Afghanistan is seeking India’s assistance in meeting its military needs to modernise its security forces and counter threats from the Taliban. New Delhi had been circumspect in the past. It must shed its reluctance
Disillusioned, nay betrayed, by Pakistan, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani sent his National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar and Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Karzai, a nephew of former President Hamid Karzai, to meet their counterparts in Delhi to apprise them of recent developments in Afghanistan. Both Mr Atmar and Mr Karzai are no strangers among Indian strategic circles, having been familiar faces on the seminar circuit. Mr Atmar has an enviable pedigree a former mujahideen, and among other assignments, the Interior Minister in the Karzai Government. He was also member of the current Afghanistan Policy Group which is seeking a regional solution for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Ever since Mr Ghani’s fatal infatuation with Pakistan, following a reversal of his predecessor’s anti-Pakistan policy, New Delhi was kept marginalised in its wait and watch mode till Islamabad showed its true colours. Instead of the peace settlement with Taliban, Pakistan delivered a massive Taliban offensive that pulverised Kabul. Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have plummeted with the trust deficit larger than ever. Turning to an old and reliable friend in the region with whom Afghanistan signed its first strategic partnership in 2012 after Pakistan’s perfidy, was only natural.
The US new Great Game had been to get rid of Mr Karzai, replace him with its nominee who will turn to Pakistan, who in turn will help to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. Since 2010, the US has been trying to have Pakistan’s security interests accommodated in Afghanistan. China was roped in by Mr Ghani as it has huge influence over Pakistan and is the source of economic investment. With this conjugation of stars, Washington, DC, hoped that Afghanistan at least, unlike Iraq, libya, Syria and Ukraine, would be a success story enabling a clean and responsible exit. Mr Ghani displeased India by putting all his eggs in Islamabad’s ISI basket. At the same time, he asked Pakistan to make a choice: Between the Taliban and its cohorts and the elected Government in Kabul. The answer he got was that either Pakistan is unable or more likely, unwilling to deliver the Taliban till it can get a better deal. Foreign Affairs advisor Sartaj Aziz has emphasised that Pakistan has influence but no control over the Taliban, though others say that the ISI has control only over the Taliban which is located in Pakistan. Clearly Mr Ghani either overestimated the ISI control or was misled into believing that Pakistan exercised influence and control. Given the known locations of Pakistan’s Quetta and Peshawar Shooras and their intimate relations with the ISI, Pakistan has played a duplicitous role: Helping the Taliban launch Operation Azm which culminated in the capture of Kunduz concurrent with assuring the Afghans that it would tame the Taliban for negotiations. If another round of talks post-Murree is held, it will have to be in Pakistan, Islamabad has said.
Compared to just two years, the political, economic and security indices have declined dramatically in Afghanistan. The disarray in the National Unity Government is an open secret. The Taliban rampages in Kabul and Kunduz brought out intelligence, leadership and morale failures in the ANSF. The flight of capital and Afghan refugees to Europe being only next to Syria, indicates the economic distress. It was to arrest the rapidly deteriorating situation veering towards the collapse of the Kabul Government that US President Barack Obama decided to stay the withdrawal of US troops by one year, leaving the ultimate exit of forces to his successor in 2017. This one-year extension of forces will cost the US $14.6 billion, for which it must thank its major non-Nato ally, Pakistan.
So what solace and advice can India provide to Messers Atmar and Karzai IJ Unlike Pakistan, on its own New Delhi does not have the capacity to determine outcomes in Afghanistan. It can contribute significantly in coalition with Iran, Russia and some Central Asian Republics, as it did in expelling the Taliban in 2001. While it enjoys immense popularity in Afghanistan, it does not exercise any political influence, though it has some influence with both factions of the the NUG; and little or none with Taliban, which is a strategic omission. It can help fix differences between Mr Ghani and Mr Abdullah. While putting boots on the ground has been ruled out, India will join a UN force deployed in the future. It should substantially enhance training programmes for the ANSF and maintain supply of non-lethal equipment. The self-imposed embargo of not providing military hardware in deference to Pakistan’s sensitivities should be lifted, as it is time to stop viewing Afghanistan through Islamabad’s prism.
In the past, New Delhi provided three utility helicopters. Now, four Russian Mi25 attack helicopters are to be financed by India. The ANSF had asked for the Hinde Mi35 attack helicopter which Russia is supplying to Pakistan, as the first ever piece of military equipment. Islamabad has apparently exercised its veto to prevent the sale of Mi35 to the ANSF. In fact, India must consider providing tanks and guns to the ANSF, which on Pakistan’s insistence has been trained only in counter-insurgency and not to fight Kunduz type of battles. The development of Chabahar Port must be fast-tracked to bypass Pakistan and develop Afghanistan as a transit hub linking it with the North-South Corridor. India, Iran Afghanistan should form a consortium to enlarge the project for enhancing connectivity.
The fall of Kunduz has ignited fresh security concerns in the US and Afghanistan about the capability of the ANSF and the Kabul regime to deal with the existential threat posed by the Taliban. Mr Ghani does not have many options. With reassurances from Islamabad, he can return to Pakistan to negotiate with the Taliban, presumably tamed by the ISI. Washington cracking the whip on its frenemy in Islamabad, will help. This option will work only if Pakistan cooperates either under duress or given additional incentives from the US, like a civil nuclear deal, a squadron of F16 or even F35. The better deal that Pakistan seeks from Afghanistan, in addition to a friendly Government in Kabul and Governors of its choice in provincial and district headquarters in South and East, is a final settlement of the Durand line. This option too will fail as even the Taliban does not recognise the Durand line.
The option that has some chance of deterring Pakistan is the one to which Mr Atmar recently contributed: The Afghanistan Policy Group Regional Project, which recommends a codified UN-mandated and monitored non-interference mechanism followed in the longer term by the acceptance of Afghanistan’s neutrality. At present, Kabul stares at a bleak horizon.