The Constitution stalemate in Kathmandu can soon escalate into a full-blown violent unrest on the streets of Nepal. It’s incumbent on the ruling coalition and its opponents to resolve the matter before that happens
Former Nepalese Prime Minister and senior Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai’s warning that violence can return to the streets of his country if the deadlock on the Constitution isn’t resolved soon, is to be taken seriously. The “extremist forces”, which he spoke of in his various interactions with the media and others during his recently concluded trip to Delhi, are not of a secret variety. They will not belong to the ruling Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-leninist). The two parties are poised to adopt the Constitution through a two-third majority which they enjoy in the Constituent Assembly, so they have no reason to agitate. Those opposing the Constitution in its present form and the effort to bulldoze the document through brute numerical strength, belong to Mr Bhattarai’s Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and its allies, the various Madhesi parties and the Janjatis. Clearly, then, the extremist forces will come from these ranks.
Three possibilities loom large. The first is that the UCPN (M) leads and actively participates in the (violent) unrest, as it had done during the People’s War which it waged for close to a decade before giving up arms and embracing the ballot box. The second possibility is that it does not take part in a violent movement but extends political support to it. And the third scenario is that while the Maoist party neither participates nor offers indirect backing, it also has no control over the mobs that take charge of the streets.
Given the UCPN (M)’s militant track record, the first option would not be difficult to execute. The party has a committed cadre, a well-oiled organisation and the unstinted support of an umbrella of ethnic parties (some of whom have indulged in serious violence in the last decade; the ethnic uprising in 2007 forced the Maoists to extend a hand of friendship to the Madhesi organisations) to do so. However, neither Mr Bhattarai nor the party’s chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ is keen on returning to the days of armed conflict. Not only have they seen and suffered enough — though they made gains out of it and from ending it — they are also basking in the glory of being hailed as peace-makers who gave up the gun and joined the political mainstream — or “created a new mainstream”, as Mr Bhattarai likes to say. They will lose global support, as well as India’s goodwill, in case they return to their roots. Moreover, the Nepali Congress and the CPN(UMl) will reap political mileage in case the Maoists take up arms again.
We then come to the option of the UCPN(M) extending political support to a violent movement, covertly or otherwise. The rogue elements can be let loose on the streets of Nepal, especially in the capital Kathmandu, and in the Terai belt which is the stronghold of the Madhesi groups. The Maoists can disclaim the affiliation of these elements, frown at the violence, but extend ‘in principle’ support to their ‘just demands’. This may not deceive anyone, but it will offer valuable leg room and leverage to the UCPN (M) to intervene and negotiate with its political rivals while maintaining a distance from the armed conflict.
But it is the third possibility which is the most frightening. What if neither Prachanda nor Mr Bhattarai has any control over the lumpen groups that take to the streets demanding a new Constitution that factors the concerns of the Maoists and the MadhesisIJ What if personal scores start getting settled through mob violence in the name of a fair and inclusive ConstitutionIJ If the Nepali Congress-CPN (UMl) regime cracks down on the blood-shedding protestors, will the Maoists and the Madhesis support that driveIJ These may be hypothetical situations, but the prospect of facing them is not dim. During his India visit, Mr Bhattarai made it known that armed unrest is a very real possibility, though his party fervently did not want to “return” to the path of violence.
The solution lies in engagement between the Maoists along with their allies and the ruling combine. Somebody will have to walk the middle path, and that somebody will have to be everybody. One thing is for sure: The two-third majority path will not lead to a solution. The numerical strength in the House does not in any manner address genuine apprehensions of large sections of the population that have been left out of not just the power structure of Kathmandu but also from the development agenda over the decades of monarch, aristocracy, monarchy again and then of the many post-monarchy Governments. To that extent, the Nepali Congress and its ally must be ready to accommodate. By digging in their heels, they will promote the impression of working against the interests of the sidelined majority. Nepal cannot afford another era of bloodshed — not even in the name of a just Constitution.
Mr Bhattarai does not have kind words for the parliamentary system that exists in Nepal (or in India, for that matter). He may have a valid point here and there, but he cannot forget that he has been a beneficiary of that very system not too long ago; and so has his colleague Prachanda. In fact, it was through this system, now being discredited by the Maoists, that the ‘change’ which Mr Bhattarai is today so proud of, could be concretised. In any case, it would not be advisable for the Maoists to open two battlefronts simultaneously: One for a fresh Constitution and the other to change the electoral system of choosing Governments. The two issues must be disentangled for now.
The UCPN (M)’s emphasis on having a Constitution which provides for the creation of States on ethnic lines (at least keeping in mind the larger ethnic groups) and offering them greater autonomy is somewhat at variance with the Maoists’ traditional thinking in favour of a strong Centre and distaste for social divisions on caste or ethnic lines. Mr Bhattarai strongly disputed this impression during an interaction and claimed that the Maoists had always backed the carving of States on ethnic considerations.
Aditya Adhikari, journalist and author of the very readable and elaborate account of the Maoist movement in Nepal,The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Story of Nepal’s Maoist Revolution, brings to the fore this dilemma. He writes, “…the Maoist position on ethnicity had inherent contradictions. Maoist leaders advocated ethnic autonomy and stressed the need to protect cultures… But the top Maoist leaders did not really value these cultures and traditions. As Marxists, they viewed all tradition as retrograde. Some of them even feared that the emphasis on ethnic rights and autonomy might fragment and weaken the nation”. But that was then and this is now.