affairs Sushil Kumar Shinde's has claimed that there was no “specific” intelligence. It is unclear why he has made this assessment — Was his ministry in the dark about the alertsIJ Or, is he reluctant to accept that despite the warnings the attack could not be preventedIJ Neither gives any comfort but both point to the UPA’s ham-handed response to what is still India's greatest internal security threat.
One can hope that as the general election approaches and the Maoist threat gains larger proportions, the Government will get its act together. Unfortunately, if past experiences with the UPA regime are anything to go by, it is easier said than done. Take the 2010 Dantewada attack which killed 76 policemen. The massacre initially moved then Home Minister P Chidambaram to prioritise the Maoist threat, which had almost fallen off the Union Government's radar during his predecessor Shivraj Patil's tenure. But the programme quickly lost traction. Two years later, when Mr Shinde replaced Mr Chidambaram, even the semblance of an offensive was effectively put to rest.
The UPA's counter-insurgency efforts have suffered from the Congress's ideological infirmity towards the Maoists. On the one hand, there was an occasional leader like Mr Chidambaram who sought to take a strong line against the rebels. On the other, there have always been the likes of Mr Digvijaya Singh who portrayed the terrorists as “misguided ideologues”, publicly criticised party colleagues for advocating harsh measures, and even scuttled bipartisan political responses by bad-mouthing non-Congress State Governments. Towards this end, they also had the support of the National Advisory Council, Congress president Sonia Gandhi's personal think-tank, which often empathises with the Maoists. Indeed, as a result of the Congress's fickle-minded approach, even the country’s occasional successes in the fight against the Maoists — such as the Grey Hounds in Andhra Pradesh — could not be scaled-up into a national strategy.