US, Afghanistan squabble over new agreement
Afghanistan’s President, Mr Hamid Karzai, may well have his reasons for refusing to sign the long-worded Security and Defence Cooperation Agreement Between the United State of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and some may be legitimate. Perhaps he does not want to end his tenure with a pact that his rivals will flaunt as Mr Karzai's subservience to the US, and hold him derisively for ever. Or maybe he genuinely believes that an important piece of paper such as this agreement should be given a thorough consideration by his successor regime before it is inked. Whatever the case may, it is clear that Mr Karzai's refusal has led to an increase in acrimony between his Government and Washington, DC. The US has been for some time now impressing upon Mr Karzai that his failure to sign the pact could mean the complete end of American presence after the US-led Nato forces withdraw from Afghanistan in the summer of 2014. The warning has clearly not had the impact which the US hoped for. This is not the first time in recent months that Mr Karzai and the US have clashed. Earlier, sharp differences arose between the two allies over a proposal to involve the Taliban in talks and even lure them as a partner in governance. Both the US and the Afghan regime have blown hot and cold, with each accusing the other of pandering to extremist elements. In this accusatory game, neither Washington, DC, nor Mr Karzai seems to be giving enough attention to the fact that their skirmish — which is getting into a serious confrontation as the day for the withdrawal of troops draws near — can not just derail the more or less sound relationship the two have shared over the last decade but also give an upper hand to their rivals, primarily the Taliban, to engineer a comeback. The Taliban are already sensing an opportunity, given the less than effective administration that exists in many Provinces of Afghanistan and the growing resentment among the people consequent to the ineffective governance.
While the Taliban play the wait-and-watch game, they will be bolstered by the friction of the kind that has now arisen with Mr Karzai's refusal to sign the agreement. It is possible that the Afghan President may reconsider his decision and do the needful. If that happens, it will strengthen the bilateral relations between Washington, DC, and Kabul. If it doesn't, it could become a thorn in the flesh for the two parties as they work out their arrangement for the post-2014 scenario. But keep aside the political compulsions for a moment; both Mr Karzai and the US realise that Afghanistan will need the latter's support in the years to come — if not for anything, at least to rebuild its economy ruined by years of political instability and violence. If the two countries cannot agree on even a bilateral pact as friends, it is anybody's guess how far they can progress in less happier circumstances.