Each day, each comment, and each upload on Truth Social obscures, rather than reveals, the social truth. No one knows what the US President Donald Trump wants from the Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yes, the former wishes to end the Ukraine war so that he becomes the frontrunner to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. But there is complete uncertainty about the relationship between the two leaders. Are they friends, as Trump has claimed several times? Are they enemies? Do they have a love-hate relationship?
A few days ago, Trump said that he was ready to impose fresh sanctions against Russia. What we had seen was the first phase, which included curbs against the buyers of Russian crude oil. The president had in his reserves a second and third phase. It was the day Russia continued its attack on Ukraine, with an offensive that is being claimed as the largest air strike since the war began. But as Trump refused to reveal his cards, i.e., if he has any, Russia stated that sanctions would not be enough to force it to back off.
Trump’s two presidencies have produced distinct chapters in the US-Russia relations. His initial “America First” approach during the first term disrupted established alliances, and led to pursuits that amounted to unpredictable outreach to Moscow. In his second term, he has emphasised normalisation amid the Russia-Ukraine war, and renewed bilateral summits, even as the global sanctions against Russia expand and enlarge. Together, these tenures reveal a complex blend of unilateralism, transactional diplomacy, and rapprochement.
When Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, Europe was roiled by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Hence, early on, he signalled a pivot toward normalising ties with Moscow, and argued that direct dialogue could accelerate a ceasefire. In February 2025, his first Oval Office sit-down meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, which was attended by the US Vice President JD Vance, turned into a public dressing-down.
Trump accused Zelensky of “disrespect” and “gambling with millions of lives,” and Vance scolded the foreign leader for failing to say “thank you” for the US past and ongoing military aid. The encounter ended in a kind of a verbal duel, and an abrupt collapse of a planned bilateral minerals-rights deal. Zelensky left with empty hands, without any agreements, either on the war or minerals.
Yet, later that day, Zelensky resorted to gratitude, despite the clear confrontation. He posted on X (formerly Twitter): “Thank you America, thank you for your support, thank you for this visit. Thank you @POTUS, Congress, and the American people. Ukraine needs just and lasting peace, and we are working exactly for that.” It seemed that Ukraine was ready for an American-enforced deal.
In August 2025, Trump hosted Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, to broker a peace deal. Though concrete breakthroughs proved elusive, Trump supported the Russian leader’s territorial solution, which envisaged more land that it had already captured in Ukraine. Trump touted the meeting as evidence of his unique access to Putin’s ear, and repeatedly promised renewed cease-fire talks. Zelensky backtracked, and point-blank refused to give such huge tracts of territory.
During the same months, February to August, as Trump explored peace overtures, his administration maintained the earlier sanctions on Russia, and expanded them. Simultaneously, he authorised continued US military aid and security guarantees for Ukraine. In fact, India was saddled with a 50 per cent tariff on its exports to the US because it purchased Russian crude oil. As Trump explained, this was the best way to deprive Russia of its money, and sink its economy. Best friend or worst enemy?
Rather a case of a combination of unilateralism, transactional diplomacy, and rapprochement. The fact is that Trump admitted that ending the Russia-Ukraine war has proven to be more difficult than he envisaged. “Frankly, the Russia one, I thought, would have been on the easier side of the ones (wars) I’ve stopped, but it seems to be something that’s a little bit more difficult than some of the others,” he said last week. In his bid for the Nobel, the US president takes credit for having stopped seven wars across the globe.
When Trump first assumed office in January 2017, he vowed to upend the US foreign-policy orthodoxies. He withdrew the country from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Paris Climate Accord, Iran nuclear deal, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. These moves signalled a departure from the three-decade-long post-Cold War engagements. It left Washington’s global leadership role in a flux, and raised questions about multilateral platforms.
Despite this unilateral posture, Trump cultivated an unusually warm personal rapport with Putin. Early in his first term, he praised the Russian as a “strong leader,” and downplayed Moscow’s interference in the 2016 American elections. The US intelligence agencies, however, concluded that the Russian meddling had taken place. There were reports that the Trump family benefitted from several deals that were pushed through, or supported by, the Kremlin.
In fact, in 2017, the US Congress imposed new sanctions on Russia for interference in the elections, and its role in Ukraine and Syria. The Ukraine war was still a few years in the future. Throughout Trump’s first term, the US administration targeted Russia’s energy sector, oligarchs, and intelligence services. In 2018, seven oligarchs, and the 12 companies they owned, were put under the scanner. Top Russian officials, including Putin’s ex-son-in-law, were sanctioned. After the Kremlin allegedly poisoned a former Russian spy, who escaped the west, the US restricted the exports of dual use technology to Russia. Still, the measures were criticised as half-hearted, half-baked or merely reactive, rather than proactive.
In security affairs, bilateral cooperation waned. Arms-control frameworks unravelled with the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty with Russia in 2019, while diplomatic channels on Syria and Ukraine remained strained. Even so, the Trump administration flirted with the idea of a “grand bargain” to resolve core disagreements. Such proposals never matured into substantive policies, which left Trump’s first-term as one that was characterised by transactional flirtation amid overarching frictions in the context of the US-Russia relations.
During both the tenures, Trump’s personal diplomacy and public statements shaped bilateral dynamics, reflecting a persistent blend of transactional pragmatism and improvisational flair. In the future, the durability of any US-Russia détente will depend on whether personal summits and sanction posturing can produce a sustainable settlement to the Ukraine crisis, or simply perpetuate another period of unpredictable and chaotic strategic competition.