No less than sixteen political parties have over the past few days attempted to scuttle the presentation of the Budget on the 1st of February as decided by the Government of India. This proposition has found resonance far beyond the political spectrum with eminent jurists as well as former Election Commissioners claiming this challenge as valid. However, as this article will attempt to suggest - all such criticism, should it be challenged in law would cement its status as a frivolity attempted to mask the possible debate on issues of relevance for the poll-bound states.
In order to answer the question of the validity of the Government’s move to bring forward the Budget it is essential to primarily understand the nature of the Budget itself.
As noted by the Constitution itself, specifically in Article 112, the Annual Financial Statement has the primary objective to reveal comprehensive information to showcase the financial position of the Government and enable the Parliament to debate the impact of such a program on the nation’s economy. It is common knowledge that the Rajya Sabha has a subordinate role with respect to financial matters but what is often overlooked is the primacy given to the Executive in our Constitutional scheme. In more specific terms, the Government must table all financial proposals and the legislature itself would have no power to increase such proposals. As exemplified in Article 113(3) of our Constitution, if such an amendment of increase were to be passed, it would be tantamount to a vote of no confidence.
Furthermore, the primacy of the Government’s role in budgetary procedures is further cemented by the scheme of the annual financial statement itself. The estimates of expenditure included in the Budget have to show separately the sums required to meet expenditure: (1) which the Constitution has charged on the Consolidated Fund; and (2) the sums from the Consolidated Fund required meeting other expenditure. Even though the expenditure contained in the first category can be discussed in both Houses, the same cannot be submitted to a vote, thereby remaining the exclusive domain of the Government. Thus, our Constitutional scheme itself gives the Executive widespread if not absolute powers in the call for finances. This position is perfectly summed up in Sir Erskine May on Parliamentary Practice as: “The Crown demands money, the Commons grant it and the lords assent to the grant.”
This brings us to the question of “WhenIJ” Criticism has been leveled at the identified date on two points: firstly, on the issue of procedure as to the ability of the Government to table a Budget that would adequately represent the position of the preceding year and second on the propriety of the Government taking such an action three days before Uttar Pradesh goes to polls.
The first criticism suffers from a logical gap as to what the Budget is in fact meant for in the first instance and the absolute discretion of the Finance Minister to make this decision in the second. Taking the first, as per the Constitution itself, the financial statement is prospective, that is, estimate of receipts and expenditure are always of the coming year. Similarly, Rule 213 of the Rules of the House of People makes it very clear that there is no bar on the presentation of more than one Budget in a year. This entails that if the Government so feels, it has discretion to table an Interim Budget when all information is not at its disposal. In fact, as noted in the treatises on Constitutional law by DD Basu, during election years it is common for the Budget to be presented twice a year, even as a vote on account is obtained in the first set of Budget prior to the General Election. This presentation before the lok Sabha elections is not an inviolable custom and was done in the very recent past by the previous Government’s presentation of the Interim Budget in February 2014. In terms of state elections too, the Election Commission in 2013 allowed for the Union Ministry of Agriculture to announce a new Minimum Support Price, despite elections in Karnataka. An argument to say that the Budget should not be presented before an election would be tantamount to arguing by extension, in an election year there shouldn’t be a Budget presentation at all, which would create an absurdity.
Additionally, the primary role of the Finance Minister in making such a decision is established by clause 2 of Article 112 of the Constitution itself. The clause specifically provides that the Finance Minister may present the Budget in any form he likes subject only to two conditions that he must show separately the sums charged and not charged on the Consolidated Fund as well as the expenditure on revenue account. The day for the presentation of the Budget has not been specified by any provision but on the contrary Rule 204 of the lok Sabha provides for such presentation on any day as the President, bound by the Council of Ministers, may direct. In this light, the only body of individuals mandated to influence such a decision is the Estimates Committee of the House, which may guide the Minister by making “suggestions”. Thus, constitutionally the decision of presentation is not one of information available but rests with the appropriateness to be decided by the Finance Minister.
Finally, the meat of the criticism directed at the date of Budget presentation is the question of propriety of such a move. In civilized societies propriety is judged on the legality of such actions. Although judging the propriety of actions before they have taken place is suspect, the law as it stands both in terms of the Representation of Peoples Act as well as the Model Code of Conduct allow for the presentation of the Budget as scheduled. In 2013, the Supreme Court in S. Subramaniam Balaji declared that promises made by a political party could not constitute as corrupt practice, more so if the Model Code of Conduct does not include such practice. With respect to Model Code, the provision cited to criticize the Budget date is as follows - “Ministers and other authorities shall not announce any financial grants in any form or promises thereof”. This provision cannot cover the Budget on multiple grounds. Firstly, it is not provided in the Constitution as to who will present the Statement in the two houses, therefore, the Budget itself goes beyond individuals. Secondly, the Code looks to outlaw the announcement of financial grants specifically; the Budget on the other hand is not a financial grant but an all-encompassing statement of a nation’s future economic status. Thus, most importantly, the Code is applicable to the poll bound states, which entails that a Constitutional mandate of the presentation of the Budget has a national character to it. This in itself makes it fall outside the scope of the Election Commission’s purview.
Any question on the date of presentation would not only question constitutional integrity but also more importantly bring into doubt such national character of the democratic set-up. Therefore, the Opposition to the bringing forward the date of the Budget is a red herring in the national political spheres. There can be no doubt the move is legal and mandated, the only question remains whether the voter in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Manipur and Goa believes so and much like the propriety of the Budget that is a question which the majority shall leave to the future.
(The author is a student of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata and the Indian Representative at the World Assembly of Youth.)