Islamabad is determined to ensure that, even as the American withdrawal proceeds, the Taliban takes control of Afghanistan. This is bad news for India, given the strategic interest it has in the region
Over-optimistic assessments about a ‘change of heart’ in the political elite in Islamabad and in Pakistan’s de facto rulers, its Khaki-uniformed military, reinforced by self-serving ‘they are now good boys’ certificates from the Americans and British, have often led the Indian establishment to erroneously assess Pakistan’s political imperatives and policies. The present narrative emerging from New Delhi’s starry-eyed Wagah ‘candle-light brigade’ is that with Mr Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi with a strong political base in the Army-dominated Punjab Province, now Pakistan’s Prime Minister, we are assured of terrorism-free ties and blossoming bonhomie and friendship. It is true that Mr Sharif is keen that nothing should come in the way of his efforts to set the Pakistani economy in order, or set right the power crisis in his country. Tensions with India will be an avoidable distraction for him and should, in his political perspective, presently be avoided.
A good beginning has been made to normalise ties with Pakistan after the recent elections there. The Prime Minister’s Special Envoy Satinder lambah, who is a hard-headed realist on relations with Pakistan, met Mr Sharif in lahore, even before Mr Sharif assumed office. Mr Nawabzada Shahryar Khan, a suave and sophisticated Pakistani diplomat was, in turn, sent to New Delhi. It has been agreed that ‘back channel’ talks will be resumed between the designated Special Envoys. The back channel talks, which earlier took place between Mr lambah and his then counterpart, Mr Tariq Aziz, did make substantial progress in devising a framework to deal with the Kashmir issue, by arriving at common ground between General Pervez Musharraf’s proposals for ‘self- governance’ and Mr Manmohan Singh’s assertion in Amritsar that borders cannot be redrawn, but we can work towards making them ‘just lines on a map’.
The ‘back channel’ talks between 2005 and 2007 took place after Mr Musharraf assured Mr Vajpayee in January 2004 that “territory under Pakistan’s control will not be used for terrorism against India”. This was preceded by an agreement for a ceasefire across the loC in Jammu & Kashmir — an agreement that has broadly been observed by both sides, with violations occasionally occurring, when jihadis are sought to be infiltrated across the loC. Moreover, Mr Musharraf did, for various reasons, rein in his jihadi groups till his power progressively eroded in 2007. While he did keep his Corps Commanders informed about the ‘back channel’ talks, I was not surprised when two of his favourites, whom he made four-star Generals, subsequently insisted to me that they were unaware of what had transpired.
The Pakistan Army is quick to disown whatever it finds inconvenient. We should have no doubt that the Sharif Government will not agree to start ‘back channel’ discussions from where they concluded in 2007. We can, at best, expect some progress on Kashmir-related confidence building measures. Disowning past agreements is a trademark of Pakistani foreign policy. General Zia-ul-Haq was, determined to disown the Simla Agreement and Benazir Bhutto junked the ministerial Joint Commission set up by Gen Zia.
Pakistan is going to be primarily focussed on developments on its western borders across the Durand line. While it pays lip service to non-interference and respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, Pakistan appears determined to ensure that even as the American withdrawal proceeds, the Taliban takes control progressively of parts of south-eastern Afghanistan, while keeping the entire Pashtun belt under its pressure.
In their desperation to cut their losses and exit from Afghanistan, the Americans appear quite reconciled to this happening. I was interested to take note recently of sneering references by some Pakistani friends ,asking how India would ensure the safety of its nationals spread across Afghanistan, once the Americans left. More importantly, whether it is on issues of dealing with terrorist groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Quetta and Peshawar Shura of the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, or the lashkar-e-Tayyeba, the real driving force will remain the Pakistan Army.
The constant refrain of Pakistani interlocutors now is that India ‘should forget about the past’, and ‘put Mumbai behind’ and move on with ‘business as usual’. In effect, the message is that we should forget about any possibility of Pakistan bringing the perpetrators of 26/11 to book. We should never forget that apart from being the most trusted asset of the Inter-Services Intelligence in waging jihad against India, Hafiz Saeed has enjoyed the patronage of two generations of the Sharif family and even today receives funding from the Punjab Government headed by Mr Shahbaz Sharif. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is slated to meet Mr Sharif in New York in September. It is imperative that he makes it clear to his counterpart that India will not ‘forgive or forget’ what transpired during the 26/11 attack and that terrorism cannot go hand in hand with dialogue and normalisation.
There is much that India and Pakistan can do to move the process of normalisation forward. The ministerial level Joint Commission set up in 1983 can be revived and reinvigorated. There could be greater energy cooperation involving the supply of electrical power and finished petroleum products across the Punjab border. Group tourism and pilgrimage, easing of visa restrictions and more extensive contacts between academics, youth and wide cross-sections of civil society need to be promoted. While welcoming improved trade relations, overzealous sections of India’s business community should avoid giving the impression that grant of obligatory Most Favoured Nation treatment to our exports is of vital importance to us.
The Pakistani military seems to have some ‘bright ideas’ to scare the Western world and India by threats of using tactical nuclear weapons against India, if the latter retaliates following another 26/11-style terrorist attack. I was compelled to respond to such threats, recently telling Pakistani military officials that we were not impressed by such bluster, and adding that while the Pakistan Army was ‘adventurist’, its officers lived too comfortably to be ‘suicidal’! The Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Mr Shyam Saran, has conveyed this quite bluntly while explaining the tenets of India’s nuclear doctrine. A wide ranging defence dialogue with Pakistan including more regular contacts between the Armies, Navies and Air Forces would be useful.
There appears little prospect of any movement on issues like demarcation of the land boundary around Sir Creek and beyond, or on the Siachen issue. One will have to live with the status quo on such issues, while ensuring existing CBMs are respected.