On 15 August, when India celebrates Independence Day, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan will mark four years in power. The day and date are symbolic in other ways. Both nations, along with China and Russia are involved in a new, more nuanced version of the ‘Great Game.’ Unlike the one played between the 1800s and 2000s (Russia, Britain, Europe and the US), the new sport is more economic in nature and less political, geopolitical and military. The players are situated in the East, rather than the West.
Historically, the term, ‘Great Game,’ was coined by a British intelligence officer, Captain Arthur Conolly, in the 19th century. It was during this time that England was involved in a conflict with the Russian Empire for domination over Central Asia. Hence, Afghanistan was the crucial playground. Later, the US was embroiled in the geopolitical and military plays.
The international community, except Russia, does not formally recognise the Taliban regime in Kabul due to its dismal human rights record. But over three dozen nations, including India, have extended humanitarian aid for the beleaguered Afghans. Under Neighbourhood First policy, New Delhi offers limited development support. But it keeps a hawk eye on the developments. Beijing is more aggressive and open.
India’s budgetary allocation under ‘Aid to Afghanistan’ is down. From budget estimates of `350 crore in 2021-22, it fell to `200 crore in 2022-23. The figure remained constant till 2024-25, though the revised estimates later put it at `50 crore. In 2025-26, Afghanistan was allocated `100 crore. This may indicate that India is losing interest in Central Asia, but it is not a correct perception.
One of the challenges that India faces is in terms of logistics in moving materials to Afghanistan. Land connectivity between the two nations is through Pakistan. The India-Iran Chabahar port project in Iran’s southern coast is expected to ease this knot. India set aside `100 crore for the project in 2025-26. Of late, China and Pakistan have taken a keen interest in Chabahar to further expand the former’s expansionist interests in the region.
To woo the Taliban, Beijing delivered in-kind aid valued at $31 million, including 50,000 vaccine doses, 40 tonnes of medical supplies, and a pledge of further concessional financing once the regime is “normalised.” In exchange, China seeks access to Afghanistan’s resources such as lithium, copper and natural gas, apart from transit corridors for its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Dragon is breathing fire at Uyghurs, a Sunni Muslim Turkic ethnic group based in China, who accuse Beijing of forcefully annexing their territory. China wants to ensure that the Muslim Taliban regime stays away from the Uyghurs.
Though China is yet to grant formal recognition to the Afghanistan government, it accepted the credentials of its diplomatic representative. It has exchanged delegations for “cooperation.” In May this year, Beijing hosted a trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was an attempt at making Kabul a party to theChina-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.
India is against it since it passes through parts of the China-occupied Ladakh and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. India has engaged with the regime in Kabul. India has forged partnership with multilateral organisations for this purpose. Altogether, it has provided roughly $50 million worth of assistance, including grains, medicines and clothing. Education and capacity-building programmes are a crucial aspect of India’s partnership with Afghanistan.
As a Parliamentary panel once stated, “India’s Neighbourhood First Policy is a dynamic policy that adjusts to our renewed interests in the region while evolving according to regional circumstances.” It added, “Being aware of China’s Belt and Road vision and America’s Indo-Pacific vision,”it was in “India’s strategic interests… to focus on wider engagements and deepening of ties with smaller neighbours.”
Thus, the “Great Game” continues in a new shape.