Indian state, Naga rebels find common ground
Clichéd as it may sound, the Naga peace deal is a historic one. It is of the sort that comes but once in a generation and has the potential to be a major turning point in the path of not just one group or community but the nation as a whole. The deal, signed between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland led by Issac Chisi Swu and T Muivah, brings to an end one of the longest running insurgencies of not just India but all of Asia. It builds on an 18-year-long ceasefire agreement between the two parties, who have, since 1997, engaged in more than 80 rounds of talks. Hopefully, the fruits of peace that this deal should bring will be enjoyed in equal measure by the Naga people and the rest of the country.
Decades of insurgency has taken a huge toll on the Naga community, which has been squeezed between parallel power structures and now relegated almost to the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. The deal, if implemented effectively, should bring to the Naga people many opportunities for rapid development and prosperity. For the Indian state, the peace pact with NSCN(IM) is an important element in the larger effort to end insurgency in the North-East.
The Naga movement has been commonly referred to as the “mother of all movements” and it is believed that if it can be brought to a close, then the others, all past their prime anyway, will quickly lose sustenance. Once a durable peace has been established in the North-East, it will be easier to economically integrate the region into the Indian mainstream and also pave the way for India to improve its connections with south-east Asia through the North-Eastern States.
The details of the agreement are not yet available but the official statement issued on the occasion highlights the crux of the deal: On one hand, the “Government of India recognised the unique history, culture and position of the Nagas and their sentiments and aspirations”, and on the other hand, “The NSCN understood and appreciated the Indian political system and governance.” At the ground-level, this means two things: First, NSCN should have formally given up its demand for a Greater Nagaland or Nagalim, which would have covered all contiguous regions inhabited by the Naga people, including areas in Myanmar as well as in the States of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam.
Therefore, no changes in India's territorial demarcations are expected, with the insurgents having accepted Indian sovereignty, a key requirement for the Union Government. Second, the Union Government is expected allow greater autonomy to the Nagas and make a definite, more deeper, acknowledgement of their unique history. How exactly this happen will only become clear once the details of the agreement are known.
But suffice to say that the deal is proof of how both the Indian state and the insurgent leaders (who notably had rejected the first Naga peace deal — the 1975 Shillong Accord) have matured in their own ways to find common ground. While the former acknowledges that greater recognition of one constituent's ethnic diversity will not threaten its collective identity, the latter understands that being part of the Indian nation-state does not take away from its unique heritage and, in fact, offers better prospects for the community's welfare and development.