Be it in Tibet, where locals rarely uses violence but are frustrated by Central policies, or in Xinjiang, where the temptation to use violence is stronger, Beijing has utterly failed in its so-called minority strategy
On March 1 shortly after 9pm, 33 people were killed and 130 wounded when a group of attackers dressed in black went on the rampage at Kunming railway station. The ‘terrorists’ indiscriminately hacked and stabbed passers-by. A day later, Xinhua, quoting Kunming officials, said that the initial investigations suggested the deadly attack was “planned and organised by separatist forces from Xinjiang.” The attack came a day ahead of the opening of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and two days before the first session of the National People’s Congress. The South China Morning Post commented: “It is traditionally the most politically sensitive time of the year, with the Government eager to maintain stability and paint a rosy picture as thousands of delegates and Government leaders head to the capital.”
One question comes to mind: Why should Uyghur dissidents strike out in their homelandIJ last November, an article in The China Daily, which went unnoticed in the main media, has perhaps the answer. The Chinese newspaper reported that a delegation from Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi visited lhasa, Tibet’s capital, to “learn more about security and stability”. The delegation, taken around by Mr Deng Xiaogang, the local security czar, had not come for sight-seeing. They were in Tibet to inspect the effective grid management system, which arranges every five or 10 households into a group. According to the Chinese daily: “They concluded that the Urumqi Government should put more effort into improving community facilities and service, enhancing the management of its floating population, and maintaining community stability.” The Orwellian monitoring system put in place in Tibet (probably by Mr Deng) is now being replicated in Xinjiang and other ‘restive’ areas of China. For the rebels, it was probably easier to recklessly strike in the relatively peaceful Yunnan Province.
To come back to the Kunming incident, witnesses said that six men and two women used long knives to “crazily” attack innocent passengers. Terrified victims ran away seeking protection. The legal Daily newspaper reported that the Special Weapons And Tactics unit arrived on the scene less than 15 minutes after the beginning of the carnage and after firing two warning shots, Captain Zhang Jun (not his real name), the Swat leader, gunned down a masked woman who threatened him with a knife; he later shot four of the attackers in 15 seconds. The incident was described by Beijing as a “terrorist attack”.
The Kunming massacre should, however, be seen in the perspective of the past events in the restive Xinjiang. Interestingly, some of violent happenings were triggered or occurred outside the western Province. On June 25, 2009, two Uyghur factory workers were killed and dozens injured in a huge brawl with Han Chinese in Shaoguan, in the southern Province of Guangdong. As retaliation, thousands of Uyghurs went on rampage in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, soon after security forces were sent to control the protest. According to Government sources, some 200 people died in the unrest and more than 1,600 were injured. Hundreds were arrested and at least 26 are sentenced to death. Uyghur sources said the number of victims could be as high as 500. ‘Ethnic separatist forces’ were blamed.
Since then, unrest has not stopped. One most sensitive incident occurred on October 28, 2013, when three Uyghurs belonging to the same family crashed their car into Chinese tourists on the Tiananmen Square, killing two. The occupants of the car later set themselves on fire. On January 15 this year, an eminent Uyghur academic (and Government critic) Ilham Tohti was detained by police and charged with separatism, carrying the death penalty. The list is indeed long.
Who were the Kunming ‘terrorists’IJ A Uyghur source in Kunming told Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur service: “I believe the attackers may have been a desperate group of Uyghurs who fled Xinjiang to Yunnan and were trapped there after the Chinese authorities discovered their plans to get across to laos.”
Mr Wang lixiong, the Chinese dissident, has his own perception of the Kunming incident. The outspoken writer knows Xinjiang well; he travelled there nine times between 1980 and 2007. After the Kunming attack, he wrote: “People asked how I look at the incident. The issue lies not in the incident itself but beyond it, and it has been long in the making.” Mr Wang quotes from his book My West China; Your East Turkestan (2007) in which he argues that the name ‘Xinjiang’ itself shows where the problem lies. He asks: “What is XinjiangIJ Its most straightforward meaning is ‘new territory’. But for the Uyghurs, how could the land possibly be their ‘new territory’ when it has been their home and their ancestors’ home for generationsIJ It is only a new territory for the occupiers.” He adds: “The Uyghurs don’t like to hear the name ‘Xinjiang’ because it is itself a proclamation of an empire’s expansion, the bragging of the colonists, and a testimony of the indigenous people’s humiliation and misfortune. Even for China, the name ‘new territory’ is awkward.” He rightly asks that if Beijing claims that Xinjiang has belonged to China since ancient times, why call it ‘new territory’IJ
Soon after the incident, The South China Morning Post quoted Mr Zhang Chunxian, Xinjiang’s party secretary: “We will properly conduct our work in Xinjiang under the leadership of the National Security Commission.” Does it mean that in addition to his other tasks, Mr Xi Jinping will also look after XinjiangIJ Is the situation so serious that the influential Small Group on Xinjiang can’t take care of itIJ In a panel discussion with ‘minority ethnic groups’ during the annual Parliament meeting, Mr Xi said that Beijing would build a “wall of bronze and iron” to defend “ethnic unity, social stability and national unity”. He added that the ethnic groups were “breathing the same air and sharing the same fate”. This is a great simplification, not to say distortion, of history. Mr Xi continued: “Unity and stability are blessings, while secession and turmoil are disasters. People of all ethnic groups of the country should cherish ethnic unity.”
Unfortunately for the leadership, ‘ethnic unity’ is not cherished today by the minorities resentful of Han chauvinism. Whether in Tibet, where the local population rarely uses violence but remains frustrated by the Central policies or in Xinjiang where the temptation to use violence is stronger (the proximity with Pakistan making things worse), Beijing has utterly failed in its so-called minority strategy. The circle of violence in Xinjiang makes it all the more difficult for the leadership in Beijing to tackle the New Dominio’s issue. Patience and wisdom are required; it is, however, not the forte of the Communist Party of China.