Moon Jae-in’s visit to Washington is a powerful and symbolic show of his personal commitment to South Korea’s alliance with the United States despite the fact that both he and President Donald Trump are not on the same page on several issues. RAJARAM PANDA decodes the dynamics
Just two months into office, South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in had his first summit meeting with the mercurial US President Donald Trump on 29-30 June in Washington. Given the circumstance in which domestic politics unfurled in South Korea, leading to the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye and thereby necessitating early election catapulting Moon’s entry to the Blue House and ending nearly a decade of conservative rule, Moon’s summit meeting with Trump assumes significance. While the liberal Moon has pledged to eschew the hard-line approach pursued by his two conservative predecessors and choose instead an engagement strategy towards North Korea, Trump has upped the ante to punish North Korea unless the latter gives up its nuclear and missiles development programme and declared that all options are on the table, including military strike, to force compliance from Pyongyang. So, it is pertinent to analyse what really transpired at the summit between the two leaders on the North Korean issue. Of course, there were other bilateral issues such as economic that figured in the agenda. Trump too is reaching out to Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on how to deal with North Korea.
Moon’s four-day visit, his first overseas trip since taking office in May 2017, is a powerful symbolic show of his personal commitment to the alliance relationship with the US, despite the fact that both he and Trump are not on the same page on several issues. But the truism is neither can do without the other. Hidden underneath was the urgency of developing trust and a good rapport between the two leaders and this was premised on a common understanding of issues.
As said, Moon carried his own baggage to Washington. Representing the progressive wing of South Korean politics, it was necessary for Moon to establish an early understanding with Trump. Notwithstanding the differences in perceptions in dealing with North Korea, there was no real hurdle in sharing their views on the North as Moon too had expressed frustration with the continuous missile launches by the North disregarding the peace overtures made by Moon. At the hindsight, Kim Jong-un has lost a golden opportunity by not responding positively to Moon’s offer. Kim should have taken advantage of Moon’s offer and gained from the economic assistance by at least agreeing to sit across the table and suspending the missile launches as the first step. It defies any rational explanation how a country in possession with nuclear weapons but remains isolated from the world can survive even when its peoples are malnourished and live in poverty.
The circumstances in which Moon came to power resulted in high public ratings. While Park’s rating nosedived to just four per cent, Moon’s skyrocketed to around 80 per cent. Past South Korean Presidents had virtually mortgaged the country’s foreign policy to the US, which had pursued a hard-line policy towards North Korea. Moon is convinced to change this course. The question is: Can he succeedIJ Any answer to this would be premature at the moment. Moon needs time to experiment his new idea.
Does this imply that his plan to bring back the basic of the old Sunshine Policy and constructive engagement can have any futureIJ In this, Moon is likely to get overwhelming support at home as popular opinion tends to endorse dialogue as the ideal way to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issue. Moon’s idea to achieve his aim by fostering economic cooperation, despite pitfalls, as a way to raise living conditions of North Korean people would have high economic costs to South Korea. The logical question, therefore, is: Are the people prepared to shoulder the financial burden, if the ultimate goal is to seek unification by economic diplomacyIJ According to a study done by Rand, reunification cost could top a staggering $2 trillion, of which $500 billion for military operations, $500 billion for damages, and $1 trillion to rebuild the economy of the North. If this is compared to the cost that West Germany had to bear when both West and East Germany were unified, around $1.9 trillion, the task for Moon seems to be onerous because the economic situations of East Germany then and North Korea today are just not comparable. Yet, Moon deserves a chance at least to experiment, if North Korea cooperates.
But South Korea is caught in a web of strategic matrix where both the US and China jostle for strategic advantage over the Korean peninsula. It is here, Moon could be constrained to experiment on his ideas as neither the US not China would allow Moon to have a free hand. Neither Moon would find himself in a comfortable position to do what he wants to do; the situation is too complicated to allow Moon that freedom. Should that mean Moon have to go along with other stakeholders whose stands remain to seek harsher ways to punish PyongyangIJ That seems to be the realistic picture unless Kim warms up to Moon’s peace overtures.
North Korea’s threat unnerves South Korea. The US is bound by alliance relationship to defend South Korea if it comes under attack. But the US is angered as Pyongyang is increasing hostility by developing the capacity to strike the US mainland with a nuclear weapon, which is why Trump keeps all options open. China’s stake is equally high as it is worried about a North Korean implosion. In a wildcard scenario, unlikely for some time, of a regime collapse, millions of North Koreans shall enter China as refugees, an unwelcome prospect for China. This single consideration compels China to keep Pyongyang afloat and despite some support to impose sanctions against the North Korea, it continues to remain its lifeline. Beijing would be unwilling to yield strategic space to the US by allowing US troops closer to its border.
Moon is caught in this complex web of strategic ambiguities and can neither afford to annoy either the US or China. While South Korea needs the US for its security, it cannot displease China either as it is its largest trading partner. When China took some punitive actions against South Korea over the THAAD issue, it hurt South Korea. Moon is aware that the value of his country’s exports to China is more than double that with the US. China has already threatened more economic repercussions if Moon does not halt deployment of the pending four THAAD batteries. Steering a path from this complex situation is one of Moon’s biggest dilemmas.
So, how did Moon react when Trump declared during their meeting that the “era of strategic patience with the North Korean regime has failed” and US has run out of “patience” with North Korea and vowed a “determined response” against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programsIJ While both Trump and Moon differ on the quantum of pressure to be put on North Korea giving up its weapons programs, both the leaders presented a united front. Both seemed to have reached a “broad consensus” on issues ranging from defence ties to the North Korean nuclear issue. Notwithstanding his intention to engage North Korea, Moon announced in Washington that the “North Korean issue must be resolved without fail” and that, “North Korea should by no means underestimate the firm commitment of Korea and the U.S. in this regard”. Interestingly, while Trump focused more on applying additional pressure, Moon wanted both “sanctions and dialogue”. Moon feels that sanctions alone cannot solve North Korea’s nuclear problem. At the same time, he concedes that “right conditions” are needed for dialogue.
What went unnoticed by security analysts of the region was the stark personality differences that the two leaders showed in the potential areas where they have disagreements. Interestingly, at the time of presidential campaign, Trump had criticised harshly South Korean trade practices and slammed Seoul for not paying enough for defence protection from the US. But during the summit, Trump assured Moon that the US “will always defend” South Korea as an ally, while emphasising on burden-sharing aspect.
Given the regional complexities with strategic calculus of each wavering over the other, can a hawkish Trump and dovish Moon conduct peaceful businessIJ Each stakeholder has compelling strategic compulsions which they find difficult to dispense with, leaving little room for flexibility. In this situation, having dialogue and discussion could face insurmountable hurdles. And yet, Moon showed immense maturity in engaging Trump without sacrificing his own policy of engaging the North diplomatically. Such a stance can now obfuscate Seoul’s concerns on Trump’s protectionist rhetoric and protect the life of the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement.
On the security front, while the alliance relationship remains intact, there could be a thaw on the issue of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment. Moon could ill afford to overturn the decision already taken and cannot overlook that Trump was “furious” when rumours surfaced that Moon wanted to suspend the full deployment of the launchers. With two leaders in opposite spectrum, the security dynamics in Northeast Asia is now in uncertain terrain.
Prof Panda is the Indian Council for Cultural Relations India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan. The views expressed are his own and do not represent the ICCR’s or the Indian Government’s. rajaram.panda@gmail.com