Chinese President Xi Jinping's grand ‘China dream' is gradually scripting the rise of the Middle Kingdom, but his new-found style of functioning may pose a threat either to his survival or to the Chinese Communist Party
Chinese President Xi Jinping is supposed to be the most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping, who has taken substantial steps so far to trim the ‘collective leadership’ and largely, the political clout of the People’s liberation Army (PlA). Today, Xi has been popularly described as the ‘chairman of everything’ as Australian academic Geremie Barme calls it. like his two predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, he heads the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), he is also the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and the President of China.
Besides, Xi has also occupied a number of other posts like he has been the head of a committee that he formed to steer ‘comprehensive reform’ and a very crucial one to oversee the China’s security agencies. He has rightly shifted from the path of ‘Peaceful Rise’, what his immediate predecessor Hu conceived as China’s future vision and mission to engage with the global community.
His grand ‘China dream’ is gradually scripting the rise of China under the larger-than-life shadow and regressive ideals of Chairman Mao Zedong. Even leaders like Deng, who commanded so much control over the party, was treading very carefully that his senior party colleagues were rarely annoyed with him while riding the country to the most difficult phase of market economy without shaking the tone and tenor of the CCP.
Today, Xi, with the same iconic style of Mao, is unfettered by such concerns of the core members of the CCP. Most importantly, he has widely encouraged the revival of unique term called ‘core’ or ‘hexin’, invented by Deng to refer to powerful leaders like Mao and himself. Unfortunately, the official media of the party has popularised the term and many Provincial chieftains have started addressing him as ‘hexin’.
The way Xi tries to concentrate on power and authority, which broadly symbolises the ‘personality cult’, truly violates the CCP Charter. A rule introduced in the party charter in 1982, prohibits any form of ‘personality cult’ which he has been promoting since he has taken over power three years back.
Arguably, the concentration of power is a double-edged sword, which might leave Xi exposed and potentially vulnerable to the ripples coming from the CCP.
However, China under Xi, is moving, despite the fact that many in the liberal camp have argued that its production fuelled growth model is no longer tenable. In 2013, American economist Pual Krugman predicted that China is about to hit the ‘Great Wall’, but Xi survived his ‘new normal’ which to him ‘a crucial rebalancing, one in which the country diversifies its economy, embraces a more sustainable level of growth, and distributes the benefits more evenly’.
Nevertheless, many say the key to success of the Communist regime is the ‘authoritarian adaptation’ which means the use of policy reform to substitute for basic institutional transformation. Though China has gone a long way since its post-Mao reforms of the late 1970s, yet the country demands more reform now under Xi.
For Xi, bringing reforms may not be easy as China currently needs harder reforms like removing state monopolies in crucial sectors of the economy, an impartial judiciary etc. These all can potentially threaten the very dominance of the party itself and Xi can hardly afford to move forward.
Xi is no Mao in the true sense of the term. Some old generation Chinese people may squirm the way he functions so reminiscent of Mao’s time, but fashioning Xi as Mao will do no good either to China or to the rest of the world. There is enough of evidence to support the view that China’s next decade, when a much younger generation of leaders will be taking over the leadership of the country, may be a turbulent one for sure.
Simultaneously, Xi has plenty of resources as well as liabilities, wide support from the public and large sections of the elite, vast foreign exchange reserves, a protected currency, a controlled banking system, party sponsored smart technocrats, a large real economy and most importantly, no perceived threat or rather an absence of any marked political opposition till date.
Hence, turning the tide in China may not be easy as the political system in that country is proved so far good at maintaining ‘order’. With Xi fast coming to the global stage, China’s future veered around hopes and fears as predicted by the liberal commentators mostly from America.
But many like Gideon Rose thinks otherwise, seeing a vast array of opportunity under the current leadership of China: ‘And it’s possible that the likeliest scenario will be neither crisis nor resilience but rather an eventual gradual political evolution….’.
In this, China may continue the cult of Xi, but when the baton passes on to the next generation, it may be so that as the Chinese authoritarian model is continually embracing market liberalism, it has to come along with a cost for sure. Surprisingly, Xi has completely ignored the hallowed guiding principles of the yesteryears, when Deng was putting 'economic construction at the centre' and now for him, politics always comes first.
Admittedly, many optimists still feel that Xi believes the time for bold economic reforms has not come yet in China. To him, first the party must clean up from deep-rooted corruption, else people may lose complete faith on it. Once his anti-graft campaign brings back the true image of the ‘people’s party’, he is likely to initiate economic reforms without disturbing the party system.
It has been predicted that he will unleash the much-awaited economic reforms only after the party Congress due late next year when many of his loyalists will be brought in crucial posts in the party. Besides, Xi’s decisive leadership style, backed by unmatched political power within the party and his relentless effort for refashioning a vigorous Chinese foreign policy have all together launched the country into a new realm of global dynamism which was not even visible during the peak of Deng.
As we move on, Xi’s new found style of functioning may pose either a threat to his own survival or to the CCP. As The Economist notes: “Either way, the success of Xi’s rule will rest not just on whether he wins the battles he has chosen to fight, but on whether he has picked the right ones. Seen from the point of view of China as a whole, it does not look as if he has. Xi seems bent on strengthening his party and keeping himself in power, not on making China the wealthier and more open society that its people crave”.
let’s wait and watch how Xi takes his new ‘cult forward’ and how the CCP bigwigs react to it, before it wreak havoc on the global political system.