The book makes us aware of Kishtwar and why it is important in the Pakistani scheme of things for Kashmir, writes Rohit Srivastava
Kishtwar Cauldron
Author: Maj Gen GD Bakshi
Publisher: Pentagon, Rs 695
Few books arrive when most needed, most timely. That is why it is such a pleasant surprise to have Kishtwar Cauldron by India’s foremost soldier-scholar Maj Gen GD Bakshi, hot on the heels of the Eid riot in Kishtwar district of Jammu & Kashmir.
Kishtwar had been peaceful for so long that the riots came as a shock to everyone, including close observers of the Kashmir scene. Even the administration was not sure how to react, as a result of which there was avoidable delay in deploying the Army to bring matters under control. This book provides some answers to the questions thrown up by the recent Kishtwar riot and offers some solutions towards framing a comprehensive policy for the region.
Bakshi spent many years in the area as force commander, a period in which the Islamist jihad was at its peak. This is thus a profound insight from a soldier about the jihad in Kishtwar, which was unique in the whole phase of Kashmir militancy on account of its demographic composition and geography. Indeed, this uniqueness led the ISI to adopt an entirely different approach towards Kishtwar, which included a sinister plan of ethnic cleansing. That the plan is still on the separatists’ to-do list is evident from the Eid riot.
Jammu & Kashmir is home to a rich ethnicity, with large numbers of tribes, different religions, and a varied culture. This by itself is hardly unique in a country like India, but in Kashmir the diverse groups have historically lived in distinct geographical regions. Thus, the Kashmir Valley has a Sunni Muslim majority; Shias dominate the cold heights of Kargil; Hindus are dominant in Jammu; whereas the cold dry plateau of ladakh has traditionally been Buddhist.
This natural division has largely been responsible for the mostly peaceful coexistence in the State; but there are invariably tensions where two communities overlap. Kishtwar is one such place where the populations of Hindus and Muslims are almost equal (roughly 40:60). And this has brought Kishtwar at the forefront of the ISI-separatist agenda. It is a region where the objectives of jihad cannot be achieved easily. At the same time, the difficult hilly terrain and remoteness, reinforced by government apathy towards the region which has only one functional road, makes it difficult to defend. The book covers these aspects.
Maj Gen Bakshi is one of our highly experienced counter-insurgency commanders, with direct experience in both command and staff appointments. Above all, he is a thinking, analytical soldier. Thus, he meticulously chronicles the surge of insurgency in Kishtwar and the methods by which the Army fought and beat back the infiltrators.
This book is unique in many ways. First, it chronicles an important but little known story of the Kashmir counterinsurgency; second, it focuses upon a particular and treacherous region; third, it offers details which generally remain confined to secret operations reports and other files in military headquarters, and rarely see the light of day. The general reader thus gets a rare glimpse into the ideology, methodology, and objectives of insurgency from the perspective of a soldier.
There are many valuable insights into the mindset and methodology of jihad. The Wahabi/Salafi school of Islam, he observes, was employed by the ISI to subvert the syncretic Sufi form of Islam in Jammu & Kashmir. There was a concerted attempt to stamp out the Sufi culture and even destroy its shrines, such as Charar-e-Sharif, which was burnt down twice. Bakshi feels this probably became an extension of the CIA- and Saudi Arabia-funded mobilisation for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. But ultimately it backfired and singed the US itself in 9/11. Indeed, it was one of the worst instances of blowback in the history of covert operations.
Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s tidy jihad on Jammu & Kashmir was a spinoff of the war the ISI waged in Afghanistan on behalf of the CIA. In fact, Zia tried to establish a new caliphate in Islamabad to destabilise the whole of Central Asia, Caucasus, Xinxiang and South Asia with a new ideology of militant mobilisation based upon an extremist interpretation of jihad.
The contemporary tension in Kishtwar, he notes, is dangerous because communal passions are being deliberately stoked there. The then minister of state for Home, Sajjad Kitchloo, also the local MlA for Kishtwar, was present in the district for three days when the arson and looting took place. This shows that competitive politics of a very base kind was being pursued in Kishtwar. Worse, there was, perhaps still is, an attempt to disarm the village defence committees that were set up at the height of the insurgency and were instrumental in safeguarding the Dogra community from the ISI-backed attempted genocide and ethnic cleansing campaign in the 1990s and early part of this century.
Bakshi emphasises that given the expected renewed jihadi offensive in 2014 (after US troops depart from Afghanistan), the disarming of the VDCs would be a sinister game plan, tantamount to opening the gates for the barbarians. How, he questions, can India afford to dismantle its defenses before an inevitable onslaughtIJ Obviously, there is need to be vigilant to ensure that the fragile peace gained at great cost is not disrupted by the ISI and its local fifth columnists.
Kishtwar Cauldron makes one aware of everything worth knowing about Kishtwar region and its role in defeating the Kashmir insurgency.