New Delhi's U-turn on dialogue with Pakistan notwithstanding, it is now armed with a covert deterrence to press for a process of constructive engagement, while factoring in the spoilers. That’s a good development
Befuddled by New Delhi’s contradictory signalling on the India-Pakistan dialogue, Pakistan Ambassador Abdul Basit early this year playfully asked some Indian strategic experts when the dialogue would resume. God knows, someone equally befuddled, replied. Then the following morning, newspapers ran the headline: ‘Foreign Secretary Jaishankar to visit Islamabad as part of Saarc Yatra’. I, for one, thought that might be the moment for breaking the stalemate.
Wrong. It was the Ufa summit between the two Prime Ministers this month that broke the ice. Just about. Why the Government wasted 13 months to prove it was not weak like the previous Government but the more muscular no-nonsense establishment which had set a new bar for talks without impressing Pakistan and having to climb down, is anybody’s guess. On his recent visit to India last week, former Nepal Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ graciously confessed to Indian reporters that, as Prime Minister, he lacked experience and made mistakes.
In dealing with Pakistan, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has not understood that New Delhi cannot change Islamabad’s behaviour as it can Nepal’s or even Sri lanka’s, because Pakistan is a nuclear power seeking parity with India and will not bend before India — especially at a time when the regional geopolitics has altered in its favour. A change in Pakistan’s skewed civil-military balance which confounds the relationship, can be brought about only by the people of Pakistan.
The clear lesson from the on-off dialogue process is that it is better to stay engaged with Pakistan without being nudged by external powers than otherwise. Not talking to Pakistan is not an option. Isolating it has been tried but has also not worked. If there is anywhere that New Delhi requires to invest its strategic patience, it is with Islamabad. This is the carrot of a strategy where the stick has been missing for long, leading to our failure to influence or moderate the behaviour of the Pakistan Army, which calls the shots.
Our leaders are mistaken that heavy and intense fire power in response to Pakistani routine firing on the border is any victory. It results in unintended casualties and displacement of civilians on both sides of the border. Understanding the dynamics of firing on the line of Control and International Border is complex, particularly after India de-recognised the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan — which monitored the cease fire line — once its nomenclature changed to loC after the 1971 war.
The Pakistan Army has to resort to firing to help its terrorists to infiltrate to keep the Kashmir issue alive. Hence, the paramountcy of infiltration and Mr Basit’s contention that “J&K is the mother of all our issues; including terrorism and others which have their origin in J&K”.
India’s strategic patience will have to run its full course. There is no short cut. According to Brookings India-Pakistan Group’s Stephen Cohen, the no-peace no-war scenario will play out for 100 years, which means a wait of another 33 years.
While Pakistan, according to its estimate, has prosecuted a successful policy of cross-border terrorism, compelling India to deeply inordinately large numbers of security forces in Jammu & Kashmir to combat insurgency, as well as a more dangerous civilian unrest (as also periodic employment of ‘good terrorists’ like the lashkar-e-Tayyeba for big signature attacks outside J&K, like Mumbai) India has been both unable and unwilling to come up with a counter-narrative mixing hard and soft power. That deficiency, to the credit of this Government, has been and is being made good perceptibly and audibly. The stick is being undeniably wielded inside Pakistan, with the chorus of protests from Islamabad as proof of it.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have articulated the contours of an unconventional deterrence for punishing Pakistan for its legacy of misbehaviour. Mr Parrikar’s famous comments on use of terrorists to kill terrorists and lament over premature dismantling of ‘deep assets’ (read R&AW) have to be read with Mr Doval’s serial but veiled warnings to Pakistan. In public lectures, he has indicated India’s willingness to settle all outstanding issues with Pakistan through negotiations but added: “India will not be cowed down by nuclear blackmail to accept covert war.” He emphasised the need for an effective deterrent to deal with terrorism. But the turning point was his blunt threat: “You do another Mumbai, you lose Balochistan.” No leader in living memory has ever made such sharp and piercing comments as Messrs Parrikar and Doval; and Pakistan’s television channels have aired them on prime time.
Clearly, India has put in place a new covert response strategy which will levy costs and hurt Pakistan for cross-border terrorism, including any spectacular Mumbai-like attack. Armed with a deterrent that New Delhi has shown the political will to employ, it can confidently cruise into a dialogue process premised on the Ufa joint statement and undisturbed by the pyrotechnics on the loC
The Ufa summit laid out a familiar three-stage resumption of dialogue. The first stage is about restoring peace and tranquillity on the IB and loC through conversations between DG BSF and Pakistani Rangers and the two DGMOs in that order. These meetings will prepare the ground for exploring the policy of reinstating the 2003 CFA.
The revival of ceasefire would make the second stage conducive for talks between NSAs. They are to discuss all issues connected to terrorism. Under the old format, ‘terrorism and Kashmir’ — the core concerns of the two sides — were on top of the agenda of talks between the Foreign Secretaries. This apparent elevation reflects the mutual concerns on terrorism with Islamabad now shifting itself from a sponsor of terrorism to its victim. The third stage to discuss all outstanding issues at what level and format has not been spelt out. According to Pakistan NSA Sartaj Aziz, it could be discussed through a back channel. The back channel on Kashmir between 2004 and 2007 made outstanding progress to produce a four-point formula, that has not been disowned by either side.
The meetings to restore peace and calm on the border leading to talks between the NSAs require re-scheduling to enable the next probable summit between the two Prime Ministers on the sidelines of the UNGA in end-September to be productive. They could decide the next steps. New Delhi’s U-turn on dialogue notwithstanding, it is armed with a covert deterrence to press for a process of constructive engagement factoring in the spoilers.