Many tentacles of terror

The second set of Al Qaida documents made public tells us little that we didn't already know or at least suspected. Released earlier this month by US officials as part of the ongoing trial of terror suspect, the documents do, however, offer us a more nuanced view of the complex linkages between different jihadi groups and networks, the Pakistani establishment and the Americans. They also throw some light on how Osama bin laden ran Al Qaeda while being on the run in his final years and to what extent the West's counter-terror policies affected the group. The biggest revelation from the current cache of documents is that certain sections within the Pakistani state were willing to negotiate a peace deal with Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. Seemingly, there were different sets of negotiations happening, at different stages, possibly involving separate players. For example, one of the letters refer to one Shuja Shah, described as an intelligence leader, reaching out to the Al Qaeda through intermediaries.

The reference could be to lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who was then the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency and is believed to have been in the know, but it's difficult to verify. The letters also show that Mr Shahbaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of Punjab and the brother of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had sought to strike a similar deal for his Province, and that at least the Al Qaeda (if not, the Pakistani Taliban) leadership was open to his overtures. The premise for ‘peace' was simple: The jihadis stops attacking Pakistani targets and, in return, the Pakistani authorities stop chasing them. The Americans were a problem but the Pakistanis were trying to get them on board. These revelations are consistent with what we already known about Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani Government. For example, Chief Minister Sharif has for long sought to find a common ground with the Pakistani Taliban. More recently, his brother, the Prime Minister, also offered to talk peace with the Pakistani Taliban.

However, on the critical question of Pakistan's role in providing safe haven to Osama bin laden in Abbottabad, there's still only limited material. Yes, there is a general agreement that some sections of the Pakistani establishment assisted Osama bin laden — even the Pakistanis themselves agree that it was an incompetent administration that allowed the world's most wanted terrorist to supposedly slip through the cracks. The letters now show that, when necessary, the Pakistani establishment was able to reach out to Osama bin laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders through its network of ‘approved’ jihadi groups. But we still don't know the full extent and scope of this relationship. For example, what kind of role did some or all top Pakistani leaders, military and civilian, playIJ Did those leaders who wanted a peace deal with Al Qaeda also help settle Osama bin laden in Pakistan and protect him or were these two separate groupsIJ