India's new port of call

India's $100 million investment in Iran's Chabahar port is the key to protecting its own interests in the region and must not be viewed as cocking a snook at the West which has imposed sanctions on Tehran. located at the confluence of the Indian Ocean and the Oman Sea, the port has strategic value for New Delhi as it allows India to side-step a hostile Pakistan and enjoy direct access to Afghanistan. For example, in April 2012, India used Chabahar to ship 1,00,000 tonnes of wheat and food aid to Afghanistan.

Similarly, it also plans to import minerals from Afghanistan's Hajigak iron mine, in which it has a large stake, through the same route. Essentially, Chabahar gives India the ability to dispatch goods and supplies, and if necessary even troops, straight to Afghanistan via Iran. This will be invaluable for India especially after US-led Nato troops withdraw from Afghanistan beginning early 2014. At that time, Pakistan can be expected to up the ante against India as it intensifies its own efforts to capture political space in Afghanistan. Already, Pakistan does not allow India land transit rights to Afghanistan, and there are no indications that it will change what has been a long-held state policy. let us not forget that back in the 90s, Chabahar was built with Indian assistance because even then India wanted an alternative route that bypassed Pakistan.

For land-locked Afghanistan too, a fully developed Chabahar port will be a tremendous blessing. It will reduce the country's dependence on Pakistan, which maintains a virtual monopoly over Afghanistan's sea-borne transit trade and can be trusted upon to exploit it to the fullest post-2014, possibly in association with China. It is against this backdrop that Chabahar's location just 76 kms from Pakistan's Gwadar port assumes strategic import. In February this year, Pakistan announced that China would be operating that port. This, for the first time, provides China with sustained anchorage on the edge of the Arabian Sea, close to the Strait of Hormuz through which passes the bulk of the world's oil and gas supply. Clearly, Indian presence in that neighbourhood through the Chabahar port can favourably alter regional power dynamics.

If, despite these geo-strategic advantages, the West scoffs at India's Iranian dalliance, it is unfortunate. While India does share Western concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, those cannot trump its own national security concerns. Moreover, New Delhi’s foreign policy is its preserve alone. By rejuvenating its ties with Iran, at a time when the latter has been shunned as an international pariah, India has proved that it maintains an independent foreign policy, not driven by the diktats of the West. Sure, the sanctions make it immensely difficult to do business with Iran, but by ramping up its engagement with that country inspite of it all, India has taken a calculated risk. After all, the prospect of China extending its influence in the region is too serious to gloss over.