The dialogue must be comprehensive but Paresh Barua’s absence, who continues to maintain an anti-talk stance, doesn’t make it all-inclusive
If reliable reports are anything to go by, formal dialogue with ULFA (Pro-Talk)-which began in 2011but hadstalled with the end of the interlocutorship of A.B. Mathur-is, in all probability, going to experience a revival soon. By all accounts the last round of talks ended on a positive note with the organisation expressing its satisfaction about the initiatives which New Delhi has taken.
ULFA's 12-point charter of demandswas formally handed over to New Delhi on August 5, 2011. The demands were broad in nature and scraped out by the Arabinda Rajkhowa faction of ULFA (Pro-Talk from a 37-page charter that was presented to the Pro-Talk group by Sanmilito Jatiyo Abhiborton, the civil society body that took the initiative to bring about an interface between the faction ofthe ULFA and the government.
Not all the demands are unreasonable, such as prevention of illegal migration from Bangladesh and correct redressal to the problem of floods in Assam. Demands such as Constitutional reforms may not be acceptable to New Delhi, but negotiations always proceed from the intractable to the acceptable by application of compromise.
How far is New Delhi prepared to go in its accommodative posture vis-a-vis the demands of ULFA (Pro-Talk)?It can possibly grant of some rights to backward states, especially by way of rights over natural resources and land, prevention of illegal migration and proper management of floods.
There have been myriad attempts to engage the ULFA in a dialogue in the past. But the process has never quite reached a station that it is presently positioned in. Indeed, for the first time ever a solution seems to be within arm's reach, and one that could be acceptable to the pro-talk faction of the organisation. But an important question that is also being raised is whether there is merit in talking to a group that holds the guns, or with one that has no guns.
Moreover, there seems to be a more mellowed ULFA chief of staff, Paresh Barua, as compared to his earlier avatar who would not be moved from his position that sovereignty of Assam must be discussed. Baruah and his faction, albeit considerably depleted as a result of desertions, have also made welcome announcements by way of three back-to-back unilateral ceasefires. These are interesting pointers which both New Delhi and Dispur should take note of and take steps to anvil a comprehensive peace process with a unified ULFA.
To return to the ULFA, New Delhi must be ready to provide certain concessions, some of which may even be unacceptable. Indeed, it may wish to actually profitably gain from the close nexus that ULFA has with NSCN (IM), aiding thereby the vexed interstate boundary problem. It can also witness economic development, further people to people interface and thereby providing a fillip to the "Act east Policy". It must also be caveated at this juncture that the cadres of the organisation should be rehabilitated in a manner that would make them self-reliant. Mere transfer of funds would disallow them from standing on their own feet and could witness a scenario of return to belligerence. The accent should be not to present them fish to eat, but teach them how to fish for anhonourable livelihood.
New Delhi can hold talks only within the ambit of the constitution and after such groups abjure violence. Dialogue with ULFA must be a comprehensive affair. Dialogue in the absence of Paresh Barua, who continues to maintain an anti-talk stance, is not going to be all-inclusive. The analogy that can be proffered at this juncture is to stress on the point as to whether"peaceful nights would prevail if even one tiger out of the nine caged is on the prow".
The point about Paresh Baruah is particularly important since he has declared a unilateral ceasefire, but because Chinese or Pakistani interests seem to be continuing to chaperon him, and may even prevent him from returning to India even if he wishes to. A psychological profileof Paresh Barua leads to the summation that hedoes not quite perceive a role for himself in a peaceful settlement. He prides on his "military" innards, considers himself to be a modern day LachitBarphukan and would, if the need arises, go down fighting.
In any event, the fact of the matter is that only a dialogue with a united ULFA would entail a peace process that can be said to be a comprehensive affair.
(The writer is conflict expert and author of books on security and strategy. The views expressed are personal.)