On the face of it, China’s decision to cultivate Pakistan as its satellite state makes geo-political sense. However, Beijing must consider the risks involved in an informal annexation of a country bristling with religious bigots
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi goes on his much anticipated Chinese return-state visit, is China in the process of informally annexing Pakistan, in a sort of neo-USSR embraceIJ Is it building a dragon-patterned Chinese screen, to replace the old Bamboo Curtain of the Cold War yearsIJ
This, even as there is great potential of the India-China relationship being ramped up to unprecedented highs, involving billions in Chinese investment and infrastructure know-how. India is also simultaneously cooperating with Japan with equal ardour, ignoring long standing Sino-Japanese antagonisms. It is also joining hands with both Russia and America wherever possible, particularly on the Make in India initiative. On this very trip, South Korea too may get involved with helping India build warships.
In fact, the Modi foreign affairs doctrine that has emerged over the year, stresses bilateral progress with all who can be mutually benefited. This includes Australia, Canada, France, Israel, the UK, and Iran; the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation at our doorstep, even Pakistan, if only common ground can be found.
And all this, without the traps of Nehruvian non-alignment, and the geopolitical blocks it had created in the past. India is, under Mr Modi, deliberately and pointedly side-stepping the bilateral antagonisms that may exist between some of our re-engaged friends and seeing its own way clear. But, yes, a big brother-ish Chinese move to become the dominant power is afoot in Myanmar, Sri lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, all part of a sinuous, metaphorical, New Silk Road, dreamt up by President Xi Jinping. All roads do lead to the erstwhile Middle Kingdom.
Could India fall to becoming a Chinese client-state tooIJ It seems highly unlikely, despite massive Chinese competitiveness, because of India’s size, engineering and software prowess, its geo-political importance to others, and the maturity of its democratic systems. India is militarily much weaker today than China, but may not remain so in the decades to come. And its GDP growth rate may be second to none for years going forward.
With Pakistan, there is no contest between itself and China. Pakistan has long been the recipient of Chinese largesse by way of infrastructure, nuclear and military hardware, and ‘most favoured nation’ treatment. This, even when Pakistan was partnering the US in the Afghanistan theatre. But what is the risk involved in an informal annexation of a country bristling with Islamic radicalsIJ It is one the Chinese seem willing to take, with the newly announced $47 billion investment corridor going right through the country in an explosion of fraternal affection. It boldly traverses Pakistan from China’s own restive Xinjiang Province, via Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the capital Islamabad, and on, across, all the way to Gwadar Port in Balochistan, on the Arabian/Persian Gulf.
The Chinese have earlier, already developed and modernised Gwadar Port to serve as their access to the oil rich Gulf region. And they are also mining for minerals in natural resource-rich Afghanistan. Is this massive ambition only fair and appropriate for a nation like China, with trillions in investible reserves, a slowing domestic economy and manufacturing export marketIJ Why should it not build up its regional and strategic footprint when it has such a compliant ally in PakistanIJ
Pakistan, which many call a failed Islamic state, besieged by its own radical fringe, ever ready to be used for a price, long dependent on hand-outs from both the US and China, will receive vital economic life support, along with the implied military security from this investment. India is seen to be not protesting the matter, partially because it would be futile. And partly because a Pakistan which is, in any case a semi-formalised satellite state of China’s, when brought into a closer embrace, will probably make for a more stable neighbourhood.
It is even likely China will get Pakistan to behave if its India relationship demands so, though China is also free to use Pakistan as a pressure tactic, its cat’s paw, as always, through our being part of the Soviet block years. Isn’t North Korea serving a similar purpose for Beijing too, and what can any other country, including the mighty US, do about itIJ
Pakistan, despite its ever increasing nuclear arsenal, will not want to engage India in formal military confrontation. But it can be an influencer and conduit, even a proxy player in the West Asian region, smarting at the geo-political shift of the US once again towards Iran, amongst the reduced clout of the oil rich region. The sulking is evident from the reluctant attendance at the forthcoming Gulf Cooperation Region Summit to be held in Washington, DC, and at Camp David.
The abiding worry and threat in Xinjiang and Pakistan alike, that won’t dissipate just because China seems undaunted by it, is from domestic, home-grown Islamic terrorism. In Pakistan it seems to be growing wings, recently bringing down a helicopter with shoulder-held missile launchers, downing two Ambassadors in the process. The target, however, was no less than Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself. These terrorists, grown powerful under Pakistan’s non-state actors’ policy, are now Frankenstein monsters, with many sympathisers in the Pakistani political, armed, and intelligence establishments.
How long, therefore, before these people get their hands on a nuclear weaponIJ And what will that mean for the Pakistani state and its Chinese patronsIJ India may be a declared target for being infidel and idolatrous, but it is not really the jihadi’s obstacle on the road to power and influence. And neither is the hoary-bug bear of Kashmir.
The highly militarised Pakistani state and its excellent intelligence organisation, the Inter-Services Intelligence, has long liked to believe it can use the Pakistani Taliban, the lashkar-e-Tayyeba and its affiliates, in Pakistan, across the border in India, and internationally, as a fifth column and to great effect. They are useful, per Pakistani covert policy, to wage guerrilla war and foment subversion wherever needed.
But, increasingly, as the terrorists have gained strength, they are less amenable to being controlled. The Pakistanis and their Chinese masters may be making a big conceptual and strategic mistake with regard to these non-state actors. They are not bound by any code or protocol. Kashmir is the flagged issue that these neo-jihadis are happy to keep alive, because it gives them freedom, money, arms, training, and political clout. But, as time goes on, it is control of the state itself that they want. It is the bigger prize by far, a nuclear armed Pakistani state, won, not via the ballot but by the jihadi bullet; with the infrastructure-building Chinese as partners by default.