The creation of a permanent Chief of Defence Staff/ Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee was a political decision, given a bureaucratic and military colouring out of unfounded apprehensions
Trekking last week in the remote mountains of Pokhra, Nepal, which provides the strategic Gorkha connection, I was told by the Indian Army Pension Paying Colonel in Pokhra, Srikand Mooley, that the worthy lt General Anil Chait, currently Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, was slated to become the new Chief of Army Staff next month when incumbent, Gen Bikram Singh would be appointed the first Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, the middle path to the feared Chief of Defence Staff. He quoted The Business Standard as the source of the story. On returning to New Delhi, I checked the veracity of the stunning news. Thereafter, I am convinced it is wishful thinking.
The idea of a CDS/ Permanent Chairman COSC — currently it is a rotating post, the senior-most service chief assuming the appointment — has been doing the rounds since the early 1970 when the victor of the 1971 War, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, was expected to be appointed CDS. Of the Kargil Group of Ministers’ 340 recommendations, all but one, the CDS, were accepted. It was said the Government required greater political consultation on CDS. Suddenly in July 2001, Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar was sounded out about being appointed India’s first CDS. An office was earmarked and rehearsals of Guard of Honour held under supervision of Col KK Sharma, HQ Delhi Area. NDTV carried it as ‘breaking news’ throughout that day and the next. Then suddenly the screen went blank — end of CDS story.
The Naresh Chandra Task Force established in May 2011, unlike the Kargil Review Committee and the subsequent GoM on it which carried out the country’s first ever Strategic Defence and Security Review was tasked to ‘review existing processes, procedures and practices in the National Security System and suggest measures for strengthening national security apparatus, including non conventional areas having bearing on overall security’. Further, its members were not Ministers but retired civil and military bureaucrats. It was a limited effort.
The 130-page NCTF report was submitted in June 2012 to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who directed the Ministries concerned to submit their recommendations within three months so that by end-September 2012, the National Security Council Secretariat, headed by lt Gen Prakash Menon, could present a consolidated paper to the Prime Minister’s Office/National Security Adviser, Mr Shiv Shankar Menon. Not surprisingly, the Union Ministry of Defence first sat over the 97 issues raised in the report relating to the Defence Ministry, and when nudged, responded by rejecting the two key ones: Creation of a permanent post of Chairman COSC without undermining the autonomy of single service chiefs; and promotion of synergy in civil-military relations by cross-posting military and civilian officers up to the level of Directors over the next five years to each other’s headquarters.
Wanting to be seen as having introduced meaningful defence reforms, especially after Gen VK Singh’s pre-retirement outburst on ‘critical hollowness’ in defence preparedness, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had instituted a periodic review on the state of health of defence preparedness through 20-minute briefings by each service chief. As with most initiatives, this never took off, but had there been a fourth chief responsible and accountable for single point of advice, the Prime Minister would have interacted with one instead of three persons. The PMO and the NSA were not deterred by the Defence Ministry dragging its feet on the NCTF report. They have pressed Union Minister for Defence AK Antony to speed up further consultations and accept the two key recommendations. Mr Antony says more consultations are needed as the appointment invokes traditional fears about the knight in shining armour, mounted on a white steed, who would unleash a coup. This theory gathered traction after news reports that Gen VK Singh had ordered the movement of Special Forces into Delhi. A senior bureaucrat in the national security apparatus told me: “Gen Singh has dislocated our efforts to introduce the fourth General”.
Historically it was the Air Force which was the spanner in the works. The last chief, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, said he was not opposed to CDS per se but not its present form and added that for the next five to 10 years, it was not needed. Surprisingly, Gen VK Singh had also ruled out the appointment till ‘integration is done and we move towards theatre commands’. Apparently and suddenly, a dramatic transformation has taken place in the disposition of the Air Force, the consistent conscientious objector to single point of advice. The credit for creating consensus must go to the subtle and graduated approach of the NCTF, deft handling by Mr Menon and pragmatism among the services.
last month, at the Combined Commanders’ conference, addressing the Prime Minister, Chairman COSC, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne announced that “all three services have agreed to the appointment of Permanent Chairman COSC as an interim measure towards CDS”. This is a historic statement in unanimity of consent. The Prime Minister said that right structures for Higher Defence Management were urgently needed and if the Services were in agreement the political leadership would give the most careful consideration to their recommendation. This is a historic statement of intent. All this does not mean the fourth General will be appointed any time soon, certainly not next month.
Here are four reasons why the ‘feared idea’ will take time to fructify: The Prime Minister’s capacity to enforce any idea is highly diminished. Mr Antony is the operational Minister and will have the last word. He is status quoist, guided by babudom. He could do nothing to rein in Gen VK Singh, and that caused unprecedented damage to the image of the Army. The Government is licking the wounds of a massive electoral defeat which is the politically inappropriate environment for the landmark appointment of the fourth General. Mr Antony will not wish to disturb the chain of succession which he protected zealously recently. So, whatever has to happen will occur after Gen Bikram Singh’s superannuation in July 2014, and the decision will be taken by the new Government.
The fourth General is required for kickstarting an Integrated Defence Planning process for the next generation of reforms and carving out an institutional role for the military in decision-making and removing anomalies like ‘the defence of India is vested with the Defence Secretary’. The creation of a Permanent COSC/CDS was always a political decision which has been given a bureaucratic and military colouring out of unfounded apprehensions of the military doing a Musharraf.