India will have to live with an unresolved border dispute while Beijing dictates the terms of relations in other fields. Dismantling the status quo will depend on how soon India can catch up militarily and strategically
After back-to-back visits — probably the most intense in recent history and uncannily coinciding with the change of leadership in China and in the aftermath of the Depsang intrusion — by the Indian Ministers for External Affairs and Defence, the National Security Adviser and the Chinese Premier, it is clear that resolution of the India-China border dispute is firmly on the back-burner and the current focus is on maintaining a peaceful border. The three-stage Special Representatives’ dialogue for evolving a mutually acceptable border solution has failed, like previous efforts to define the line of Actual Control. Consequently, the SRs are engaged in strengthening Confidence-Building Measures and agreeing on a new Border Defence Cooperation Agreement. External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid recently said, “It does not help to hasten resolution (of the border) if you are are not ready”. This, after 15 rounds of SR talks, 18 points of consensus, several serious differences, including Chinese reneging on previous agreements like not disturbing settled populations, are out in the open! In short, the Chinese are asking for concessions in Arunachal Pradesh (read: Tawang) for concessions they will make in ladakh.
Chinese interlocutors I met recently in Beijing confirmed that neither side is ready to make concessions due to the absence of a strong leadership which can make compromises — they call this a “weak domestic situation” — and public opinion being against concessions. Not mentioned here is presumably the rigid stance of the People’s liberation Army, which Depsang demonstrated, leading to speculation that the party does not control the gun due to differences between the state and the PlA, as the latter reports to the party.
At another level, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi waxed eloquent at the recent Asean Regional Forum meet about the success of the 16th round of SR talks held between “two brothers”. He described Premier li Keqiang’s visit to India like “sowing seeds in spring and reaping fruits in autumn between natural strategic partners”. Mr Khurshid appeared to match these sentiments when he said, “Every step we have taken with China over the years is a positive step. There is no reason for alarm or discomfort”. These inanities stand out in sharp contrast to the China-Pakistan relationship as being between “iron brothers”, which keeps India anchored to South Asia.
The inventory of Chinese taunts, insults and lies is huge. The Depsang intrusion remains unexplained and, in the words of National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon, “Explanation was not asked for”. Major General luo Yuan’s tirade and warning issued on the eve of Defence Minister AK Antony’s Beijing visit last week is unprecedented. But then, this is part of a pattern that began in 2006 when the Chinese decided not ‘to hide their strength and bide time’. In 2010, on the eve of then President Hu Jintao’s visit to India, Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi told CNN IBN, “What you call Arunachal Pradesh, the whole of that area is disputed.” That same year, then Premier Wen Jiabao, who had famously said that, “India and China are friends 99 per cent of the time over 2,000 years”, had promised that the trade imbalance would be corrected. In 2013, Premier li repeated those words in New Delhi, and there is no doubt that his successor will say the same.
In 2010, China unilaterally reduced the length of its border with India from 4,000km to 2,000km, excising all of the Jammu & Kashmir border.
Despite the unfriendly Chinese sentiments and actions, Indian leaders ritually reiterate Tibet is part of China, though in the last two Joint Statements, this admission was missing. Further, our leaders even say they will not join any multilateral organisation to contain China. Why, when China does not lose any opportunity to do down India, regionally and multilaterallyIJ Next time, when the Chinese describe Arunachal Pradesh as ‘South Tibet’, India should say, “But Tibet is not part of China”. When they mention the capacity to muster 34 divisions, and flag 1962, New Delhi should remind them of Nathu la in 1967 and say, “We have the Dalai lama who is equal to 100 divisions”.
Before Mr Antony’s visit, the new chief of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, Mr Avinash Chander, explained India’s quest for a swift second strike and Agni 5 acquiring Intercontinental Ballistic Missile range — strategic signalling to China about deterrence parity. Raising the Strike Corp and additional offensive formations in the north to close the capability gap were carried by newspapers that led to the Chinese General’s strategic indiscretions.
Mr Antony’s passage to China was to repair defence ties ruptured in 2009 when the Northern Army Commander in Kashmir was given a paper visa which led to suspension of counter-terrorism exercises. These will be resumed next year and defence relations expanded with contacts between the two Air Forces and increased exchange in ship visits. Keen on joint exercises in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese have sought maritime cooperation including search-and-rescue and anti-piracy missions. More contact across increased number of border points and joint patrols are also slated .
The new Chinese leadership has emphatically returned the focus of engagement to the undefined border, probably by contriving Depsang or the PlA staging it anyway. Hence, the need for strengthening mechanisms for peace and stability on the border. On top of the existing 1993 and 1996 border CBMs, 2003 SR dialogue and 2012 joint mechanism on border, territorial and sovereignty issues and core interests, there is now the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement which is a synthesis of previous protocols intended to freeze the border dispute, to resolve which neither side is ready. Importantly, the word ‘stability’ has been added to ‘peace and tranquillity’.
But a codified perception of each other’s lAC, the lack of which has led to transgressions, is missing. Till 2003, both sides attempted an exchange of maps reflecting their lAC. In 2000, an agreement was reached on the Central Sector where the Chinese studied the Indian map without showing their own. It was then decided to shift from cartography to a political resolution, skipping a delineation of the lAC. That enterprise too has failed.
India will have to live with an unresolved border dispute while China dictates the terms of relations in other fields. Breaking the status quo will depend on how soon India can catch up militarily and strategically, and invent a leadership to face up to the Chinese. The question to ask is: Why is the Government of India not ready to negotiate the border disputeIJ The unpreparedness is due to lack of strategic thinking and foresight.