Constitutional revision debate in Japan

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Ever since Japan’s Constitution was promulgated 70 years ago, not a single change has been made in it. But PM Abe wants to change this trend and has resolved to complete the process before his term ends, writes Rajaram Panda

In an extremely controversial and massive shift for the country’s pacifist stance, Japan’s Cabinet took a historic decision on July 1, 2014 — ‘Development of Seamless Security legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People’ — that will allow the Government to reinterpret the Constitution allowing limited exercise of the right of collective self-defence. The Shinzo Abe Government hoped that the new legislation will enable Japan to coordinate with the United States and other members of the international community, thereby contribute to solidifying its peace and security.

It was not easy for the Abe Government to reach such a historic decision. The liberal Democratic Party (lDP) had policy differences with its coalition partner, the New Komeito, which wanted the Government to pursue a cautious approach on permitting Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence. But protracted efforts on Abe’s part finally led both the parties to find middle ground and reach an agreement. Under the Government’s reinterpretation of the Constitution, particularly Article 9, Japan will now be able to use the minimum necessary force when there is an armed attack on a foreign country with which Japan has close relations.

The question that arises is: Why did Abe feel the need for such a foreign policy activism at this point of timeIJ Since the end of World War II, Japan backed by its ‘Peace Constitution’, adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, and not become a military power that could pose a threat to other nations.

By observing the three non-nuclear principles, Japan flourished as an economic power and distributed the economic dividends to its people. But since then, the changed security environment in the region exposes Japan’s vulnerability.

Implementing the law   

March 29, 2017, marked another significant landmark in Japan’s security policy as it marked one year since the Shinzo Abe Government enacted the new security related law that significantly broadened the scope of the country’s Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) activities, including enabling the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defence. The law also gave the SDF personnel on UN peacekeeping operations greater authority to use their weapons.

Post-Trump situation

This situation has somewhat changed after Donald Trump took over the US presidency. He has demanded greater security burden from the allies — Japan and South Korea — by way of paying more to the cost of the US forces stationed in the bases. He made further controversial statement that the allies might even think of acquiring their own nuclear weapons to defend their countries. Such statement was alarming to the people in both Japan and South Korea, though emboldens the hardliners and conservatives to demand for revisiting their nuclear options. The situation, however, during the pre-Trump era was not dramatically different as the clamour for revising the nuclear policies existed but was dormant. That voice gets more currency now.

How has Japan been able to use this new law for the country’s security during the past one yearIJ And what changes have occurred in the security environment in Japan’s neighbourhoodIJ Without doubt, threats from North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programmes have increased. The firing of a series of missiles by North Korea, including two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on July 4 and 28, that landed in the Japanese waters, is a matter of concern for Japan. The SDF has a legitimate right under the new law now to monitor the Sea of Japan. The Maritime SDF of Japan can now engage its Aegis-equipped vessels round the clock to intercept any incoming missiles. If tensions heighten, Aegis destroyers from the US Navy’s 7th Fleet will also jointly monitor the situation. Even here, there are various interpretations on the use of force.

North Korean threat

Each time North Korea launches a ballistic missile, it is an indication of having made further advances in its missile capabilities. The one fired on July 4 flew for about 40 minutes and travelled around 930 km. It was the 10th occasion in 2017 that North Korea fired a ballistic missile. The one fired on July 28 had similar range. On June 8, it fired several surface-to-ship cruise missiles as well. Much hope rests on China to exercise its influence on North Korea to change course. But China is either incapable or unwilling to exert any pressure on Pyongyang owing to its own strategic compulsions.

Japan faces limitations

Even though North Korea fired two ICBMs in July in Japanese water, exposing the latter’s vulnerability, Japan remains unclear on what sort of response it would adopt if the same kind of missile flew over it in the future to target the mainland US. The prospect of an ICBM fired by North Korea in the future flying through the sky over Japan and towards the US became a more realistic possibility after the US confirmed that the missile fired was an ICBM. Though Japan’s security related legislation came into force in March 2016, making it legally possible for Japan to intercept such a missile, Japan can only conduct such an operation under strict conditions. 

The legislation of March 2016 incorporated three new conditions on the use of force set forth by the Cabinet decision of July 2014 to reflect a change in the interpretation of the Constitution. These conditions are: An armed attack occurs and threatens Japan’s survival; there are no other appropriate means to protect Japan’s people; and use of force is restricted to the minimum necessary. Japan will be able to use force and shoot down a ballistic missile heading towards the US only if these three conditions are met.

Revising Article 9

The above limitation and constraint brings into discussion the issue of Constitutional revision, especially Article 9. Ever since Japan’s Constitution was promulgated 70 years ago, not a single change has been made in the document. However, Prime Minister Abe wants to change this trend and has resolved to complete the process before the end of his time in office. The document adopted under the US occupation had changed the balance between the state and Japanese society as well as the trajectory of Japan’s relations with the world. Abe wants to change this so as to reflect the current world situation.

Abe’s task is not easy. While the Opposition decries his focus on the nation’s military, there is no consensus even within the ruling lDP. Even before initiating any move to alter Article 9, Article 96 that sets forth the revision process needs to be amended. The first step in any attempt to revise an Article of the Constitution is that the proposal has to be passed by both the Houses of the Diet with a two-thirds majority. If the proposal is passed, the second step will be to put the proposal for a national referendum in which majority of the eligible voters of the country must endorse before the amendment takes effect. Given the reservations among the various political parties, including those by some within the ruling party, on tampering Article 9, and also given the strong anti-militaristic stance of the people, it seems that Abe’s objective is destined to be unrealisable.

Any attempt to revise Article 9 by the Abe administration is likely to be seen critically in China and South Korea in the prism of history’s shadow. Even within Japan, there are deep passions in the people about the Constitution’s influence on society and they will be unwilling to see any change.

chinese Response

China perceives Abe as a nationalist who is determined to dramatically alter Japan’s security posture and revision of Article 9 is the prerequisite. China sees Abe’s slogan during the election campaign to “take back Japan” as meaning to take back Japan’s Army by the American occupation forces, and therefore, alarming as such a policy could challenge the liberal order that the Japanese people have embraced for the past 70 years. China’s fear also stems from the perception that Abe is undermining popular opinion against revision as demonstrated by many opinion polls by the Japanese media. China fears if Japan shall continue to maintain its pacifism or opt for a robust military posture and sees Abe’s policy from such a prism.

South KoreaN Response

like China, Japan-South Korea relations suffer from the shadow of history. Most Koreans are against Japan’s Constitutional reform and consider it as a sign of Japan’s revert to militarism. The issue of comfort women — a euphemism for sex slaves of Korean women used by Japanese military to work in war front brothels during the World War II — continues to haunt bilateral ties and is a constant irritant, fanning anti-Japanese feeling in South Korea. The common threat of North Korea has not helped improve the Korean perception of Japan either.

However, there is also another view in South Korea that tends to take a softer perspective towards Japan. For example, Seong-ho Sheen of Seoul National University is of the opinion that Japan is unlikely to have any desire to return to militarism as its people feel that they are the greatest victims of such a past. He argues that with a super-aging population and a shrinking economy, Japan is unlikely to have the appetite and capacity to become an expansionist power if it wanted to. However, Sheen’s views belong to the minority opinion among both the educated intellectuals and the commoners in South Korea.

Given the Prime Minister’s determination, can Japan finally find itself on the cusp of acquiring its own militaryIJ That would not be easy. Though strengthening its militaristic posture in the wake of Chinese assertiveness on territorial issues and North Korean threat could seem to be a valid reason for a reasonable response, the path to assume such a posture is never smooth. Abe has to cross several hurdles, some of which appear insurmountable. To the outside world, Japan’s SDF is just military in all but name and what Abe wants is to give it a legal legitimacy. If China does not halt its aggressive posture and North Korea does not pause its nuclear and missile programmes, public opinion in Japan might swing swiftly in favour of amending the Constitution and a referendum would then no longer be a hurdle. At the moment, however, it appears to be a mere will o’ the wisp.

(This article is based on a lecture delivered by the author at Rio Branco Faculdades Integradas, Sao Paulo, Brazil, on August 18)Professor (Dr) Panda is ICCR India Chair Visiting Professor at Reitaku University, Japan. The views expressed are his own and do not represent either of the ICCR or the Government of India. Email: rajaram.panda@gmail.com